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ABSTRACT  
The Peruvian Andes are one of the most important water sources for the country. 
Therefore, their exploitation might pose critical threats for local farming activities, 
national economy, and water quantity and quality. At the same time, the Andes have 
experienced activities of the mining industry over the last decades, which has boosted 
the national economy. The mining concessions and operations have brought together 
campesino communities and mining companies. This has led to the escalation of 
conflicts due to mining impacts on water, the mining-related misinformation, the 
distribution of mining royalties, and the compensations in return to the rent of 
campesino community lands to mining companies. Focused on the farming-mining 
lands, this research adapts mixed-methods to analyze the land-use conflicts and to build 
a risk index to support decision-making processes. It aims to evaluate the 
environmental, social and institutional roots of land-use conflicts to model conflicting 
situations between the small-scale farming communities and mining companies. It 
follows four key objectives. First, the analysis of heavy metal concentrations in water 
and soil with land-cover classification and participatory mapping allowed the 
measurement of key biophysical parameters in farming-mining lands. Second, mixed-
methods via semi-structured surveys, in-depth interviews, social and content analyses 
were used to assess the social and institutional aspects related to the management of 
water and soil. Third, the results from the multi-criteria analysis were compared with 
content analysis, surveys and interviews to integrate and consolidate the 
aforementioned biophysical, social and institutional components in a theoretical 
framework and land-use conflict risk index. Fourth, three main scenarios were 
developed to simulate the conflicts between communities and mining companies. The 
resulting land-use conflict risk index can provide a useful decision-making tool for the 
governments to tackle conflict management through revealing the conflict-triggering 
criteria and indicators. Furthermore, this is the first interdisciplinary research that 
depicts a thorough understanding of the interaction of the fourteen studied campesino 
communities with state institutions, civil society, and mining companies once the mining 
concession is given.  
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KURZFASSUNG  
Die peruanischen Anden sind eine der wichtigsten Wasserquellen des Landes. Daher 
könnte ihre Nutzung eine kritische Bedrohung für die lokale Landwirtschaft, die 
Volkswirtschaft sowie die Wassermenge und -qualität darstellen. Gleichzeitig haben die 
Anden in den letzten Jahrzehnten eine potenzielle Bergbauindustrie beherbergt, die die 
Volkswirtschaft ankurbelt. Die Bergbaukonzessionen und -aktivitäten haben 
kleinbäuerlichen Gemeinden und Bergbauunternehmen in den Anden 
zusammengebracht. Die Bauern sind aufgrund der Auswirkungen des Bergbaus auf das 
Wasser, der Bergbau-verbundenen Fehlinformationen, der Aufteilung der 
Bergbaugebühren und der Ausgleichszahlungen für die Verpachtung ihres Geländes an 
die Bergbauunternehmen in Konflikte geraten. Diese Forschung konzentriert sich auf 
bergbau-landwirtschaftlich genutzte Gebiete und verwendet gemischte Methoden, um 
Landnutzungskonflikte zu analysieren und einen Risikoindex zur Unterstützung von 
Entscheidungsprozessen zu erstellen. Diese Doktorarbeit zielt darauf ab, die 
ökologischen, sozialen und institutionellen Ursachen von Landnutzungskonflikten zu 
evaluieren, um Konfliktsituationen zwischen kleinbäuerlichen Gemeinden und 
Bergbauunternehmen zu modellieren. Diese Forschung verfolgt vier Hauptziele. Erstens 
ermöglichte die Analyse der Schwermetallkonzentrationen in Wasser und Boden mit 
dem Klassifikationssystem der Bodenbedeckung und der partizipativen Kartierung die 
Messung der wichtigsten biophysikalischen Parameter in bergbau-landwirtschaftlichen 
Geländen. Zweitens wurden gemischte Methoden mittels halbstrukturierter Befragung, 
der Tiefeninterviews, der sozialen Analyse und Inhaltsanalyse verwendet, um die 
sozialen und institutionellen Aspekte im Zusammenhang mit der Bewirtschaftung von 
Wasser und Boden zu bewerten. Drittens wurden die Ergebnisse der 
Mehrkriterienanalyse mit Inhaltsanalysen, Umfragen und Tiefeninterviews verglichen, 
um die oben genannten biophysikalischen, sozialen und institutionellen Komponenten 
in einen theoretischen Rahmen und einen Landnutzungskonflikt-Risikoindex zu 
integrieren und zu konsolidieren. Viertens wurde die Entwicklung von drei 
Hauptszenarien durchgeführt, um die Konflikte zwischen Gemeinden und 
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Bergbauunternehmen vorherzusehen. Der Risikoindex des Landnutzungskonflikts kann 
der Regierung ein nützliches Entscheidungsinstrument zur Bewältigung des 
Konfliktmanagements liefern, indem er die konfliktauslösenden Kriterien und 
Indikatoren enthüllt. Darüber hinaus ist diese Doktorarbeit die erste interdisziplinäre 
Forschung, die ein gründliches Verständnis des Zusammenwirkens der vierzehn 
untersuchten kleinbäuerlichen Gemeinden mit staatlichen Institutionen, der 
Zivilgesellschaft und Bergbauunternehmen nach Erteilung der Bergbaukonzession 
ergeben hat. 
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RESUMEN 
Los andes peruanos poseen una de las fuentes hídricas más importante en el país, por 
lo que su explotación puede amenazar críticamente las actividades agrarias, la economía 
nacional y tanto la calidad como la cantidad de agua de uso local. Simultáneamente, el 
potencial de la industria minera en los Andes ha impulsado la economía en las últimas 
décadas. Así las concesiones y operaciones mineras han reunido a las comunidades 
campesinas y compañías, conllevando al conflicto debido al impacto sobre el agua, la 
desinformación relacionada a dichas operaciones, la distribución del canon minero, y la 
compensación por la renta de tierras comunales. Ésta investigación adaptó métodos 
mixtos para analizar los conflictos de uso de la tierra y para construir un índice de riesgo 
con el fin de apoyar los procesos de toma de decisiones en tierras andinas agro-mineras. 
Este estudio evalúa las causas ambientales, sociales e institucionales de dichos conflictos 
para analizar situaciones conflictivas entre las comunidades campesinas y las compañías 
mineras. Los resultados de esta investigación se basan en cuatro objetivos clave: 
primero, el análisis de las concentraciones de metales pesados en agua y suelo, la 
clasificación de cobertura de suelo y el mapeo participativo permitieron la medición de 
los parámetros biofísicos en tierras agro-mineras. Segundo, los métodos mixtos 
mediante encuestas semiestructuradas, entrevistas en profundidad, análisis social y de 
contenido fueron usados para evaluar los aspectos sociales e institucionales 
relacionadas al manejo de agua y suelo. Tercero, los resultados del análisis multi-criterio 
fueron comparados con el análisis de contenido, encuestas y entrevistas para integrar y 
consolidar los mencionados componentes físicos, sociales e institucionales en un marco 
teórico y un índice de riesgo de conflicto de uso de la tierra. Cuarto, el desarrollo de tres 
escenarios principales fue hecho para simular los conflictos entre las comunidades y las 
compañías mineras. El índice de riesgo de conflicto de uso de la tierra puede convertirse 
una herramienta útil para la toma de decisiones a nivel del gobierno a fin de manejar el 
conflicto, dilucidando los criterios e indicadores que lo originan. Asimismo, este estudio 
es la primera investigación interdisciplinaria que plasma una comprensión profunda de 
la interacción de catorce comunidades estudiadas con las instituciones estatales, 
sociedad civil, y compañías mineras cuando la concesión minera ya ha sido otorgada.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The neoliberal policy of Peru has promoted private investment that has led to 
extractivism (Gustafsson, 2018; Gustafsson and Scurrah, 2019). In the last decades, 
mining concessions have increased, boosting the Peruvian economy via the increase of 
the gross domestic product (Gudynas, 2015). Mining concessions are overlapping water 
sources, protected areas, and community lands especially in the Andean region (Bax et 
al., 2019; Bebbington and Williams, 2008).  Due to the social, economic and 
environmental interests in mining, Peru needs well-established and inclusive 
environmental regulations and reforms to face the challenges of extractivism (De 
Echave, 2018). However, Peru is characterized by weak political organization and 
governing state institutions, poor networking of communities with state institutions and 
the lack of resources and strategic abilities to empower land-use planning and better 
conditions for extractivist projects (Gustafsson, 2018; Gustafsson and Scurrah, 2019; 
Henríquez, 2015).  
The political and institutional weakness has influenced the development of 
environmental institutionalism—a set of state institutions and instruments of public 
policy that focuses on the problems of the degraded environment on which people 
depend (Damonte and Vila, 2014). However, environmental institutionalism is also 
undermined in order to benefit pro-extractivism investments. Despite the isolated 
efforts of the epistemic community 1  to be involved in environment-related state 
institutions and Peru´s participation in international agreements, the country´s 
environmental policy still needs to be improved, clarified, and made more inclusive 
(Arce, 2014) in order to support environmental institutionalism (Andaluz Westreicher, 
2011) and ensure the sustainable use of resources. These goals could improve mining-
community relations and the socio-environmentally responsible use of resources in 
mining operations. Peru has improved its environmental institutionalism by enacting 
new laws and regulations such as prior consultation and community participation in the 
                                                     
1 Epistemic community is defined as a network of professionals who are recognized by 
their expertise and competence in a particular domain, and have an authoritative claim 
to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain (Haas, 1992). 
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decision-making process (MEM, 2008). However, these mechanisms have only become 
tools to inform affected stakeholders rather than effectively preventing conflicts 
(Bebbington et al., 2013). Although the government has attempted to integrate 
communities into the decision-making process, these attempts lack coherence and lead 
to very marginally inclusive political agreements (Arce, 2014).   
In weak environmental institutionalism, on the one hand, land-use conflicts 
caused by the change of land use from farming to mining activities jeopardizing local 
livelihoods (Hilson, 2002) could be a tool to negotiate better conditions for the 
communities. The need to negotiate with the government also arises because 
communities face poverty, impoverished public services, limited economic 
opportunities and a lack of farming development (Conde and Le Billon, 2017; Haslam 
and Tanimoune, 2016). On the other hand, conflicts are criminalized and their 
inappropriate management may result in violence due to the absence of suitable 
mechanisms within the government. As a result, farming-based communities experience 
resistance to mining activities due to the vulnerability of water sources and mining 
operations overlooking their total water consumption (Bebbington et al., 2013; 
Bebbington and Williams, 2008; Preciado Jerónimo and Álvarez Gutiérrez, 2016). 
Community resistance has also increased because mines tend to locate upstream (at 
headwaters), and their activities influence the water supply of downstream 
communities (Bebbington et al., 2013; Bebbington and Williams, 2008). Consequently, 
mining-community relations are crucial to prevent conflicts and are influenced by 
environmental institutionalism and natural resources.  
In the central Peruvian Andes, a long mining history is associated with 
environmental complaints of campesino communities (Caballero Martín, 1981). Since 
the early twentieth century, there has been a movement of the population from 
campesino communities to the settled mines in order to gain a paid job (Cotler, 2016; 
Li, 2017). These mines initially promoted railway and road construction to facilitate 
mining production, and thus influenced the local livelihoods (Caballero Martín, 1981). 
These changes generated a diversification of local economies and promoted temporal 
migration to the nearby urban areas. As a result, mining operations have affected the 
Introduction 
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Andean ecosystems and community livelihoods over time via water, soil and air 
pollution (Abanto Kcomt, 2007; Blacksmith Institute, 2007; Caballero Martín, 1981; 
Reuer et al., 2012; Rodbell et al., 2014). In 2017, 78.6% of the conflicts that occurred in 
the Central Andes had socio-environmental roots related to mining operations 
(Ombudsman of Peru, 2017a).  
In this study, an interdisciplinary approach is used to analyze land-use conflicts 
in the central Peruvian Andes. Most studies, rather than integrating the biophysical, 
institutional and socio-economic aspects, have viewed these aspects in isolation 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Figueroa et al., 2010; McDonell, 
2015). An interdisciplinary approach (Cathain et al., 2008; Schönenberg et al., 2017) is 
thus suggested to view the impacts of mining from different perspectives. This study 
analyzed the biophysical parameters and the social and institutional aspects in farming-
mining lands, and integrated these elements to develop a risk index of land-use conflicts. 
Additionally, the research aimed to synthesize different approaches in order to 
understand the social, environmental and institutional roots of a land-use conflict 
(Nature, 2015; Schönenberg et al., 2017). The research fields are extractivism (Gudynas, 
2015), environmental institutionalism (Damonte and Vila, 2014), water security (Grey 
and Sadoff, 2007), state capture (Durand, 2015), and livelihoods (Chambers, 1995; De 
Haan, 2012). This research focuses on lands where communities and mining companies 
interact and there are no active conflicts. This stems from findings of previous studies 
that have reported the emergence of new stakeholders (e.g. “social instigators”) where 
(personal) interests can fuel conflict, suggesting that future research should avoid these 
instigators in order to obtain a better impression of the status quo in mining-affected 
communities.  
 
1.1. Research objectives  
Based on biophysical, social and institutional assessments in farming-mining lands, the 
general objective of this research is to evaluate the environmental, social and 
institutional roots of land-use conflicts to model conflicting situations between the 
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small-scale farming communities and mining companies in the Central Andes of Peru. 
The specific objectives and research questions (RQ) are:  
a. To measure key biophysical parameters (e.g. water and soil) in campesino 
community farming-mining lands. 
 (RQ 3-1) Do biophysical measurements in farming lands reflect the impacts of 
heavy metals?  
 (RQ 3-2) How are these biophysical factors influencing the community 
livelihoods in the Junin Region? 
b. To assess social and institutional aspects related to the management of water 
and soil in the campesino community farming-mining lands. 
 (RQ 4-1) How is the environmental institutionalism perceived locally?  
 (RQ 4-2) How do local stakeholders perceive environmental institutionalism 
in a context of non-active land-use conflict?  
 (RQ 4-3) What are the profiles and the challenges of campesino communities?  
 (RQ 4-4) What are the main causes of land-use conflicts in community mining 
lands?  
c. To integrate and consolidate the above biophysical, social and institutional 
components. 
 (RQ 5-1) How can the biophysical, socio-economic, and institutional 
components be combined in a risk index? 
d. To develop scenarios to simulate the conflicts between campesino communities 
and mining companies. 
 (RQ 5-2) Based on the implications of this risk index, how can it be improved 
through future research?  
 
Above all, this research aims to answer the following question: How can the 
assessed environmental, social and institutional roots of land-use conflicts be integrated 
into a model to determine the risk of conflict in farming-mining lands?     
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1.2. Thesis structure  
This thesis is organized in six chapters. The first two chapters are introductory, the 
following three chapters provide the main results of this research, and the final chapter 
provides a summary and conclusions.  
Chapter 1 gives a general introduction, the research questions and objectives, 
and the overview of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 presents the background for the thesis that provides the historical 
background of mining and campesino communities, the definition of concepts and 
theories, and a literature review of land-use conflicts. It also provides the research 
design and conceptual framework, including an overview of the methodology used and 
data collection.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of how agreements between mining 
companies and campesino communities are developed and what are their main clauses. 
As a consequence of such agreements, communities rent their lands to mining 
companies, which might influence biophysical factors. Therefore, this chapter also 
provides an assessment of water and soil quality in farming-community lands. Finally, 
this chapter presents an example of the influence of an agreement on farming lands.  
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of environmental institutionalism in the Central 
Peruvian Andes. Stakeholders and their network are identified to assess their 
interactions before a conflict escalates. The influence, interests, legitimacy, and 
authority of stakeholders are also assessed as well as the livelihoods and challenges of 
the campesino communities. Finally, the drivers of land-use conflicts that were reported 
by stakeholders are described.  
Chapter 5 provides a decision-making support tool that indicates the risk level 
of manifested land-use conflict per community. The developed risk index of land-use 
conflicts integrates the indicators and criteria that were given by stakeholders (e.g. 
mining companies, state institutions) and community members. The risk index was 
validated by experts to evaluate its outputs and applicability.  
Chapter 6 highlights the main findings and conclusions of this research. This 
chapter also provides the study limitations and recommendations for future research 
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and the development of the risk index. Since this study is the first one of its kind that 
focuses on the integration of biophysical, institutional and socio-economic aspects, the 
results are indicative and lead the way for further interdisciplinary studies regarding the 
land-use conflicts.  
 
1.3. Published chapters  
This research has produced two published articles (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) in scientific 
journals, one article published in conference proceedings (Chapter 2), and one accepted 
book chapter for publication (Chapter 4).  All articles and book chapters were published 
in peer-reviewed journals and books.  
 
Quispe-Zuniga, M. R.; Ortiz-Quispe, C. M.; Plasencia, R. Mining projects and socio-
Environmental factors that weaken campesino (peasant) communities in the Central 
Andes of Peru. Gestión y Ambiente. 2018, 21 (2), 47–61. 
https://doi.org/10.15446/ga.v21n2supl.77833. 
 
Abstract: In the central Peruvian Andes, the potential impact of mining and the overlap 
of mining areas with community lands have caused different impacts, ranging from 
those affecting the environment to those affecting the community institution. The 
objective of this study is to analyze the socio-environmental factors that would weaken 
the campesino (peasant) communities of Huasicancha and Chongos Alto in the central 
Andes. The study applies mixed methods, including in-depth interviews with open-
ended questions and non-participant observation from November 2016 to July 2017. In 
total, 50 stakeholders (e.g. community members, state institutions, mining companies, 
etc.) were interviewed. The results reveal that both communities face socio-
environmental factors such as the economic and environmental influence of mining 
projects, the economic influence of social programs, the state institutions, the lack of 
interest of community members in community activities, the existing territorial conflicts, 
lack of job opportunities, and the decline of farming production. These socio-
environmental factors have weakened the campesino community as an institution. 
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Keywords: campesino or peasant community; comunero; mining project; 
compensation; institution. 
 
Quispe-Zuniga, M. R. Mining and campesino community: Land-use conflict in Central 
Peruvian Andes. In International Conference Economic Management in Mineral 
Activities; Nguyen Thi Hoai Nga, Ed.; Publishing House for Science and Technology: 
Hanoi, 2018; pp 38–55. 
 
Abstract: Mining exploitation in Peruvian Andes overlaps campesino community lands, 
generating the initial step for building a relationship between mining companies and 
communities. The Peruvian government and its institutions are the regulators of all 
extractivism projects and the protectors of campesino communities. Campesino 
communities have the autonomy to decide on the use of their community lands; 
however, these lands can be used for a public purpose (e.g. mining activities) with 
corresponding compensation. Land-use conflicts among communities and mining 
projects mainly occur in remote areas. Mining projects have become an economic 
opportunity for the national and subnational government due to the mining royalties. 
Since the affected community does not directly receive the mining royalties, it 
negotiates with the respective mining companies. Nevertheless, the environmental 
impact and the vulnerability of the community´s livelihoods enhance land-use conflicts.  
Therefore, this study analyses the interactions among stakeholders in communities that 
are currently influenced by mining projects in the central Andes of Peru to understand 
the mining-community-government context, the resistance factors and the interactions 
of stakeholders before the land-use conflict escalates. To analyze these interactions, an 
exhaustive literature review, observations and in-depth interviews of 23 stakeholders 
(including community authorities, mining companies and state institutions) were 
conducted in the south-western part of the Junin region, central Peruvian Andes. The 
results reveal the interactions of these stakeholders before the land-use conflict 
escalates. The findings show how the interactions increase from a simple complaint by 
a community to a conflict and then the establishment of a dialogue table. 
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Keywords: Campesino community; state institution; mining projects; farming activities; 
resistance factors. 
 
Quispe-Zuniga, M.R.; Callo-Concha, D.; Plasencia, R.; Greve, K. Implementing 
Environmental Reforms in the Central Peruvian Andes: Socio-Economic and 
Institutional Aspects of Mining Affected Campesino Communities. In Civilizing 
Resource: Investments and Extractivism Societal negotiations and the role of law; Laube, 
W., Pereira, A. R. B., Eds.; Lit Verlag: Bonn, 2019 (Forthcoming). 
 
Quispe-Zuniga, M.R.; Santos, F.; Callo-Concha, D.; Greve, K. Impact of Heavy Metals on 
Community Farming Activities in the Central Peruvian Andes. Minerals 2019, 9, 647. 
 
Abstract: The high mining potential of the Peruvian Andes has promoted booming 
foreign investments. The mining activity takes place on campesino community lands and 
headwaters. Once the government awards a mining concession, mining companies must 
regularly negotiate land rent with communities over the whole duration of the mining 
operation, often leading to disagreements. Our research objective is to identify the 
mining impacts on the farming activities of campesino communities in the Junin region, 
central Peruvian Andes. Using a mixed-methods approach involving in-depth interviews, 
water and soil analysis, land-cover classification and participatory mapping, we analyzed 
the mining-community agreements and the mining impacts on the farming lands. We 
arrived at two primary conclusions. First, mining activities in terms of heavy metal 
concentrations impact on farming lands, although the contribution of previous and 
concurrent activities cannot be distinguished. Second, the diverging and short-termed 
interests of the involved parties which circumscribe the agreements may potentially 
lead to conflicts. 
 
Keywords: Water and soil quality; community lands; mining operations; land-use 
conflicts. 
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2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND  
2.1. Mining potential in the Peruvian Andes  
The Andes are 900 km north to south and 750 km east to west (Graham, 2009). The 
mountain chain regularly faces the impact of the El Nino phenomenon along with 
population growth, climate change, and extractivist projects (Buytaert and De Bièvre, 
2012; Kohler and Maselli, 2012; Perreault, 2014). The Peruvian Andes are the main water 
source of the country and there is great concern regarding the impact of extractivism 
and water stress on the coastal and mountain populations (Bebbington and Williams, 
2008; Perreault, 2014; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011; WB, 2018). In the last decades, Peru 
has promoted irrigation projects in the arid coast with water from the Andes in order to 
boost the economy and development (Arroyo and Boelens, 2013). However, there are 
also small-scale farmers in the mountain regions, i.e., indigenous and campesino 
communities, who depend on water and land for their livelihoods. These natural 
resources are truly “the means of gaining a living” (Chambers, 1995) despite the 
economic diversification of the local communities (Boelens et al., 2010; Brain, 2017). 
Currently, water security, i.e., “the availability of water in terms of acceptable quantity 
and quality for the health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production that couple with 
water-related risks for people, environment and economies” (Grey and Sadoff, 2007) is 
not only threatened by the rapid glacial melting and irrigation mega-projects, but also 
by mining operations. Despite water use at different intensities and volumes in mining 
operations (Arroyo and Boelens, 2013; Bebbington and Williams, 2008; Perreault, 2014; 
Preciado Jerónimo, 2011), no study exists on the current actual water consumption by 
mining operations (Preciado Jerónimo, 2011; Preciado Jerónimo and Álvarez Gutiérrez, 
2016). It is evidenced, however, that the Peruvian Andes have been transformed due to 
the increase in mining concessions and operations (Figure 2-1) through neoliberal 
policies and pro-mining policies (Bury, 2002; Li, 2009; Perreault, 2014). 
Most mining operations are located upstream at headwaters, and their 
activities influence the water supply of downstream communities, making these worry 
about the source and quality of the water for their daily activities (Bebbington and 
Williams, 2008). The use of subsurface and surface water in mining activities (i.e., 
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hydroelectric generation and mechanisms) increases shortages for local communities 
and cities (Bury et al., 2013). In addition, pressuring water resources for their 
functioning, mining operations are also negatively affecting the water quality of the 
watercourses due to the annual release (>13 billion m3) of mining effluents into water 
bodies (Bebbington and Williams, 2008). Affected communities try to negotiate with the 
relevant mining company for compensation in return for the rent of their community 
lands and resources. In other cases, communities have to sell their lands to mining 
companies, generating the displacement of the community and the loss of livelihoods 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a).  
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Figure 2-1. Peruvian Andes and mining concessions (mining cadastre) indicating mines 
at exploration and exploitation stages.  
Based on INGEMMET (2018).  
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Peru has a history as a mining country (Perreault, 2014). During Spanish 
colonization, the colonial governors took the “mita” (Inca mandatory work) to exploit 
the indigenous population in order to bring rural people to mining sites, thus reducing 
the Incan population and increasing gold production (Moore, 2003; Perreault, 2014). 
Since the independence of Peru (1821), mining activities have not been well regulated 
by the subsequent governments. In the early twentieth century, the number of mining 
workers increased in the central Peruvian Andes with the foundation of the Cerro de 
Pasco Mining Company (CPMC), concentrating mining workers in the cities Pasco and La 
Oroya. The company recruited its workers from neighboring communities allowing them 
to complement their farming tasks with mining activities (Cotler, 2016; Li, 2017). The 
economic dynamics that were generated by mining exploitation led to the railway 
construction in the Central Andes to connect the two cities and mining sites with Lima, 
thus influencing local livelihoods by the introduction of manufactured products 
(Caballero Martín, 1981).  
In the 1920s, CPMC installed smelters in La Oroya to facilitate their processes, 
which affected the neighboring communities (Caballero Martín, 1981; Li, 2017). In the 
1980s, mining pollution increased and dispersed due to the weak regulation of the 
emissions from La Oroya smelters (Figueroa et al., 2010; Li, 2017; WB, 2005). La Oroya, 
which is located close to the smelters, was considered in 2006 as one of the top ten most 
polluted cities in the world, highlighting the environmental concerns related to mining 
activities (Blacksmith Institute, 2007; Li, 2017). However, the environmental impact of 
the smelters had occurred long before 2006, as reports on the impacts and complaints 
from neighboring communities date from the very start of the operations of the smelters 
(Caballero Martín, 1981; Cotler, 2016; Li, 2017). These complaints and reports affirm 
that the emissions from the smelters caused a toxic smoke that killed the livestock in 
the surrounding area and made the local inhabitants sick. The long-term use of the 
smelters has also caused fluvial and aeolian transportation of sediments affecting the 
daily activities of the local people and grazing of livestock (Caballero Martín, 1981; Razo 
et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 1974).  
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In the late twentieth century, environmental impacts occurred primarily as a 
result of weak or lacking appropriate laws and regulations for mining companies. The 
Peruvian government established neoliberal policies in the 1990s (President Alberto 
Fujimori, 1990-2000) and tax exemptions for investors to promote private investment 
(Bury, 2005; CRP, 1991). During Fujimori´s government, mining was prioritized over 
community livelihoods and local ecosystems (Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Gustafsson, 
2018; Gustafsson and Scurrah, 2019) due to the ‘state capture’ by the private sector and 
corruption (Durand, 2016; Quiroz, 2013). The state capture is manifested in the 
influence of private companies in the making of laws and decrees to promote extractivist 
investments (Durand, 2016; Hellman et al., 2000a, 2000b) and to influence the staff 
exchange between public regulators and the companies they were meant to regulate. 
In Peru, many companies combine their organizational capacities and networks to 
strongly influence the investment-related decision-making of the government (Durand, 
2016). This has undermined the creation of strict mining-related state legislation 
(Dargent et al., 2017).  
The national economy is attracting foreign investment and developing 
extractivism. Extractivism is defined as the extraction of natural resources at high 
volume and intensity to export these as raw materials without or with only minimal 
processing (Damonte and Peralta, 2015; Gudynas, 2017, 2015; Lang and Mokrani, 2013). 
In 1992, the Peruvian government implemented the General Mining Law (MEM, 1992) 
to boost mining investment (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a). This law focuses on the state 
property of mineral resources, the environment, public health, mining activities, and the 
collection and distribution of “canon minero 2 ” and mining royalties 3 . Since the 
enactment of this law, mining investment and royalties have boosted the Peruvian gross 
domestic product while increasing the dependency on mining royalties (Gudynas, 2015). 
                                                     
2 “Canon minero” refers to 50% of taxes from mining sector that are distributed among 
the affected subnational governments (Arellano-Yanguas, 2010; CRP, 2001; CRP, 2004a; 
SNMPE, 2018).  
3 Mining royalties refers to the economic consideration that the owners of the mining 
concessions pay to the Peruvian government for the exploitation of metallic mineral 
resources (CRP, 2004a). 
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Since the 2000s, the Peruvian government has established laws for the royalties, special 
taxes, and a special mining levy4 for the mining companies (CRP, 2011a, 2011b, 2004a, 
2004b).   
The canon minero is mainly given to the affected subnational governments in 
order to reduce the poverty of the affected population (Gamu et al., 2015). The canon 
minero is distributed as follows: 10% to the district where the mining site is located and 
25% to its corresponding province, 40% to neighboring districts and provinces within the 
same region, and 25% to the regional government (including 5% to public universities of 
the region) (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; CRP, 2004a; Wall and Pelon, 2011). Although the 
communities affected by mining in the benefited district are not directly receiving the 
canon minero due to their autonomy, 50% of the funds given to the district government 
have to be invested in order to benefit the affected communities via the improvement 
or provision of public services (CRP, 2004a, 2004b).  
Despite the economic importance of mining operations for the central 
government, there is a controversy in the economic and ecological trade-offs for the 
affected areas. These trade-offs represent ca. 33% of the depreciation of natural capital 
impacted, a figure that underestimates the loss of ecosystem services (Figueroa et al., 
2010). According to Cuba et al. (2014), the neoliberal Peruvian economy promotes 
mining concessions while the country and its inhabitants do not know that their lands 
might be under concession. Although INGEMMET (Mining, Metallurgical and Geological 
Institute) provides an online and public platform (e.g. GEOCATMIN) to spatially observe 
the current mining concession areas in the country (INGEMMET, 2018), its effective use 
by communities needs to be assessed.  
 
2.2. Campesino communities  
In the twentieth century, Peruvian indigenous communities were considered to be the 
lowest social class, and most of them worked under conditions of semi-slavery in large 
farms and mining exploitation sites (Cotler, 2016). The abolishment of the indigenous 
                                                     
4 The special mining levy (“gravamen especial a la minería”) created in 2011 is a tax-
deductible trimestral levy (CRP, 2011c). 
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tax in 1821 and land distribution among literate community members in 1824 attempted 
to remove the colonial holdover and to change the indigenous status into campesino as 
an integration measure (Cotler, 2016). Another integration measure was the sale of 
community lands to trigger small landholdings and reduce communities 5  (Caballero 
Martín, 1981). However, landowners took over the community lands to build a serfdom 
system that assimilated the community members (Caballero Martín, 1981). Until 1840, 
commercial and colonial disarticulation caused the fragmentation of inter-regional 
economies and the emergence of feudalism and regional oligarchy. During the 1860s, 
small traders with economic capital started gathering the most productive crop/grazing 
lands, consequently uprooting the campesino communities from their lands (Caballero 
Martín, 1981). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the campesino 
community members were used for different tasks inside large farms and new mining 
projects. Consequently, the impact of mining sites (e.g. CPMC in the Central Andes) on 
agriculture first occurred due to the acquisition of large agricultural areas for mining 
activities (De Wind (1985, 1987) cited in Arellano-Yanguas (2011a). 
From 1920 onwards, Peru recognized the legal existence of indigenous 
communities referring to these communities as native communities (including 
Amazonian people) (PCR, 1920; SICCAM, 2016). In 1933, the government officially 
registered these communities in order to (1) recognize their legal identity, (2) build a 
land registry of their communities, and (3) compensate them in case of expropriation of 
their lands (PCR, 1933). For the first time in history, in the political constitution of 1979, 
the Peruvian government referred to communities as native and campesino 
communities. It identified community areas as inalienable land unless the land was 
required for public use. In this case, around 66% of the community population was to 
approve the land concession and economic compensation in return (PCR, 1979). In 
accordance with the ad hoc law 24656 in 1987, campesino communities were 
recognized as fundamental democratic institutions with the autonomy to develop and 
                                                     
5 The promotion of sales of community lands was based on the inconsistency of the 
existence of communities within the established liberal regime in Peru, where all 
inhabitants must identify themselves as Peruvians (Caballero Martín, 1981). 
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use their land within the national constitutional framework (CRP, 1987). After the new 
political constitution of 1993, the government confirmed the autonomy of campesino 
communities regarding the organization, communal work, and land use, which need to 
respect the Peruvian laws (PCR, 1993). Currently, a community member can be anyone 
born inside the registered community, the child of a community member or any person 
integrated into the community (PRP, 1991). Inside a community, a community member 
can choose its authority, e.g. community president (PCR, 1993; Szablowski, 2002). 
Although there can be a level of disorganization inside a community, it may integrate 
stronger when common interests are threatened or there are opportunities to obtain 
benefits (Remy, 2004).  
Peru has tried to join the isolated and detached towns and communities in the 
Andes and Amazonia despite the complex geomorphological conditions (Cotler, 2016; 
Soifer, 2015). However, less economic opportunities and internal armed conflicts 
triggered the migration of campesino communities to urban areas, thus decreasing their 
populations. In the Andean region, armed internal conflicts took place during the 1980s 
and mainly affected campesino communities (Urrutia, 2003). Two groups were involved: 
The Shining Path and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA). The Shining 
Path tried to topple the Peruvian government by internal attacks where thousands of 
campesino community members died (CVR, 2003; Ruiz Peralta, 1996; Starn, 1995; 
Taylor, 1998). Consequently, migration of community families took place from 1984, 
with those having the economic means migrating to other districts or provinces, while 
only the youth in poor families left the community (CVR, 2003; INEI, 2009). Migration 
has also triggered a shift in perspective in agricultural production within communities, 
where farmers are motivated to know their market and use a production plan (Sánchez 
Aguilar, 2015). Other factors triggering migration were lack of drinking water, electricity, 
education, and health services, which were weaknesses in the Andes before and during 
the 1990s (Laszlo, 2008; Salas Carreño, 2008). Food scarcity was also managed through 
the migration process, which led to the depopulation of most communities. 
Campesino communities usually engage in subsistence and small-scale farming 
as a consequence of the agrarian reform (1969-1972) that made it possible for them to 
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obtain land from large farms (PRP, 1969, 1972; Szablowski, 2002). Considered as one of 
the main economic activities in Peru, agricultural production depends on altitude, soil 
conditions, rainfall patterns, climatic hazards, and other factors (Inbar and Llerena, 
2000; Milan and Ho, 2014). Livestock is also used to boost the economy and diversify 
family incomes in campesino communities (Kristjanson et al., 2007), and is used by the 
families as a source of food, fertilizers, investment, savings and insurance (Bustamante 
Becerra, 2007; Kristjanson et al., 2007; Valdivia and Quiroz, 2003). Since most families 
strongly depend on livestock, livestock grazing, and cattle nutrition, family labor 
influences their ability to produce livestock-related products (e.g. milk, meat) (Bartl et 
al., 2009). In the 2012 Peruvian agricultural census, farming activities covered 30.1% (38 
742 465 ha) of the country, while this area was 57.7% (22 269 271 ha) in the Andean 
region (INEI, 2013a). This region comprises 15% productive agricultural area, 70% 
natural pastures, and 7% forest and mountains. However, not all agricultural land is used 
for crop production due to a lack of water (122 923.65 ha affected in 2012), lack of credit 
for farming investment (40 403.12 ha), lack of workforce (31 419.84 ha), soil erosion, 
and lack of seeds (INEI, 2013b). Consequently, campesino communities that mainly 
depend on farming activities tend to be resistant to mining activities due to the 
environmental impacts and because these cause the temporal/permanent migration6 of 
new community generations to urban areas (Bury, 2002; Conde and Le Billon, 2017; 
Inbar and Llerena, 2000). In addition to the farming activities, campesino communities 
that are close to urban areas have diversified their economies. Communities 
consequently face the temporal or permanent migration of their members who aim to 
get a paid job, which is more attractive to farmers than the uncertain income from 
agriculture and livestock rearing under the threats from climatic hazards (CTRJ, 2015a; 
Escobal, 2001).  
In the Andes, many mining sites are located at headwaters and thus affect 
downstream communities (Brain, 2017; Li, 2017). Mining sites also require surface water 
                                                     
6  Temporal migration refers to the movement of community members from the 
communities to urban areas in order to work. They stay in the city on weekdays and 
come back to the community at the weekend. 
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or have to drain groundwater, increasing concern among the affected communities 
regarding both water quantity and quality (Brain, 2017; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011). Thus, 
mining sites affect water, land, the cohesion of social networks and local employment 
of the campesino communities (Brain, 2017).  
 
2.3. Peruvian state institutions 
Although the Peruvian government has promoted environmental reforms and 
regulations (e.g. environmental impact assessment, environmental certification), these 
are still too weak to deal with the challenges generated by extractivism (De Echave, 
2018). The weakness of state institutions undermines these policies, failing to trigger 
development strategies (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011b; Hinojosa, 2011). In 2008, Peru 
created the Ministry of Environment (MINAM) and its state institutions such as the 
Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA) (PRP, 2008). However, 
following governments have not enforced the environmental management of projects 
of extractivism, and have weakened environmental institutionalism by removing central 
functions of MINAM and restricting the work of state institutions of MINAM (CRP, 2015; 
Damonte and Vila, 2014; De Echave, 2018; PCM, 2013; PRP, 2014). Environmental 
institutionalism, i.e., the set of state institutions and instruments of public policy that 
focus on the problems of degraded environments on which people depend (Damonte 
and Vila, 2014), has been negatively affected by current policies. This has occurred 
despite the creation of new state institutions like SENACE (Peru´s Environmental 
Licensing Agency) that aims to face the environmental public demands (SENACE, 2018; 
Preciado Jerónimo and Álvarez Gutiérrez, 2016).  
The weak state institutions are still characterized by low stability, social 
fragmentation (Henríquez, 2015), low institutional confidence (Gudynas, 2017), and 
weak enforcement capabilities (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009). In addition, the presence of 
state institutions in most regions is weak in the regulation of mining concessions and 
investments and the relationship between communities and mining companies (WB, 
2005; Henríquez, 2015). In a context of weak environmental institutionalism, 
communities may be poorly informed for the decision-making process regarding 
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extractivist projects (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Hilson, 2002). Despite communities 
requesting a proper prior consultation for mining projects (De Echave, 2018), the lack of 
poor community consultation causes misinformation and misunderstanding between 
local people and mining companies (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; 
McDonell, 2015). As a consequence, some communities look for technical support from 
non-governmental institutions in order to be better prepared for facing mining 
companies (Haarstad and Fløysand, 2007). 
Once extractivism faces environmental institutionalism, the processes of state 
institution building and democratization are usually involved with the extractivism-
related conflicts (Bebbington, 2012; Gudynas, 2017). As a result, conflicts may arise in 
weak environmental institutionalism. The conflicts are defined as a complex process 
where society, government, and the private sector perceive that their 
goals/interests/values/needs are contradictory, leading to violence7 (Ombudsman of 
Peru, 2017b; Kriesberg and Dayton, 2011). Land-use conflicts are the response of 
communities to the threats of their ecosystems and livelihoods through water and soil 
pollution (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Li, 2009; McDonell, 
2015).  
Socio-environmental factors have become the main reason for conflicts (Figure 
2-2) in mining-community shared areas. Besides these underlying root causes, there are 
also socio-environmental and economic reasons behind the land-use conflicts. For 
instance, despite the assigned public benefits for the communities, poverty and 
marginalization have increased, as well as the probability of occurrence of conflicts 
(Haslam and Tanimoune, 2016). In addition, the latent problems of the community (e.g. 
poor irrigation systems) affect their agricultural opportunities (i.e., less available 
agricultural land), increasing land competition and land-use conflicts (Haslam and 
Tanimoune, 2016; Urrutia, 2003).  
                                                     
7 Violence is defined as a destructive demonstration of the conflict (Ombudsman of 
Peru, 2017b).  
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Figure 2-2. Annual share of conflicts due to socio-environmental drivers in Peru, 2005-
2016.  
Based on the Ombudsman of Peru (2005-2017b).   
 
Initially, land-use conflicts are rooted in the environmental impacts of mining 
activities on farming livelihoods and even the displacement of small-scale farmers 
(Adam et al., 2015; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011b; Delgado and Romero, 2016; Helwege, 
2015; Triscritti, 2013). As the conflict escalates, other reasons and stakeholders´ 
interests emerge such as the question of economic compensation for the communities 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a). Also, the distribution of mining royalties in the sub-national 
government and the deterioration of the environment have triggered conflicts and the 
formation of non-governmental groups to deal with these conflicts (Bebbington and 
Bury, 2009; Durand Guevara, 2014; Melucci, 1999; Triscritti, 2013). Current researchers 
propose different forms of implementation, approaches, and models for mining-
community relations. However, the improvement of these relations requires effective 
public institutions and changes in political norms (Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Helwege, 
2015). 
 
2.4. Land-use conflicts in Peru 
A land-use conflict occurs when the use of land and its resources deviates from the use 
found through the capability evaluation (i.e., natural use) and affects the livelihoods of 
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local communities (Campbell et al., 2000; Hilson, 2002; Valle Junior et al., 2014; Von Der 
Dunk et al., 2011). Site-specific ecological, social and economic interactions trigger land-
use conflicts (Campbell et al., 2000) involving different parties and socio-environmental 
impacts (Tudor et al., 2014). Conflict drivers are related to values (e.g. landscape value 
such as biodiversity, water, livelihood), resource scarcity, social power imbalances, 
property rights, and weak institutions with the lack of a clear environmental policy 
(Brown and Raymond, 2014).  
In the mining context, most conflicts are rooted in the environmental impacts 
of mining activities on community livelihoods, the mismatch of interests on land use, 
and displacement of small-scale farmers (Delgado and Romero, 2016; Valencia and 
Riaño, 2017). Although campesino communities have the autonomy to decide on the 
use of their community lands, this autonomy includes only the depths of the agriculture 
soil. The subsoil of Andean lands belongs to the Peruvian government, meaning that the 
government has the legal power to decide the land use (De Echave, 2018). Thus, once a 
mining company gets a concession from the government, it enters the reality of 
campesino communities and generates or increases the inequality and politicization of 
the community (Henríquez, 2015). Loayza and Rigolini (2016) applying the Gini 
coefficient found high inequality in mining districts compared to non-mining districts. 
Although inequality is enhanced by mining operations, it is also based on the previous 
circumstances of the community members (e.g. education, qualified skills). Likewise, the 
politicization of the community, although triggered by mining operations, is based on 
the pre-existing conflicts in the community. 
In the period 1990-2010, the beginning mining boom increased the gross 
domestic product through the applied neoliberal reforms and promotion of investments 
(De Echave, 2018; Loayza and Rigolini, 2016; Zegarra et al., 2007). This boom was 
boosted by high metal prices and the economic expansion of China and India (Loayza 
and Rigolini, 2016; Perreault, 2014; Zegarra et al., 2007) (Figure 2-3) with peaks in 2008 
and 2011-2012. In 2008, mining-related conflicts also occurred in different regions 
simultaneously (Dargent et al., 2017) (Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3).  
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Figure 2-3.  Annual total and mining-related exportations in USD millions in Peru, 1970-
2017. 
Based on BCRP data (BCRP, 2018). 
 
On account of the mining boom, resistance to mining, i.e., `spoken, cognitive 
or physical´ counter-actions or the contraposition/mobilization/opposition forms 
(Hollander & Einwohner, 2004; Rose, 2002; Conde, 2017), has risen at the community 
level where mining operations are active (Conde, 2017). Communities base their 
resistance on factors that are related to four main actors: mining projects, a mining 
company, the community itself, and the state (Conde and Le Billon, 2017). Figure 2-4 
shows the interaction of the actors and factors involved. For instance, marginalization is 
a community-related factor but involves the government and the community as actors 
because the government needs to reduce the economic and political marginalization 
among communities. The current central Peruvian government has agreed with regional 
governments to set as a priority building or improving roads to connect cities, thus 
stimulating local economies and reducing marginality (PRP, 2017a). Marginalization 
restricts the ability of people to find opportunities and take advantage of them when 
they arise for improving their livelihoods (von Braun and Gatzweiler, 2014).  
The resistance factors are the base of the “Ecological Distribution Conflicts”, 
i.e., conflicts of interests and values over the access to environmental resources 
(Martinez-Alier, 2002), and relate to the theory of “Environmentalism of the Poor”. This 
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theory focuses on the conflict between poor people and the government/market, where 
poor people (e.g. campesino communities) defend their environment (Martinez-Alier, 
2002). Thus, although Peru´s case has shown a break between the government and local 
communities due to land/water concessions in the context of extractivist projects (De 
Echave, 2018), livelihood dependency on water and land has changed as communities 
have evolved due to increased temporal proximity with urban areas, diversification of 
local economies and migration.   
Figure 2-4. Mining resistance factors in community-government-mining company-
project context. Based on Conde and Le Billon (2017). 
 
In mining-farming environments in Peru, an unstable order marked by conflicts 
and demonstrations has developed, where state institutions face difficulties in 
managing conflicts (Calderón, 2012a; Henríquez, 2015). Conflicts may be used to 
pressure the state and private sector to negotiate with the campesino community to 
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provide them with better benefits (Burneo de la Rocha and Chaparro Ortiz de Zevallos, 
2010; De Echave, 2018). Although conflicts related to extractivism do not derive from 
problems of ‘governance’, conflicts deepen due to the disconnection among different 
levels of government and political bodies (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Damonte and 
Glave, 2012; Merino Acuña, 2015). In the last decade, most mining-related conflicts have 
been considered radical (De Echave, 2018). According to Calderón (2012a), the 
radicalization of the conflict consists of the enunciation of the conflict, the verbal 
expression of the unrest, and the threat of public demonstrations or direct actions. 
However, this radicalization reflects the perception promoted by the media to the 
population, and sometimes their partial position regarding the conflict (De Echave, 
2018).  
 
2.5. Research design and conceptual framework 
During the last decades, the high mining potential of the Andes has boosted the Peruvian 
economy, with most of the mining operations overlapping with campesino community 
lands. Most of the mining concessions have been done at high elevations, encroaching 
on farming lands and jeopardizing the livelihoods of campesino communities. The 
history of campesino communities, Peru´s national history, neoliberal policies and the 
national dependence on industries of extractivism have all left their mark on the current 
development of land-use conflicts. Mining impacts have provided the impetus for 
mining resistance from communities due to the vulnerability of their natural resources 
(e.g. water quality) and farming-based livelihoods (Conde and Le Billon, 2017). Mining 
concessions positioning themselves at headwaters, the insufficient negotiation power 
of communities, mining-related laws, and weak environmental institutionalism combine 
to trigger land-use conflicts. Land-use conflicts may strongly depend on how the 
government, the mining company, and communities play their own roles to gain 
economic profit from mining operations while attempting to maintain a healthy 
environment and good relations.  
The present research focuses on land-use conflicts in the Central Peruvian 
Andes. The following conceptual framework (Figure 2-5) guides the research and its 
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operationalization of the interdisciplinary approach implemented. Drawing from 
previous studies on land-use conflicts, this research used a mixed-methods approach 
(Creswell and Creswell, 2017) and is defined by three phases: (i) water/soil assessment, 
(ii) identification of stakeholders and disclosure of community livelihoods, and (iii) 
integration of the findings into a land-use conflict risk index.  
First, the assessment of metal concentrations was applied for water and soil 
downstream from mining sites. Biophysical factors were both sampled following the 
Peruvian protocols (ANA, 2016a; MINAM, 2014) and analyzed by inductively coupled 
plasma-atomic emission spectrometry (EPA, 1994). The results were compared to 
secondary government data and land-cover classification. Participatory mapping with 
community authorities and key informants was used for the comparison with land-cover 
classification data that was obtained by processing Landsat images by maximum 
likelihood classification. 
Second, the livelihoods of the campesino community were identified to assess 
their economic activities. This focused on the disclosure of the family income and the 
problems that may affect their involvement in the local economy. Likewise, the 
interactions among stakeholders and the functions of state institutions were 
determined to establish the legitimacy/authority and influence/interest of stakeholders 
(Chevalier and Buckles, 2013) in community-mining lands. The drivers of land-use 
conflicts were obtained from in-depth interviews and a semi-structured survey of 
stakeholders and community members, respectively. This phase shows the conditions 
before a land-use conflict in community-mining lands develops and escalates. 
Third, the land-use conflict risk index is based on the results and data collected 
using the aforementioned methods. The main aim was to integrate and consolidate the 
above biophysical, social and institutional components, and to develop scenarios to 
simulate the conflicts between campesino communities and mining companies through 
GIS-based multi-criteria decision analysis. The risk index provides a useful tool for 
supporting managers and the government in making more informed decisions and 
progress towards managing or preventing land-use conflicts.  
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Figure 2-5. Conceptual framework and research design 
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3. IMPACT OF HEAVY METALS ON COMMUNITY FARMING ACTIVITIES IN THE 
CENTRAL PERUVIAN ANDES  
3.1. Introduction  
A recent boom in mining exploitation has extended along the Andes, overlapping with 
community lands and water bodies (Bebbington and Williams, 2008). It is estimated that 
the livelihoods of 40 million people depend on these Andean ecosystems (Becker and 
Bugmann, 2001; Josse et al., 2009). In the case of Peru, most of the Andes are occupied 
by campesino communities. Legally, a campesino community is a set of neighboring 
households that share the collective ownership of a determined area (Castillo et al., 
2004; CTRJ, 2015b; CRP, 1987) and are economically dependent primarily on agricultural 
and livestock-related activities (Bartl et al., 2009; Kristjanson et al., 2007; Postigo et al., 
2008; Valdivia and Quiroz, 2003).  
Recently, land-use conflicts have emerged between campesino communities 
and mining operations (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011; Robbins, 
2012). These mainly occur due to the underrepresentation of campesino communities 
in the decision-making processes (Bebbington and Williams, 2008; Robbins, 2012), 
location of the mining projects and subsequent endangerment of water quality, and 
inefficient use of water (Bebbington and Williams, 2008; FAO, 1999; Franks et al., 2014; 
Järup, 2003; Jaskoski, 2014; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011).  
Nevertheless, the number of mining projects has increased in Peru due to 
legislation that favors investments (Preciado Jerónimo, 2011). The General Mining Law 
(GLM) of 1992 sets a roadmap for establishing mining operations that mainly considers 
the ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ phases (MEM, 1992). Generally, the operation 
requires the permission of the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) and the campesino 
community/communities that own the land (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Jaskoski, 2014). 
Based on the canon minero, 50% of the taxes from the mining sector are distributed 
among the affected subnational governments (Arellano-Yanguas, 2010; CRP, 2004b, 
2001; SNMPE, 2018). The subnational governments directly affected by mining may 
receive up to 75% of this tax (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; Damonte and Glave, 2012; MEM, 
1992), while campesino communities are excluded from receiving it directly. As a result, 
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the communities tend to negotiate compensations separately with the mining 
companies. Both canon minero and compensations are aimed at reducing land-use 
conflicts. Despite this, conflicts have increased (2005-2011), reduced in 2012 and have 
remained constant (ca. 162 yearly conflicts) since then (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; 
Ombudsman of Peru, 2005-2017a). In 2017, Peru allocated 16 million ha for mining 
concessions (INGEMMET, 2017), although not all of these became viable mines. The 
most common mining practice in Peru is open-pit mining, as this model is preferred for 
exploiting metal deposits. There are 36 open-pit mines throughout the country (América 
Economía, 2018). The environmental impacts of open-pit mining mainly relate to water 
infiltration and supply to rivers (Hartman and Mutmansky, 2002; King et al., 2017; 
Martín-Duque et al., 2010; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011), which impact the socio-economic 
situation of local households (Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Bebbington and Williams, 
2008; Figueroa et al., 2010; McDonell, 2015).  
Most studies have split these biophysical and socio-economic aspects rather 
than integrating them (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Figueroa et 
al., 2010; McDonell, 2015). Therefore, an interdisciplinary approach (Cathain et al., 
2008) is suggested to broaden the understanding of the impacts of mining from different 
perspectives. In this sense, the overarching objective of this chapter is to identify the 
mining impacts on the farming activities of campesino communities in the Junin Region. 
Therefore, this study first analyzed the agreements between mining companies and 
communities via in-depth interviews with stakeholders. Then the study evaluated the 
influence by open-pit mining sites on the water and soil quality and assessed the effects 
on farming lands. The following two research questions guide this chapter: (RQ 3-1) Do 
biophysical measurements in farming lands reflect the impacts of heavy metals? (RQ 
3-2) how are these biophysical factors influencing the community livelihoods in the Junin 
Region? 
 
3.2. Materials and Methods  
Under the interdisciplinary approach, this investigation applied mixed-methods (Hesse-
Biber, 2010a, 2010b) including in-depth interviews to analyze the negotiation process 
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between campesino communities and mining companies, laboratory analyses to 
measure heavy metal concentrations in streams and farmland soils around the mines, 
and participatory mapping and GIS-based land-cover classification to assess the 
perspectives of the community members and effects on their livelihoods. For the water 
and soil analyses, this study used inductively coupled plasma-optical emission 
spectrometry (ICP-OES) (EPA, 1994) and for the mapping ArcGIS (Hagner and Reese, 
2007), and R programming language (Hijmans et al., 2017; Leutner et al., 2018; R Core 
Team, 2015) (Figure 3-1).  
 
 
Figure 3-1.  Overview of research methodology  
Based on (Gottlicher et al., 2009; Ramirez-Gomez et al., 2016; EPA, 1994).  
 
3.2.1. Research site 
The Junin Region (S11°29’-W74°59’) within the Mantaro watershed hosts a large 
number of mining companies, is of great importance for agricultural production, and 
encompasses 389 campesino communities (CTRJ, 2015c, 2015d; INEI, 2018a; Osorio, 
2009). The study site includes the sub-basins Cunas and Aimaraes of the watershed 
(CTRJ, 2015a; IGP, 2012, 2005) within which are located the 14 campesino communities 
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and three mining sites. The Azulcocha mine is in the Cunas sub-basin, while Corihuarmi 
and Huacravilca mines are in the Aimaraes sub-basin (Figure 3-2). The Azulcocha mine is 
situated on glacial and glaciofluvial bedrocks in an irregular gorge with different 
landforms (CTRJ, 2015a). The mine currently covers 8600 ha at 4400 m above sea level 
(MASL) for zinc production, and a concentrator plant with 500 ton/day processing 
capacity (Bloomberg, n.d.; Clean Technology S.A.C., 2007). The Corihuarmi mine, located 
in an epithermal gold-silver belt, is an open-pit mine covering 10 168 ha at ca. 5000 
MASL and exploits gold (ANA, 2016b, 2015; Barradas, 2013; Minera IRL, n.d.). The 
Huacravilca mining mine covers 2000 ha for exploration at 4700 MASL over fluvial and 
glaciofluvial deposits and six sedimentary units (Blache Snow Consulting, 2012; Fresnillo 
Perú S.A.C., 2017; Rumbo Minero, n.d.).   
 
Figure 3-2. Research area in (a) Junin Region, and (b) location of mining operations and 
campesino communities in Aimaraes and Cunas sub-basins.  
                     Based on government data and INGEMMET (INGEMMET, 2018). 
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After subnational governments and community authorities had authorized this 
study, 14 out of 18 communities agreed to participate, i.e., nine from the Cunas sub-
basin and 5 from the Aimaraes sub-basin. As not all communities are affected by mining 
operations in the same way, the considered campesino communities were divided into 
mining-affected and not mining-affected communities (Figure 3-2, Table 3-1). 
 
Table 3-1. Mining operations with the stage of use and assessed campesino communities 
with the number of active members in parentheses.  
 Cunas Sub-Basin Aimaraes Sub-Basin 
Mining Operation Azulcocha (exploitation: Zn) 
Huacravilca (exploration: Ag) 
Corihuarmi (exploitation: Au) 
Mining-Affected 
Communities 
San Pedro de Sulcan (25) 
Usibamba (238) 
Shicuy (75) 
Huasicancha (251) 
Chongos Alto (108) 
Palmayoc (22) 
Palaco (23) 
Llamapsillon (55) 
Not Mining-Affected 
Community 
Chala (72) 
Santa Rosa de Huarmita (23) 
San José de Quero (30) 
Bellavista (50) 
Misquipata (30) 
Chucupata (20) 
No control community 
 
3.2.2. Interviews with stakeholders 
To understand the negotiation dynamics between mining operations and campesino 
communities, in-depth interviews with community authorities and representatives of 
the mining operations were carried out (Appendix 8.1). In total, this study interviewed 
authorities from each mining-affected community and five representatives of four 
mining companies. In addition to the mining companies operating in the study area 
(Table 3-1), a fourth mine—Volcan mining company—was included considering its long 
history (ca. 75 years) in the Junin Region and its track record of negotiations with the 
communities. The identity of all stakeholders was anonymized given the sensitive 
character of the revealed information. All in-depth interviews were carried out in 
Spanish. 
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3.2.3. Water and soil sampling  
To explore the historical presence of heavy metals in the surroundings of the sample 
points (Table 3-2), the used data were the regional geology and geochemistry of the 
Geological, Mining and Metallurgical Institute (INGEMMET) (INGEMMET, 2018).  
Also, this study used the assessments of the Agency for Environmental Assessment and 
Enforcement (OEFA), which found concentrations of heavy metals that were higher than 
the threshold allowed by Environmental Quality Standards (EQS) (Ayers and Westcot, 
1985; MINAM, 2017a, 2015) (Appendix 8.2).In this study, 12 sample points were 
selected along the rivers Pucara (Cunas sub-basin) and Aimaraes. At each sample point, 
this research took two samples, i.e., 24 water samples, during the dry season (October-
November) of 2016.  
Azulcocha and Corihuarmi are located at the headwaters of the Aimaraes and 
Cunas sub-basins. In each sub-basin, four case sample points and two control sample 
points were selected, i.e., a total of eight cases and four control samples. Case sample 
points were taken upstream (approx. 50 to 100 m) and downstream (approx. 100 to 500 
m) of the mining sites and campesino communities (Figure 3-3). Water sampling 
followed the national protocol of Peru´s National Authority of Water (ANA, 2016a). The 
24 samples were sent to the Corrosion and Protection Institute (ICP) of the Pontifical 
Catholic University of Peru (PUCP) to determine total heavy metal concentrations 
through inductively coupled plasma-optical emission spectrometry (ICP-OES) according 
to the EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency) method 200.7 – Rev. 4.4. 
(EPA, 1994).  
Regarding the presence of heavy metals, INGEMMET identified contents of 
mercury (Hg), chromium (Cr) and/or arsenic (As) in the Aimaraes glacial deposits and 
contents of Cr, As, lead (Pb) and cadmium (Cd) in colluvial deposits (INGEMMET, 2018). 
In the Cunas river, Cr contents were found in alluvial and glacial-fluvial deposits and in 
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the Mataula8 and Casapalca9 formations. High concentrations of As and Cd in two Cunas 
alluvial deposits had also been previously identified (INGEMMET, 2018).  The presence 
of heavy metals in the sample locations is summarized in Table 3-2.  
 
Table 3-2. Geological characteristics and natural heavy metals (HM) presence in water 
sample points and their surroundings.   
Sub-Basin Sample 
Lithology and 
Geochemistry 
Surroundings of Sample 
Points 
Geological unit HM Geological unit HM 
Cunas 
B-AM (upstream 
Azulcocha) 
Goyllarisquizga 
Group (Ki-g) 
 
Chunumayo F. (Jm-ch)  
Cercapuquio F. (Jm-c)  
A-AM (Downstream 
Azulcocha) 
Jumasha F. (Ks-j)  
Pariatambo F. (Ki-pt)  
Glacial D. (Q-gl)  
B-UC (Control 1, 
upstream Usibamba) 
Glacial, fluvial D. 
(Q-glfl) 
Cr 
Casapalca F. (KsP-c)  
Alluvial D. (Q-al)  
A-UC (After 
Usibamba) 
Alluvial D. (Q-al) 
Cr, As, 
Cd 
Casapalca F. (KsP-c) Cr 
I-N (Confluence of 
rivers) 
Glacial, fluvial D. 
(Q-glfl) 
 
Alluvial D. (Q-al)  
Casapalca F. (KsP-c)  
PN (Control 2) 
Mataula F. (Np-
m) 
Cr 
Alluvial D. (Q-al)  
Casapalca F. (KsP-c)  
Aimaraes 
I-L (Control 1) Glacial D. (Q-gl)  
Domo andesítico 
(N/dmand) 
 
L-S (Control 2) Glacial D. (Q-gl)  
Chúlec F. (Ki-chu)  
Casapalca F. (KsP-c)  
A-CM (Downstream 
Corihuarmi) 
Glacial D. (Q-gl) 
Hg, Cr, 
As 
Jumasha F. (Ks-j)  
Chúlec F. (Ki-chu)  
B-HM (upstream 
Huacravilca) 
Condorsinga F. 
(Ji-c) 
 
Cercapuquio F. (Jm-c)  
Granite (N-gr)  
A-HM (Downstream 
Huacravilca) 
Glacial D. (Q-gl) 
Hg, Cr, 
As 
Granite (N-gr)  
Cercapuquio F. (Jm-c)  
A-CA-S (Downstream 
Huasicancha 
disputed area) 
Colluvial D. (Q-cl) 
Cr, As, 
Pb, Cd 
Yanacancha F. (N-ya)  
Rhyolite (Nri)  
D: Deposit, F: Formation; Based on INGEMMET (2018), Mégard (1968), Wise (2007) 
                                                     
8 Mataula formation is characterized by lacustrine layers, sands and sandstones and 
fluvial conglomerates (Wise, 2007; CTRJ, 2015d). 
9  Casapalca formation is older than the Mataula formation and is characterized by 
shales, siltstones, sandstones and hematite-based conglomerates (Wise, 2007; CTRJ, 
2015d). 
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Figure 3-3. Water sample points and geology in sub-basins in (a) Cunas and (b) Aimaraes; based on INGEMMET (INGEMMET, 2018). 
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Regarding soils, the sample sites correspond to natural pastures used for 
grazing by the communities. It was verified that in each sample site there was no 
evidence of recent landslides that would alter results. In each sub-basin, the sample 
points were located 12 km and 24 km away from the mining exploitation sites near the 
aforementioned river courses (downstream). Control sample points were taken in non-
mining areas that have the same dominant geological type. Due to the farming nature 
of lands and the Peruvian protocol for soil sampling, two samples were taken at 30 and 
60 cm depth per sample point (Bech et al., 2012; MINAM, 2014). At each sample point, 
this study measured a 3-m square in which 2-5 samples per depth (20cm and 60 cm) 
were taken, combined and partitioned to obtain a representative soil sample (ca. 2 kg).  
Thus, eight case and four control soil samples were taken and sent to the PUCP to 
determine total heavy metal content through ICP-OES according to the EPA method 
200.7-Rev. 4.4. Table 3-3 shows the geological characteristics and the natural presence 
of relevant heavy metal. 
 
Table 3-3. Geological characteristics and natural presence of heavy metals (HM) in soil 
sample points and their surroundings.   
Sub-Basin Sample Point 
Lithology and Geochemistry 
Surroundings to Sample 
Points 
Geological Unit HM Geological Unit HM 
Cunas 
12 km 
Glacial, fluvial D.  
(Q-glfl) 
Cr Casapalca F. (KsP-c) Cr 
24 km Alluvial D. (Q-al) 
As, Cr, 
Cd 
Mataula F. (Np-m)  
Casapalca F. (KsP-c)  
Control 
Glacial, fluvial D.  
(Q-glfl) 
Cr 
Alluvial D. (Q-al)  
Casapalca F. (KsP-c)  
Matula F. (Np-m)  
Aimaraes 
12 km Glacial D. (Q-gl) 
Cr, Hg, 
As, Pb 
Condorsinga F. (Ji-c)   
Cercapuquio F. (Jm-c) Cr 
24 km Colluvial D. (Q-cl) 
Cr, As, 
Cd, Pb 
Yanacancha F. (N-ya)  
Riolita (Nri)  
Control Alluvial D. (Q-al) Cr 
Condorsinga F. (Ji-c)  
Yanacancha F. (N-ya)  
D: Deposit, F: Formation; Based on INGEMMET (1983, 2018), Mégard (1968) 
 
Although this research offers a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary 
insight into the mining companies-communities interactions, several drawbacks are to 
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be acknowledged. These mainly relate to the restrictions on water and soil sampling due 
to mining companies´ demarcations, privatization, and latent territorial conflicts 
between communities.   
 
3.2.4. Participatory mapping 
In the Usibamba community, a participatory mapping exercise was conducted following 
the methods of Ramirez-Gomez et al. (2016). As there is no agreement with the 
Azulcocha mine, community members rely strongly on farming for their livelihoods. 
Mining impacts have been reported because of the effects on community livelihoods. 
Via participatory mapping, this study aimed to (i) identify community settlements, 
livestock water sources, and grazing and agriculture areas, and (ii) to contrast the site 
conditions with the results of this study on heavy metal content and land-cover 
classification, and with official reports from the regional government (e.g., available 
community maps) and the OEFA (OEFA, 2014a, 2013a). The exercise was in two stages. 
In the first stage (March 11, 2017), ten volunteer community members participated, and 
in the second (March 23, 2017) two key informants plus nine neighborhood presidents. 
In both cases, a detailed map including roads and streams as well as the digital elevation 
model (DEM) of the 90-m resolution was used. The DEM was obtained from the Shuttle 
Radar Topography Mission (http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org/; (Jarvis et al., 2008).  
The participatory mapping outcomes were overlaid with a land-cover 
classification (LCC) that considered crops, infrastructure, rocky outcrops, vegetation, and 
water for which two Landsat surface reflectance images from the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS, 2019) were processed (Appendix 0). These images belong to Path 6 and Rows 68 
(10.64% cloud cover) and 69 (0% cloud cover) on August 07 and July 22 in 2017 (dry 
season). The LCC consisted of the following processing steps: (1) normalize topographic 
shadow on images (bands 2-7) with the Minnaert algorithm (Pimple et al., 2017) 
(Appendix 0), (2) extract training/validation samples, (3) apply a maximum likelihood 
classification (MLC) (Gottlicher et al., 2009), and (4) reclassify misclassified pixels 
(Appendix 8.4) by comparing results with participatory mapping zonification and high-
resolution imagery from Google (Esri, 2019). The resulting product is shown in Figure 3-4.  
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Figure 3-4. Land-cover classification of the research area (maximum likelihood 
classification method). 
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In total, 1647 samples were randomly taken considering a minimum distance of 
~1 km between each sample. From these, this study selected 1320 samples for training 
and reserved 327 for validation (i.e., 80% training and 20% validation). During the 
training, for each land cover class, 280 samples were taken, except in infrastructure that 
accounts for 200 samples since minimum distance did not allow us to sample more than 
this number. Similarly, for validation, this study took 70 samples for each land cover class, 
except in infrastructure where 47 samples were taken. The confusion matrix is presented 
in Table 3-4. 
The accuracy metrics calculated indicated that the map achieved an overall 
precision of 0.90. The class crops indicated that omission error was the highest in the 
map while vegetation was for the commission error. Nevertheless, Kappa indicated a 
score of 0.87, which is considered strong (64–81% of data are reliable) (McHugh, 2012). 
Because the Usibamba community was considered for participatory mapping, the 
reclassified LCC map was focused on this community for its later integration with the 
heavy metal contents and secondary data.  
 
Table 3-4. Accuracy percentage of land-cover classification 
Land cover classes 
Reference 
(Number of Samples) 
Row total 
1 2 3  4 5 Total Commission 
Predicted 
1. Crops 57 2 0 4 0 63 0.09 
2. Infrastructure 2 45 1 0 0 48 0.06 
3. Rocky outcrop 3 0 59 0 1 63 0.06 
4. Vegetation 6 0 10 65 0 81 0.19 
5. Water 2 0 0 1 69 72 0.04 
Column 
total 
Total 70 47 70 70 70 
 
Omission 0.18 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.01 
 
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Agreements between mining companies and communities 
This study previously assumed that the main stakeholders were the mining companies, 
sub-national government, and campesino communities. However, the meetings with 
campesino communities revealed that an agreement is only between the community and 
the mining company representatives. During the meetings, campesino communities 
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indicated that the agreements reached with the mining companies were weak and often 
tended to be dissolved from the very beginning up to the end. In other words, the 
agreements were rarely kept. To understand the reasons behind this, in-depth interviews 
were undertaken to explore (1) how an agreement is established, (2) the clauses it 
contains, and (3) the communities’ expectations regarding the agreements.  
Agreements include social, economic and environmental clauses. The 
community’s corresponding benefits depend on the stage of the intervention of the 
mining company. For example, during the exploration stage, benefits mainly focus on the 
annual payment and job quotas (personal conversations with Huacravilca 
representatives). During the exploitation stage, better benefits are offered (pers. conv. 
with Huacravilca and Corihuarmi representatives). The main economic clause refers to 
the annual payment to the community, which depends on the negotiation capacity of 
both stakeholders (pers. conv. with representatives of Huacravilca). The negotiation of 
the agreement is usually long (e.g., six months), depending on the mining-related 
negotiating position of the community and the occurrence of previous experiences. 
Negotiations start with the mining company establishing contact with the president of 
the community or an accessible community authority (pers. conv. with Volcan, 
Huacravilca and Corihuarmi representatives) since a good relationship with a community 
authority is crucial to the desired outcome. An example of this negotiation is given by the 
representative of the Cunas sub-basin:  
“In the first meeting with (the mine) Azulcocha, Shicuy (community) authorities 
requested balls for the children, food supplies and 10 000 PEN/year in return for the 
rent of 700 ha of land. Shortly after, Shicuy realized the real price of land rent and 
tried to change the agreement (…) The situation escalated into a conflict as 
Azulcocha refused initially (…) Finally, better clauses were negotiated and the 
agreement changed, now the payment is 300 000 PEN/year.” (LQ, representative 
of Cunas sub-basin, Tambo, 2016). 
Once the annual payment is set, the campesino community usually adds other 
economic clauses such as a job quota for community members, installation of productive 
projects (e.g., promotion of small-animal farming), and work for the community-formed 
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companies that can provide services to the mine (pers. conv. with Volcan representative 
and representative of Cunas sub-basin). Regarding the social clause, the mining company 
sustains projects such as the provision of sports clothes for school children, financing of 
a school library, school materials for children, annual health campaigns, prizes, and 
transportation for community members. The environmental clause may include the 
commitment of the mine to re-forest eroded areas and carry out participatory 
monitoring of the environmental impacts, mainly water quality (pers. conv. with 
Corihuarmi representative).  
However, community authorities have expressed that most clauses of the 
agreement are not fully accomplished (pers. conv. with Shicuy community authority). 
Regarding the breaching of the environmental clause, community authorities often 
mention pollution in higher zones (upstream headwaters), which affect wildlife and 
livestock. For instance, the Chongos Alto community authority said that: 
 “Community members who visited upstream zones reported that they saw signs of 
pollution due to mining activities” (PH, representative of Chongos Alto, Huancayo, 
2016).  
At the end of the year, the benefited community signs a certificate of 
compliance when the agreement has been fulfilled (pers. conv. with Huacravilca and 
Corihuarmi representatives). However, neighboring communities may also experience 
the indirect impacts of mining activities but have no agreement. These communities 
expect to be included in the consultation process and considered for a mining-community 
agreement:  
 “Llamapsillon (neighboring community of Chongos Alto) does not have any 
agreement with Huacravilca mine…There should be a prior consultation including 
all neighboring communities, as they did with the directly affected community, so 
we can have the possibility to accept or not their activities” (BC, representative of 
Llamapsillon, Llamapsillon, 2016). 
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3.3.2. Mining impact on water streams 
The water results were compared with the values reported by the Peruvian monitoring 
agency (i.e., OEFA) to provide the historical background. OEFA inspected Corihuarmi 
three times (2010, 2012 and 2013), and Azulcocha mine twice in 2013 (Appendix 8.2: 
Table 8-1 and Table 8-2). In the Cunas sub-basin, eight case samples were taken at 100 m 
upstream (B-AM) and 500 m downstream (A-AM) of the Azulcocha concentrator plant, 
at the confluence of the Tambo and Consac rivers (I-N), and 500 m downstream of the 
Usibamba community (A-UC). Four control samples (B-UC and P-N) were taken at non-
mining sites (Figure 3-5a). In the Aimaraes sub-basin, eight case samples were taken at 
500 m downstream of the Corihuarmi mine (A-CM), ca. 500 m downstream of the 
disputed area (A-CA-S), and 500 m upstream (B-HM), and 500 m (A-HM) downstream of 
the exploration platforms of Huacravilca. Here four control samples (L-S and I-L) were 
taken at two non-mining sites (Figure 3-5b). 
In Table 3-5 and Table 3-6, the results from OEFA and this study show where 
total metal concentrations were higher than the EQS. The total metal concentrations of 
the control and remaining case sample points were lower than the EQS (Appendix 8.2). 
In the Cunas sub-basin, the sample point downstream of Azulcocha (A-AM) showed high 
concentrations of As, Cd, and manganese (Mn), metals that are geologically absent in 
the area (Table 3-2). Compared to the OEFA reports (OEFA, 2014a, 2013a), in 2013 the 
As and Cd levels in the Huasi Viejo stream of the Cunas sub-basin were also high (Figure 
3-5a). The highest concentration of As was 13.43 mg L−1 in e02 at 100 m from the A-AM 
sample point. In this sample, there was also a higher concentration of Mn, which is 
related to the enhancement of the oxidation of arsenite in manganese oxides. In the 
Aimaraes sub-basin, the sample point upstream of Huacravilca (B-HM) and OEFA results 
showed a pH between 6.5 and 9, which is within the accepted pH range for Andean rivers 
(MINAM, 2017a). B-HM revealed a high concentration of Cd, Mn, and iron (Fe), but there 
were no reports by the OEFA in the surroundings of the sample point with which to 
compare because Huacravilca started the exploration in 2016. 
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Table 3-5. Total metal concentrations (mg L−1) in water samples exceeding 
Environmental Quality Standards (EQS) in the Cunas sub-basin. 
 Site pH Zn As Cd × 10−2 Mn 
EQS 
Irrigation 6.5-9 2 0.1 1.0 0.2 
Livestock drinking 6.5-9 24 0.2 5.0 0.2 
This 
research* 
1 A-AM 
7.8 
12.3 0.6 2.3 18.5 
2 A-AM 12.5 0.6 2.2 18.7 
OEFA 
report* 
e01 8.2 0.2 3.0 <0.0004 18.1 
e02 8.1 0.2 13.4 <0.0004 - 
pcp01 8.0 1.1 0.3 0.2 2.3 
hv01 8.3 0.1 0.1 <0.0004 0.1 
esp01_14 8.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
esp02_14 7.9 0.3 3.0 0.2 19.8 
vi01 8.2 0.8 0.2 1.0 - 
*In these sample points, INGEMMET did not report the presence of heavy metals in 2017. 
 
Table 3-6. Total metal concentrations (mg L-1) in water samples exceeding EQS in the 
Aimaraes sub-basin.  
 Site pH Cu As Cd × 10−1 Fe Mn 
EQS 
Irrigation 6.5-9 0.2 0.1 0.1 5 0.2 
Livestock drinking 6.5-9 0.5 0.2 0.5 - 0.2 
This 
research* 
1 B-HM 
5.4 
0.071 <0.010 0.1 50.0 2.1 
2 B-HM 0.072 <0.010 0.1 52.0 2.1 
By OEFA* 
sw02_10 4.6 0.2 0.5 0.1 36.1 0.4 
sw10_10 4.4 0.0 <0.005 0.0 4.1 0.4 
sw14_10 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 
EBMI  4.2 0.3 0.0 - - - 
sw10_13 3.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 16.5 0.9 
sw20_13 3.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 16.6 0.9 
sw01_13 3.1 0.1 0.0 <0.0024 25.9 1.4 
sw19_13 3.1 0.1 0.0 <0.0024 18.5 1.4 
*In these sample points, INGEMMET did not report the presence of heavy metals in 2017 
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Figure 3-5. Water monitoring and elevation in (a) Cunas and (b) Aimaraes sub-basins.  
Based on OEFA (2014b, 2014c, 2014a, 2013a, 2012). 
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3.3.3. Mining impact on soil 
Table 3-7 shows that the concentrations of As, Cd, and/or Pb exceed at least in some 
cases the EQS (MINAM, 2017b). In the Cunas sub-basin, four case samples were taken 
at 12 km and 24 km downstream of the Azulcocha mining site as well as two control 
samples (NC30 and NC60) at non-mining sites. In all soil sample sites, there was a high 
presence of cadmium at 30 cm and 60 cm depth. This may be explained by the 
geochemistry of the research area (INGEMMET, 2018) (Table 3-3) characterized by the 
presence of arsenic and cadmium at 24 km downstream. While this situation may 
explain the high concentrations of cadmium and arsenic, it does not explain that of lead.  
 
Table 3-7. Total heavy metal and other metal concentrations (mg Kg-1) in the Cunas sub-
basin. 
 Sample As Cd Cr Pb 
EQS Farming soil 50 1.4 * 70 
Control 
samples 
Control-30 cm 26.5 1.6 14.8 13.8 
Control-60 cm 20.7 1.8 16.8 9.9 
Case 
samples  
12 km-30 cm 330.2 4.8 9.8 103.8 
12 km- 60 cm 78.1 2.4 14.8 17.1 
24 km-30 cm 77.5 2.7 19.4 26.2 
24 km-60 cm 62.6 2.6 17.4 27.7 
* Based on supreme decree N° 011-2017-MINAM (MINAM, 2017b), total Cr is not a 
parameter in farming soil. However, this study aimed to indicate the Cr contents. 
 
In the Aimaraes sub-basin, a parallel sampling procedure was implemented. 
Here, four case samples were taken in the two aforementioned layers at both 12 km and 
24 km downstream of the Corihuarmi mine, plus two control samples at non-mining 
sites. Table 3-8 shows that concentrations of As and Cd are higher than the EQS in 12 
km downstream of Corihuarmi. These may relate to the geochemistry of the site. A 
similar situation is observed 24 km downstream (Table 3-3) for Cd. For the control sites, 
Cd is above EQS, but the site geochemistry only indicates the presence of Cr (Table 3-8).  
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Table 3-8. Total heavy metal and other metal concentrations (mg kg-1) in the Aimaraes 
sub-basin. 
 Sample As Cd Hg Cr 
EQS Farming soil 50.0 1.4 6.6 * 
Control 
samples 
Control-30 cm 13.3 3.3 <2.0 27.8 
Control-60 cm 13.2 3.1 <2.0 26.4 
Cases 
samples 
12 km-30 cm 84.6 4.4 9.4 22.4 
12 km- 60 cm 99.9 4.0 5.4 20.8 
24 km-30 cm 11.9 2.7 <2.0 18.4 
24 km-60 cm 6.9 2.8 <2.0 17.4 
* Based on supreme decree N° 011-2017-MINAM (MINAM, 2017b), total Cr is not a 
parameter in farming soil. However, this study aimed to indicate the Cr contents. 
 
3.3.4. Community livelihoods and mining impact 
In the Cunas sub-basin, the Shicuy community rents its lands to the Azulcocha mine 
through an agreement. However, Usibamba authorities affirmed that the flow of the 
Pucara river transports the mining impacts downstream to the Shicuy community. The 
authorities expressed concern since they use the river water for grazing and agriculture. 
This concern is supported by the aforementioned water results, which indicate high 
concentrations of arsenic and cadmium downstream of the Azulcocha concentrator 
plant. Interestingly, the Usibamba community does not want to settle an agreement 
with Azulcocha but rather to protect its livestock and dairy production on which its 
economy is based. 
Figure 3-6 shows the LCC and the land use proposed during the participatory 
mapping exercise. The LCC assessed the current land use in Usibamba and contrasted it 
with the established croplands (highlighted in bright green) and settlements identified 
during participatory mapping. Vegetation represents natural pastures grazed by the 
livestock of the Usibamba farmers. These livestock drink water from the Pucara and 
Jatun Huasi rivers. It is suspected that the Pucara river is affected by mining activities 
(pers. conv. with Usibamba authorities), which in turn pollute the Huasi Viejo, 
Yanamachay and Tambo rivers. When asked about this, the Azulcocha mine 
representative stated that the Azulcocha mine uses its concentrator plant for processing 
extractions from other mining concessions (outside of the research area), and the 
granted water use is done properly. However, Azulcocha was fined in 2013 due to the 
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lack of prevention measures related to water accumulation in mining tailings (OEFA, 
2013b).  
Figure 3-6 shows the water and soil sample sites and also the INGEMMET sites 
(i.e., geochemistry database) with the Cd and As that had higher contents than the EQS. 
Based on the LCC, the crop areas might be influenced by the geochemistry of the area. 
Regarding Azulcocha, the INGEMMET did not record the presence of heavy metals near 
the mine. The aforementioned results of the OEFA support the study findings of high 
concentrations of cadmium and arsenic downstream of the concentrator plant. Thus, 
the concerns of the Usibamba community regarding water and their livelihoods may well 
be justified.  
 
 
Figure 3-6. Land-cover classification and participatory mapping in Usibamba community. 
OEFA refers to the location of the samples collected by the OEFA in 2013. The 
locations of geochemistry values reported in 2014-2016 by the INGEMMET 
are indicated by white dots (○) with the relevant presence of heavy metals. In 
the case of As and Cd, they had higher concentrations than EQS. The locations 
of the water and soil results are referred to as water (●) and soil (▲). The 
Usibamba settlements are delineated by dotted lines. This figure is based on 
the participatory mapping, official community maps, INGEMMET 
(INGEMMET, 2018), and OEFA reports (OEFA, 2013b). 
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3.4. Discussion 
This study provides an insight into the negotiations between mining operations and 
communities operationalized through an agreement. This agreement is established via a 
regularly negotiation process in which the expectations and needs of the campesino 
communities are supposed to be met by the mining company as a counterpart. These 
negotiations are guided by previous experiences, the negotiation skills of the community 
authorities, and the knowledge on the mining potential of the community lands. It should 
be noted that there are also communities that oppose the signing of these agreements 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Hoogesteger and Urteaga, 2013). Despite the economic offset, 
communities remain concerned about the impacts of mining on water quality, 
livelihoods, and the general health of the ecosystems (Preciado Jerónimo, 2011; Rodbell 
et al., 2014). To analyze mining impacts on farming lands, this study compared the heavy 
metal concentrations exceeding the EQS in the study results with the results of the OEFA 
and the contents reported by the INGEMMET. 
 
3.4.1. Effects on the ecology  
Water quality testing in these sub-basins is novel. Previous studies have only focused on 
the Junin Lake, located between Cerro de Pasco mine and La Oroya mine, the latter one 
made the nearest city one of the top ten most polluted cities worldwide (Blacksmith 
Institute, 2007; Martin et al., 2001; Rodbell et al., 2014). In the Cunas sub-basin, the study 
results indicate that the total concentrations of arsenic and cadmium exceed the EQS. 
There is the possibility that the concentrator plant of the Azulcocha mine led to the high 
concentration of arsenic in the Huasi Viejo river given that arsenic is a by-product of metal 
smelting and a component of dust from metal ore roasting (Ng et al., 2003). On the other 
hand, there are non-exploited areas within the Azulcocha mining concession where the 
presence of heavy metals may relate to its geogeny, and the detected arsenic may have 
been released through both natural weathering and mining production (Flora, 2015). 
Since a higher concentration of manganese was also found, this might be related to the 
enhancement of the oxidation of arsenite in manganese oxides (Flora, 2015). Arsenite 
could be the dominating element due to a pH < 8 (7.8) downstream of the Azulcocha 
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concentrator plant. This situation has become a source of conflict because the Huasi Viejo 
river is used by the livestock in the Usibamba community located downstream.  
In the Aimaraes sub-basin, this study found high concentrations of cadmium, 
iron, and manganese, although the geochemical characteristics of the surroundings 
(Condorsinga formation) are not characterized by the natural occurrence of these 
elements. However, in the nearby Cercapuquio formation, zinc and cadmium are 
inherent elements, and the high cadmium concentration was possibly due to the 
neighboring abandoned and non-remediated Cercapuquio mine. After 1912, the 
Cercapuquio mine (W75°26´—S12°25´, 4380 MASL) was irregularly exploited, for 
example producing 180 ton/day of lead, zinc, and iron between 1935 and 1938 (Levi 
Rendón, 1960). This mining was underground and located on an ore deposit 
(Cercapuquio ore) that provides lead (as PbS), zinc (as ZnS), silver (as a combination of 
AgS and PbS), cadmium (as CdS), manganese (as MnO) and iron (as Fe(OH)2) (Levi 
Rendón, 1960). The proximity of Cercapuquio ore to the B-HM sample point and the 
constant soil erosion may have influenced the presence of cadmium, iron, and 
manganese. Moreover, cadmium persistence may have led to its accumulation in the 
environment (WHO, 2007). 
The results of the soil analyses indicate the presence of cadmium and arsenic 
in the samples of both sub-basins, where the geology is characterized by the natural 
presence of chromium (INGEMMET, 2018; Mégard, 1968). Chromium accumulates in 
the topsoil layer where it is absorbed and accumulated in plant roots with a small 
possibility of translocation to shoots (Kabata-Pendias and Pendias, 2001; Shahid et al., 
2017). Cadmium can also reach the roots of grass species (Peralta-Videa et al., 2009). In 
the research area, rough grass (Jarava ichu) is the main forage source of livestock (pers. 
conv. with community members). To better analyze the bioaccumulation, this study 
suggests an in-depth analysis of the cadmium and chromium concentrations obtained 
by plants, animals and human consumers (Peralta-Videa et al., 2009). In the light of the 
soil findings, this study suggests several possible reasons for high heavy metal contents: 
(1) the long-term mining activity that has led to transportation of heavy metals to water 
streams, (2) the soil erosion and proximity to the Cercapuquio ore, and (3) the airborne 
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transportation of heavy metals from the long-term use of smelters at the La Oroya mine. 
Regarding the first reason, this might explain the presence of arsenic in the soils. Streams 
crossing the zones erode and disperse soils dragging arsenic and lead downstream 
eventually reaching the flood plain, and is a more intense process during the rainy 
season (Razo et al., 2004). Regarding the second reason, the study results were overlaid 
with the geochemical characteristics of the site reported by INGEMMET (INGEMMET, 
2018). The presence of chromium is due to the underground lithological units. The high 
concentrations of other heavy metals (e.g., arsenic and cadmium) might be related to 
the geology, but could also be influenced by the long history of mining, e.g., the 
Cercapuquio mine was abandoned in the early twentieth century and never remediated. 
Regarding the third reason, since 1922 the three smelters at the La Oroya mine —
located 167 km north-west from Cercapuquio— have emitted non-regulated toxic 
smokes that have affected land and water bodies, presumably including the Cunas sub-
basin (Caballero Martín, 1981; Cotler, 2016; Martínez Alier and Roca Jusmet, 2015; 
Neumann, 2016). Although the air transportation of cadmium, lead and arsenic mostly 
occurs over short distances (Cooke and Abbott, 2008), there are reports that this has 
also occurred over great distances from the smelters (Caballero Martín, 1981). From 
2002 to 2007, the emissions from La Oroya contained cadmium, lead, and arsenic 
(Abanto Kcomt, 2007). Cadmium particles (ca. 1µm) can travel for days depending on 
meteorological parameters and the density of particles (WHO, 2007).  
 
3.4.2. Effects on the community livelihoods 
The decrease in water and soil quality either directly or indirectly due to mining activities 
has affected communities’ livelihoods and unleashed land-use conflicts (Bury, 2002; 
Conde, 2017; Prado Fernández et al., 2013). The negotiation process described above is 
often improperly conducted and neglects community members or leaves behind 
indirectly affected communities (Warnaars, 2012). The participatory mapping and land-
cover classification show how the Pucara river, which is possibly affected by mining, 
impacts other non-mining areas of a downstream community (Usibamba). Hence, the 
Usibamba community, relying mostly on livestock rearing, has developed an anti-mining 
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position since the establishment of the Azulcocha mine. The community decided to 
prioritize the conservation of the environment for their development. Upstream and 
most-affected communities, like Shicuy, hold a different position. In Shicuy, their 
agreement awards them economic benefits (i.e., 300 000 PEN/year  € 80174.46/year), 
and livestock are allowed to graze and drink near concession areas (pers. conv. with 
Shicuy authorities).  
Regarding water access and quality, farmers agree that the pollutants in the 
tailings from the Azulcocha mining project leak out into the Huasi Viejo river. They then 
flow into the Consac river and later to the Pucara river, which is used by the Usibamba 
community farmers for watering livestock and other activities, e.g., crop 
irrigation. However, the bioaccumulation of heavy metals in crops and pastures was not 
explored, and appears to remain a major challenge. The research findings, matching 
previous studies, show that water insecurity due to poor water quality is triggered by 
mining sites located at headwaters (Bebbington and Williams, 2008; Hoogesteger and 
Urteaga, 2013). The poorer water quality causing water insecurity in the Usibamba 
community jeopardizes the community´s livelihoods (Ahlers, 2010; Hoogesteger and 
Urteaga, 2013), and prevents future negotiations with mining companies. This, taken 
together with disagreements arising from the community interests, may be the seeds of 
future land-use conflicts. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
The establishment of legal mining activities and the overlapping with the economic 
interests of communities trigger environmental concerns among communities regarding 
water and soil quality. Based on the study of three mining sites and 14 campesino 
communities, agreement clauses were identified that provide economic, social and 
environmental benefits in return for the rent of community land. However, not all 
communities can be considered for signing an agreement with the mining company, and 
many do not want to do this as was the case in Llamapsillon and Usibamba communities. 
This study also revealed the impacts of heavy metal concentrations in water and soil that 
were linked to community livelihoods.  
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Mining impacts—in terms of heavy metals in soil and water—might affect 
downstream communities, including those who have no agreements with mining 
companies. Soil analyses show that cadmium and other metal contents were higher than 
the national EQS. The water analysis shows that concentrations of arsenic and cadmium 
near mining sites also exceeded the EQS. In contrast with results from the Peruvian 
monitoring agency and those based solely on the local geochemistry, these results 
indicate a relationship between the high concentrations of heavy metals and current 
mining activities, which cannot be attributed to the long-term mining exploitation of the 
region. The results of this study indicate that the livelihood of a neighboring community 
that does not have an agreement can be affected by mining activities in terms of livestock 
grazing and watering. Therefore, although the findings are significant, they are still 
indicative, and the heavy metal concentrations and bioaccumulation in the research area 
should be further explored. Finally, the findings of this interdisciplinary research have the 
potential to be used in other contexts to assess impacts on both the environment and 
community livelihoods at the intersection of mining and community interests.  
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4. IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REFORMS IN THE CENTRAL PERUVIAN 
ANDES: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CAMPESINO 
COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY MINING 
4.1. Introduction 
Most Andean countries have large territories with diverse geographies, which pressures 
governments to prioritize their investments in state building to administer these 
appropriately (Bowman, 1980; Herbst, 2000; Pulgar Vidal, 2014; Soifer, 2015; Stasavage, 
2011). State building is defined as the establishment and strengthening of state 
institutions within a country (Fukuyama, 2004). In Peru, state building has occurred at 
sites where geographic conditions are favorable while being absent in remote areas 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Herbst, 2000). Along with the improvement of state 
institutions, the expectation of improved economic integration encouraging economic 
development has been the dominant neoliberal variant prevalent in Peru (Wilson, 2004). 
However, between 1990 and 2000, Fujimori´s government reduced the power 
of the state and established measures to enforce neoliberal policies that promoted 
private sector growth and weakened civil society (Bury, 2004; CRP, 1995; Durand, 2015; 
Perreault, 2014; Radcliffe, 2005). The Peruvian legislation and institutions were 
reformed to attract foreign investments, which came mainly in the form of extractivism 
projects, i.e extraction of natural resources in high volumes and intensity to export them 
as raw materials with minimal or no processing (Damonte and Peralta, 2015; Gudynas, 
2017, 2015). With the fall of Fujimori´s government in 2000, subsequent governments 
inherited a state with a high level of “state capture”, i.e., influence in decision-making, 
by the private sector (Dargent et al., 2017; Durand, 2015), and they continued 
supporting extractivist projects although these created land-use conflicts (Gudynas, 
2017). State capture manifested in the influence of private companies in the making of 
laws and decrees to promote (extractivist) investments (Durand, 2016; Hellman et al., 
2000a, 2000b), and frequent staff exchange between public regulators and the 
companies they were meant to regulate. In Peru, many companies combine their 
organizational capacities and networks to strongly influence the investment-related 
decision-making of the government (Durand, 2016). This has undermined the creation 
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of strict mining-related state legislation (Dargent et al., 2017). 
Peru and several other Latin American countries depend on extractivism to 
boost their economies (Bebbington, 2009; Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 
2011; Vélez-Torres, 2014). However, extractivism has unleashed a set of land-use 
conflicts (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; Damonte and Glave, 2012). Land-use conflicts arise 
as a response by communities to threats to their ecosystems and livelihoods through 
water and soil pollution (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Li, 2009; 
McDonell, 2015). Furthermore, extractivism has triggered corruption, divided 
communities from their government, and weakened the capabilities of the latter to 
resolve conflicts (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Gudynas, 2017). So far, no single 
government has come up with a comprehensive mining strategy, and only deals with 
mining issues and conflicts once they become urgent (De Echave, 2018). This can also be 
seen with regard to the water sector. Because mining concessions are estimated to 
cover 25% to 67% of watersheds nationwide, it is expected that they will negatively 
affect future water provision (Bebbington, 2009; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011). Therefore, 
for most campesino communities, often located in watersheds of high mining potential, 
environmental concerns relate mainly to the pollution of water supplies due to mines 
upstream (De Echave, 2018; Li, 2017). Consequently, it is concluded that the 
environmental impacts of mining may threaten the health and livelihoods of the 
communities and also create conflicts between communities and companies (Bury, 
2002; Conde and Le Billon, 2017; Walter and Urkidi, 2017). Therefore, Walter and Urkidi 
(2017) argued that community consultation is an important strategy to prevent social 
rejection of mining projects, and that participatory processes have to include state 
institutions, mining companies, and potentially affected communities.  
The International Labor Organization 169 convention, held in 1989, was added 
to the Peruvian political constitution in 1994. It became a law (Law of prior 
consultation—Law N° 29785) and was implemented in 2011 and 2012 (CRP, 2011b; ILO, 
1989). This convention promotes the right of communities to be consulted before a 
prospection and exploitation take place on their land (ILO, 1989). However, unlike land 
concession for oil exploitation for which consultation is done before land concession, 
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consultation for mining operations is only required after the land has been granted to 
the mining company and before the start of the exploration operations (MC, 2012). The 
law for campesino communities (Law N° 24656) states that community lands belong to 
the community (CRP, 1987), but the corresponding sub-soils belong to the government. 
Because the general mining law (D.S. N° 014-92-EM) established that the sub-soil 
belongs to the government, land grants for mining operations are managed by the 
Peruvian government through the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MEM) (MEM, 1992).  
During the government of Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), there was a political 
controversy regarding mining operations and prior consultation (Remy, 2013; WB, 
2016). Based on the law of prior consultation, communities need to be registered in a 
database as native communities in order to be considered for prior consultation. 
However, the inclusion of all communities in this database has taken more time than 
expected (De Echave, 2018; WB, 2016). Although the Ministry of Culture10 maintains 
that there is no binding relationship between the registration of communities in the 
database and their consideration for prior consultation, the MEM did not apply prior 
consultation in the mining sector until 2015. The MEM argued that prior consultations 
were impractical, and because mining concessions do not involve any activities on lands, 
concessions were provided before 2011, and communities were not registered in the 
database. In late 2015, the MEM, however, started this process for the mining sector 
and to date there have been 17 prior consultation processes (MEM, 2018a; Sanborn and 
Ramirez, 2016). One explanation for this is that the law of prior consultation should not 
be imposed retroactively (WB, 2016). Thus, prior consultation has not been as effective 
as expected because many land grants were given before the enactment of this law (i.e., 
before 2011) (SERVINDI, 2015; WB, 2016). Prior consultation must not be confused with 
the public participation of communities, because public participation aims to inform 
communities about the mining project while prior consultation is for decision-making 
processes (CRP, 2011b; MEM, 2010; WB, 2016).  
                                                     
10 The Ministry of Culture was created in 2010 and is responsible for the creation of 
registration of communities in the database and the promotion of prior consultation 
(CRP, 2011b; Sanborn and Ramirez, 2016). 
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A campesino community 11  traditionally sustains its livelihoods through 
agriculture and livestock rearing (Marcos, 1994, Bury 2002). Communities consider land 
rights to encompass water, soil, and rock elements, which also form the mountains used 
for mining exploitation activities (Long and Roberts, 2001; Silva-Macher and Farrell, 
2014). Land distribution and social organization in campesino communities developed 
out of a combination of the Spanish ʻcabildo12ʼ and the Inca’s ʻayllu13ʼ (Castillo et al., 
2004; CTRJ, 2015b; Remy, 2013). The development of campesino communities has been 
influenced by four major historical processes, i.e., the reign of the landlord oligarchy 
(1821-1920), the integration of campesinos into the mining workforce (1920-1969), the 
agrarian reform (1970-1990), and the recognition of campesino communities as 
democratic institutions with autonomous land use, followed by the subsequent loss of 
this very autonomy (1990-present) (CRP, 1995; Dale et al., 1990; Gustafsson, 2018; 
Henríquez, 2015). Based on the general law of campesino communities, the community 
is governed and administrated by a community directive that is comprised of a president 
(legal representative of the community), vice-president and four authorities (e.g. 
treasurer) (CRP, 1987). The community is also governed by the general assembly 14 
formed by all active community members15 and special committees (Robles Mendoza, 
                                                     
11 In 1570, Viceroy Toledo created `towns of reduction´ to join the reduced population 
of Indians (i.e., inhabitants of Las Indias as was called the population of Andean 
countries during Spanish colonial rule) due to the death of 90% of their population. 
Viceroy Toledo created these towns to join the dispersed Indians and provided them 
with land for the growth of their population and economy. Based on the political and 
economic interests of the Spanish colony, communities were formed and recognized 
officially, including their authorities and customs (Remy, 2013; Robles Mendoza, 2004). 
12 Cabildo refers to the paternal origin from Spanish crown. The RAE dictionary defines 
cabildo as the church community (Diccionario de la lengua española, n.d.). 
13 Ayllu refers to the maternal origin from Inca culture. The RAE dictionary defines Ayllu 
(in Quechua) as a family who belongs to a lineage. A group of ayllus forms a community 
(Diccionario de la lengua española, n.d.). 
14 The general assembly discusses all community issues in order to provide a consensus 
decision. The participation in the assembly is mandatory for active members. 
15  In a campesino community, members are categorized in active and passive 
community members. Active members pay their annual contribution and taxes to their 
community. The active members always have to participate in community meetings and 
their vote and opinions are important in the decision-making process of the community. 
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2004). 
Due to increased criticism and land-use conflicts regarding extractivist projects, 
the Peruvian state has followed the international trend towards apparent increased 
social and environmental awareness. This has manifested in the creation of ad-hoc 
institutions and enacted laws and decrees supposedly safeguarding the environment 
and protecting people. These are often enshrined within broader international 
economic agreements, e.g., free trade agreements (Barandiarán Gómez, 2008; Damonte 
and Vila, 2014; Dargent et al., 2017). The set of state institutions and instruments of 
public policy that focuses on the problems of a degraded environment on which people 
depend is envisaged as environmental institutionalism16 (Damonte and Vila, 2014). A 
milestone in Peru’s environmental institutionalism was the creation of the Ministry of 
Environment (MINAM) and several state institutions with specific mandates, such as the 
Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA) in 2008 (Bebbington et 
al., 2018b, 2018a; Damonte and Vila, 2014; PRP, 2008). However, subsequent reforms 
have resulted in the weakening of these environmental institutions rather than 
reinforcing their capacity for environmental protection. For example, key functions were 
taken away from MINAM (e.g. the right to create nature reserves), the authority of 
environmental agencies has been restricted, and even environmental quality standards 
have been modified (CRP, 2015; Damonte and Vila, 2014; De Echave, 2018; PCM, 2013; 
PRP, 2014). Further, the barriers for state institutions such as the National Authority of 
Water (ANA) to enforce their functions via law and regulations exemplify weak 
environmental institutionalism. The ANA, via its decentralized offices in each watershed, 
                                                     
After a predetermined period, active members retire and become passive members. 
Passive members are not obliged to participate in community meetings and are exempt 
from paying community taxes. 
16 Environmental institutionalism (Spanish: institucionalidad ambiental) in Peru can be 
traced back to 1991, when environment-related state institutions were assigned to 
oversee corporate activities. In 2008, the creation of MINAM enforced environmental 
institutionalism and restricted the working areas of the new ministry, i.e., mining and 
hydrocarbon sectors (Barandiarán Gómez, 2008).  Thus, based on how environmental 
institutionalism has been built, it can be considered a type of historical institutionalism. 
Hall (1986) defined this institutionalism as “formal and informal procedures, routines 
and conventions” (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). 
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provides the right to water use via the request by any user (e.g. mining company) in 
exchange for a payment (ANA, 2010; CRP, 2009). However, mining companies have 
incurred debts from water use and ANA still faces difficulties to recuperate these 
(Salazar Vega, 2017).   
This institutional weakening has undermined the trust of communities. State 
institutions have struggled to rebuild this trust and promote stakeholder participation 
in consultations to prevent the outbreak of conflicts (Conde and Le Billon, 2017). For 
instance, until 2015, community consultation and the conducting of environmental 
impact assessments were the mandates of MEM (Dargent et al., 2017), which also had 
the responsibility for promoting mining projects (Dargent et al., 2017; De Echave, 2018). 
In an attempt to regain the trust of the citizens, in late 2015 the Environmental Licensing 
Agency (i.e., SENACE) under MINAM was put in charge of carrying out environmental 
impact assessments and ensuring the participation of all stakeholders in the process. 
Nevertheless, gaining citizen trust is still a major challenge for state institutions 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; SENACE, 2018).  
So far, most studies on land-use conflicts have focused on cases where conflicts 
had already occurred, e.g., Conga17, La Oroya and Tambogrande (Haarstad and Fløysand, 
2007; Neumann, 2016; Silva-Macher and Farrell, 2014). However, this research focused 
on an area where communities and mining companies seem to peacefully interact 
without conflicts. Previous studies have reported that the emergence of new 
stakeholders (e.g. “social instigators”) and their (personal) interests fuel the conflicts, 
and suggested that future research should avoid these in order to gain a good idea of 
the status quo in communities affected by mining (Arellano-Yanguas, 2016, 2011a). The 
aim in the present study was to investigate the impact of environmental institutionalism 
in the central Peruvian Andes by profiling campesino communities, identifying 
stakeholders’ interactions, and disclosing determinant factors of land-use conflicts. The 
                                                     
17  Conga is a controversial conflict that involved the death of protesters, and the 
intervention of the central government to support a third-party evaluation of the 
environmental impact assessment of the project. The conflict ended when the 
expansion project was terminated and the water became the conflict core (Guzmán 
Solano, 2016).   
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following research questions were addressed: (RQ 4-1) How is the environmental 
institutionalism perceived locally? (RQ 4-2) How do local stakeholders perceive 
environmental institutionalism in a context of non-active land-use conflicts? (RQ 4-3) 
What are the profiles and the challenges of campesino communities? (RQ 4-4) What are 
the main causes of land-use conflicts in community-mining lands? 
 
4.2. Materials and Methods 
4.2.1. Research site and sampling 
The research was carried out in the Mantaro Valley located in the Junin Region in the 
core of the Central Andes of Peru. The valley hosts ca. 368 campesino communities with 
a population of 45,702 listed in the community registers of 2012, and its agricultural 
importance is widely recognized (CTRJ, 2015a; INEI, 2014). At the same time, the Junin 
Region is a prime target of mining-related investments. In 2013, these reached almost 
USD 10 billion, and after a considerable drop nevertheless reached almost USD 5 billion 
in 2017 (MEM, 2018b).  
The study site is located in the south-western zone of the Junin Region 
between 12°00´S 75°45´W and 12°22´S 75°07´W at an altitude of over 3500 MASL. In 
this zone, three mines are located: Azulcocha, Huacravilca and Corihuarmi; the study 
included the campesino communities neighboring these mines. These communities 
possess both irrigated and rain-fed lands, and livelihoods are mainly subsistence 
agriculture and livestock rearing (CTRJ, 2015c). 
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Figure 4-1: Campesino communities in the south-western zone of the Junin Region, Peru 
(a) Location of the Junin Region, (b) two open-pit mines (Corihuarmi and 
Azulcocha), one mining project (Huacravilca) and 14 campesino 
communities. 
 
The selection of the communities followed a stepwise procedure that required 
consultation with local authorities (district and province mayors), contact and 
permission of the community presidents, and the final acceptance of the community 
assembly. Finally, 14 communities volunteered to participate, including a total of 273 
active community members (ACM) who represented their households (Figure 4-1, Table 
4-1). 
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Table 4-1. Campesino communities based on interviews with community authorities, 
201618 
District Community Description 
San Jose 
de 
Quero 
San Pedro de 
Sulcan* 
 Formed by 25 ACM.  
 Mainly rain-fed subsistence agriculture.  
 Problem to access suitable land for agriculture due to the 
dominance of rocky zones. 
Usibamba* 
 Formed by 238 ACM.  
 Livestock rearing and dairy products.  
 Irrigated and rain-fed agriculture. 
Chala 
 Formed by 72 ACM.  
 Livestock-based economy.  
 Land is characterized by poor soils.  
 Farming activities are affected by climatic hazards (i.e., 
droughts, hail, and frost). 
Santa Rosa de 
Huarmita 
 Formed by 23 ACM.  
 Drought and lack of irrigation affect (subsistence) 
agriculture.  
San José de 
Quero 
 Formed by 30 ACM.  
 Farming and livestock rearing.  
 Dairy products are a source of family income. 
San Juan 
de Jarpa  
Shicuy*  
 
 Formed by 75 ACM.  
 Livestock rearing (80% of land) and agriculture (20% of land). 
Bellavista 
 
 Formed by 50 ACM.  
 Lack of water for livestock. Crops constantly affected by 
climatic hazards. 
Misquipata 
 
 Formed by 30 ACM.  
 Irrigated agriculture despite limited access to irrigation 
channels.  
 Livestock rearing and supplementary economic activities. 
Chucupata 
 Formed by 20 ACM.  
 Livestock rearing and agriculture affected by climatic events, 
poor access to water and land suitable for agriculture.  
Huasi-
cancha  
Huasicancha*  
 
 
 Formed by 251 ACM.  
 Agriculture and livestock.  
 Rain-fed subsistence agriculture. 
Chongos 
Alto  
Chongos Alto* 
 
 Formed by 108 ACM.  
 Agriculture affected by the lack of irrigation systems and 
climatic hazards.  
 Lack of roads to the community  
Palmayoc* 
 
 Formed by 22 ACM.  
 Livestock rearing and agriculture.  
Palaco* 
 Formed by 23 ACM.  
 Agriculture and livestock rearing affected by climatic 
hazards.  
                                                     
18 Description is based on information provided by community presidents and other 
members of the community directive during in-depth interviews. 
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 Lack of technical/veterinary support by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
Llamapsillon* 
 
 Formed by 55 ACM.  
 Livestock-based economy.  
 Overgrazing and lack of technical/veterinary support by the 
Ministry of Agriculture.  
*Affected by ongoing mining activity; ACM=active community members 
 
4.2.2. Methods 
This research applied a mixed-methods approach that included observations, in-depth 
interviews with key stakeholders, application of a semi-structured survey in 273 rural 
households, and an adapted social analysis.  
Observations were carried out during community meetings and every-day 
economic activities. They were recorded and pictures were taken when necessary and 
possible (Clifford et al., 2016). Observation of community meetings aimed to determine 
the level of influence of mining companies on community decision-making. For that, 
communities were divided into two groups: case study communities affected by mining 
activities and control communities where no influence of mining activities was observed 
(Table 4-1). Mining company representatives mostly interacted with the communities 
during their general assemblies. Furthermore, discussions took place with the 
community president/authority during economic compensation measures organized by 
the company. Observing these events and company-community interactions helped to 
set the theoretical framework of the research (Clark et al., 2009). 
In-depth interviews were held with relevant stakeholders (n=34), i.e., 
representatives of state institutions, campesino community authorities, local 
government authorities (mayors of provincial and district governments) of the Junin 
Region, civil society, and mining companies. These representatives were identified 
according to their knowledge and political relevance and later contacted (Table 4-2). The 
interviews were interpreted using content analysis (Silverman 2015), which included 
manual coding and categorization. 
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Table 4-2. Number of stakeholder interviews per category, 2016-2017 
Category  Group N 
State institutions Ministry of Energy and Mining, Ministry of 
Environment 
2 
State institutions (e.g. OEFA, ANA, ONDS-PCM) 7 
Mining Company Community Relations Office 6 
Local 
Government 
Provinces of Huancayo and Concepción 2 
Districts of Chongos Alto and Huasicancha 2 
Civil society Agriculture-related (e.g. Agriculture Federation of 
Junin Region) and community-related federations 
(e.g. Campesino and native communities 
federation), faith-based organizations (e.g., 
environmental round table of Junin Region), 
Defense Coalition of Chupaca19 
4 
Community Presidents 10 
Leader (i.e., person indicated as a leader in Shicuy) 1 
Total 34 
 
The socio-economic (semi-structured) survey was carried out in 14 
communities. Households were selected applying the snowball technique (Reed et al., 
2009) among the active members of each community because most communities have 
a low number of active members (see Table 4-1). In total, 273 ACM were surveyed. The 
survey covered (i) the relationship with the mining operation, (ii) the environmental 
concerns regarding water and soil, (iii) the household socio-economic situation, and (iv) 
the household´s farming activities. Data were tabulated in Microsoft Excel and analyzed 
using STATA/SE and SPSS (IBM Corporation, 2017; Rothman, 2012; StataCorp, 2017). 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was applied to analyze the relations among the 
presence of mining activities and 16 other variables such as family economy, education, 
sex, age, economic activity, climatic hazards, and livestock. To compare the influence of 
the presence of mining activities on the other variables, a short model (i.e., using only 
two or three variables such as mining presence and water-related problems) and large 
model (i.e., using the variables of the short model and the remaining variables such as 
                                                     
19 The Defense Coalition of Chupaca is formed by one president and 14 secretaries who 
are chosen through elections every two years. Their mission is to defend the 
inhabitants regarding health, investment and management of funds, and the 
environment. 
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education, age, etc.) were created. Depending on the main variable of the correlation, 
either logistic or simple linear regression was used.  
All stakeholders who were interviewed (Table 4-2) were also invited to 
participate in a workshop in which the Social Analysis Conflict/Collaboration, Legitimacy, 
Interests, Power (CLIP)20 approach was applied (Chevalier and Buckles 2013). This social 
analysis delves into the relations among parties regarding their collaboration, 
legitimacy, interests, and power (CLIP) to describe their characteristics/relationships in 
conflict escalation. This research added an authority (a form of power) component to 
the social analysis to compare it with legitimacy, because communities are more familiar 
with this concept, referring to it as political authority20. Thus, the CLIP method enabled 
the assessment of the following components: power (i.e., influence), interests, 
legitimacy, and authority of each stakeholder. During the workshop, the stakeholders 
agreed on the influence of each stakeholder regarding the escalation of a land-use 
conflict, based on the following question: What is the level (i.e., degree) of each 
stakeholder component regarding the escalation into land-use conflict? In the 
workshop, stakeholders were divided into three groups to assess the components, and 
the results were averaged to obtain the overall component scores. The workshop aimed 
to (i) define the mining and farming situations, (ii) inquire and discuss the stakeholders’ 
                                                     
20 Based on Chevalier & Buckles (2013):  
 Power is defined as the ability to influence others and use resources (e.g. economic 
wealth, political position, and the ability to use force or threats of force, information 
access) to achieve goals.  
 Interests is defined as the gains and losses that affect power and resource uses 
experienced as a result of an existing conflict.  
 Legitimacy is defined as the recognition of the rights and responsibilities of a 
stakeholder by other parties through law or local customs. 
 Collaboration/conflict is defined as a social relation involving the existing ties that 
affect stakeholders in conflicts and that they can use to influence the conflict.  
 Political authority is defined as a recognized office, position or role by an institution 
or by local customs, giving the stakeholder the ability to reach decisions and pass or 
implement rules and regulations. 
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positions, their collaboration (i.e., working relationship), legitimacy, authority, interests, 
and power, and (iii) identify factors that trigger campesino-company conflicts. 
Fieldwork took place from July 2016 until April 2017. The interviews, surveys 
and the workshop were carried out in Spanish. Before the interviews and the 
administration of questionnaires, the oral or written consent of the respondents was 
sought. 
 
4.3. Results 
In Peru, most studies tackle environmental reform processes and implementation from 
the approach of institutional development and political aspects at a national scale 
(Andaluz Westreicher, 2011; Damonte and Vila, 2014; OXFAM, 2008). Furthermore, they 
focus on the performance of specific environmental state institutions in conflicts 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011b; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Bebbington and Humphreys 
Bebbington, 2009; Merino Acuña, 2015). Due to the escalation of conflicts related to 
extractivist projects, there is a growing necessity to study the impact of environmental 
reform processes in areas with latent conflicts. This will help to elucidate the outcomes 
of the implementation of environmental institutionalism at the local level. This study 
evaluates the local perception of environmental reforms and agencies, the typical 
interactions among stakeholders, the economic profile of community households and 
the possible roots of land-use conflicts.  
 
4.3.1. Stakeholders´ views 
At the end of the 1990s, Peru’s central government had become a highly centralized 
state. Therefore, after the fall of Fujimori’s authoritarian regime in 2000, the 
decentralization of state institutions became a key component of the re-establishment 
of democracy and renewed state building (PNUD, 2006; Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; 
Dargent et al., 2017). The decentralization process aimed to contribute to a full, 
harmonious and sustainable development (CRP, 2002), and also led to the opening of 
decentralized offices of environmental state institutions such as the Agency for 
Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA) and the National Authority of 
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Water (ANA) of the Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture, 
respectively. In 2010, OEFA assumed the environmental supervision of mining activities 
(OEFA, 2010, 2016) to be carried out by offices in all the regions of Peru (MINAM, 2009). 
However, during the interviews, still, 8 out of 34 stakeholders claimed that the absence 
of state institutions continues to affect the community development decision-making 
process regarding extractivist projects.  
In the research area, communities did not have prior consultation, since mining 
concessions occurred before 2011 (i.e., enactment of prior consultation law). Also, only 
four of the studied communities are currently registered as campesino communities 
(Huasicancha, Chongos Alto, Palmayoc and Palaco) in the database of the Ministry of 
Culture (MC, 2019). These factors affect the perception of communities regarding their 
functions in the decision-making process and the presence of state institutions. On the 
other hand, prior consultation should not be mistaken with participation (WB, 2016). In 
the general assemblies of the case study communities, ACM could participate to 
establish the agreements21, and the representatives of the mining companies could 
discuss with ACM to elucidate, for example, the clauses of the agreement or concerns 
related to mining activities. When the community requires the guidance of state 
institutions such as OEFA, the community authorities might request this from the 
decentralized OEFA office. This would then be followed by the provision of an 
informative workshop based on the working area and needs of the community during a 
general assembly. Representatives of state institutions often argue that the capacity and 
technical resources of decentralized offices do not suffice to effectively deal with a large 
number of mining conflicts they have to deal with. This was explained by a 
representative of the regional office of OEFA in Junin: 
                                                     
21  The agreement is set only between the community and the mining company 
representatives. Agreements include social (e.g. support for schools), economic (i.e., 
annual economic compensation) and environmental clauses (e.g. respect of 
environmental standards, remediation). The community’s corresponding benefits 
depend on the stage of intervention of the mining company (e.g. exploration or 
exploitation). 
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“OEFA started in 2008 (…) but OEFA still needs a greater decentralization of its 
activities because of the many mining-related conflicts (…) The problem for 
extending decentralization is not the budget, but the management and 
prioritization of OEFA (…) In OEFA-Junin, for instance, there are difficulties related 
to human resources for applying protocols and a lack of equipment” (YM, 
representative of OEFA-Junin, Huancayo, 09.12.2016). 
Most stakeholders also decried a lack of basic information on the mandates 
and responsibilities of state institutions. The representatives of OEFA and ANA 
confirmed that the regional offices have to address the information gap that can affect 
the decision-making process of communities with regard to extractivist projects. A well-
informed community can request technical advice and support from state institutions 
when interest in an extractivist project is shown in or near the community. In the case 
of ANA – created in 2008 to develop policies and strategies to manage water resources 
(MINAGRI, 2008) – the representative confirmed that only if a community knows about 
ANA´s work are they able to request assistance:  
“ANA needs to do more outreach in order to be visible in communities, so local 
people can request its assistance [if needed]” (CC, representative of ANA, 
Huancayo, 23.11.2016).  
A similar concern was shared by OEFA representatives: 
“The coordination between OEFA and the community has problems regarding the 
lack of information about OEFA in the community, hindering the work between 
both sides” (YM, representative of OEFA-Junin, Huancayo, 09.12.2016).   
Acknowledging and clarifying the concern raised by a regional representative 
of OEFA-Junin, a representative of the national office of OEFA in Lima claimed that OEFA 
is trying to inform the public about their mandates and responsibilities:  
“OEFA currently does studies (i.e., information campaigns) in communities to make 
them aware about OEFA (…) However, to inform communities in an appropriate 
way (e.g. to have the support of accredited interpreters or someone from the same 
community) is still a challenge for OEFA” (MT, representative of OEFA-Lima, Lima, 
16.02.2017).  
Implementing environmental reforms in the Central Peruvian Andes: Socio-economic 
and institutional aspects of campesino communities affected by mining  
68 
 
Similar outreach problems are experienced by the National Office of Dialogue 
and Sustainability of the Presidency of Ministry Council (ONDS-PCM) that is in charge of 
managing conflicts, as the representative of the OEFA in Lima affirmed: 
“Although ONDS-PCM focuses on prevention of conflicts, they fail to reach out to 
the communities” (MT, representative of OEFA-Lima, Lima, 16.02.2017). 
Timely and proper information regarding mining projects and state 
institutions, as well as laws and reports of environmental impact studies, would help 
communities to safeguard their own interests, as previously pointed out by Arellano-
Yanguas (2011a) and De Echave (2018). Besides a lack of information, the lack of capacity 
and equipment mentioned above further weakens the capacities of regional 
environmental offices for implementing environmental institutionalism and even 
increases the disinformation. In general, this study found that a lack of information on 
the side of campesino communities is leading to the perception of an absence of state 
institutions, which in turn undermines the implementation of environmental 
institutionalism because campesinos do not even attempt to seek official assistance. As 
a consequence, the weak implementation of environmental regulations that were 
meant to curb mining conflicts rather than facilitate conflicts (Damonte and Vila, 2014).  
 
4.3.2. Environmental institutionalism and stakeholder interaction 
Contrasting with previous research that studied conflicts after they have manifested and 
escalated (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Dargent et al., 2017), this research studied conflicts 
in their latent stage. Statements of stakeholders disclosed the details of their 
interactions. Representatives of the civil society (Federation of Campesino and Native 
communities, and the Defense Coalition of Chupaca) stated weak collaboration between 
campesino communities and civil society, although it was also expected that the 
collaboration improves if a conflict were to start and then escalate. This is consistent 
with the findings of Arellano-Yanguas (2011a) and Li (2017). On the other hand, state 
institutions claimed to have good collaboration among themselves and praised the 
existing policy frameworks for enabling their collaboration. Nevertheless, a certain level 
of disarticulation regarding how to coordinate their work to tackle land-use conflict 
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among state institutions was identified. This disarticulation was described by 
representatives of ONDS-PCM and OEFA-Junin:   
“[There is] no harmonic articulation [coordination of the work] of all sectors for the 
solution of the conflict” (HM, representative of ONDS-PCM, Lima, 17.12.2016).  
“Since there are so many stakeholders, it is difficult to coordinate the negotiations, 
letting each institution focus on its own competences and establishing its own 
home grounds (…) OEFA and ANA try to coordinate but they don’t have any 
cooperation/effective communication when there is a water-related problem. ANA 
and OEFA work together in meetings, but they don’t have a joint approach in the 
field” (YM, representative of OEFA-Junin, Huancayo, 09.12.2016).   
This disarticulation might lead to a weak institutional response to land-use 
conflicts and result in the communities distrusting the dialogues or further negotiations 
with the state institutions and mining companies. The weak institutional response can 
be seen in the failure of monitoring of extractivist projects like Camisea (gas 
exploitation) by state institutions (Bebbington et al., 2013), triggering the need to pursue 
the enforcement of environmental institutionalism. Another example of weak 
institutional response is that the measures for conflict prevention or solution are 
temporal and make use of the police force (e.g. the police confronts communities during 
the conflict) (Bebbington et al., 2018a).  
Despite water-sector reforms, a lack of cooperation and coordination also 
exists between institutions like ANA and other related institutions such as their 
decentralized offices (Boelens et al., 2010).  The reason could be that these institutions 
have been weakened by environmental institutionalism through the restriction of their 
functions (e.g. modification of environmental standards and promotion of investments) 
(Bebbington et al., 2018; CRP, 2015). Another reason is the ‘dual bureaucracy’ according 
to Arellano-Yanguas (2008). This promotes the union of determined sectors and state 
institutions with macroeconomic stability in order to enact reforms on the one hand, 
while on the other promotes a lack of power to defend unfavorable policies for 
extractivism. In addition, other institutions like ONDS-PCM have been restructured 
recently. ONDS-PCM, created in 2012, has been restructured by the Presidency of the 
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Council of Ministers (PCM) in 2017 to become the Secretary of Social Management and 
Dialogue as part of the recently created Vice-ministry of Territorial Governance (ONDS, 
2014; Maquet, 2018; Montoya, 2018). The constant changes may affect the progress of 
this institution regarding the management of land-use conflicts.   
Because of weakened environmental institutionalism, representatives of 
mining companies, state institutions, civil society, and community authorities were 
asked to assess their own levels of power (influence), interests, legitimacy, and authority 
to prevent land-use conflicts between campesinos and mining companies in a common 
exercise (i.e., adapted CLIP method). Figure 4-2 shows their interests and influence with 
regard to latent mining conflicts for each stakeholder and their level of collaboration 
among the other entities. Most state institutions have a medium level of influence, 
although this differs slightly by institution. For instance, ONDS-PCM was indicated as 
having a low level of influence and interest given that it only operates once the conflict 
has erupted. It was also interesting to learn that community authorities first became 
aware of the existence and functions of some state institutions and legislation through 
this study, confirming the lack of information about state institutions and their functions 
as one of the factors driving conflicts.  
 
 
Figure 4-2: Level of influence, interests and working relationships among stakeholders 
involved in latent land-use conflicts in south-western Junin. 
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Communities were described as having a medium level of interest regarding 
conflict escalation. The reasons could lie in the national and local context. In the Central 
Andes, there has been a diversification in the economies of communities due to the 
increased temporal proximity to markets or the capital city (i.e., Huancayo). This 
proximity has made communities more aware of potential jobs. Thus, a diversified 
economy changes the farming-dependent livelihoods of communities, reducing the 
chances that conflict escalates due to mining impacts on their environment. Although a 
principle finding outlined in the following section is that the family income of 
communities is mainly dependent on livestock, community members with diversified 
jobs were possibly not represented by the survey. The absence of city workers (i.e., 
community members who mainly work in the city) could be because the interviews took 
place in the communities, and city workers tend to migrate temporally, i.e., they stay in 
the city on weekdays and come back to the community on weekends or stay in the city 
during the day. Another reason for the medium level of influence could be due to the 
criminalization of the conflicts by the central Peruvian government. This is 
demonstrated in the use of police force and the declaration of states of emergency in 
the conflict-related local government as has been reported in previous studies 
(Bebbington, 2012; De Echave, 2018). Consequently, the level of interest in conflict 
escalation is only medium for communities because, although a conflict could ultimately 
lead to better conditions, conflicts also represent possible casualties of community 
members and imposed states of emergency.  
The mining companies were assigned a high level of interest and influence, 
implying a good position to establish alliances given that their influence stretches to the 
highest levels of decision-making (Durand, 2016, 2015). Despite the existence of several 
processes like local participation, citizen referendums, prior consultation, etc. (Walter 
and Urkidi, 2017), civil society has a low level of influence and interests. Furthermore, 
despite the medium level of interest but a high level of influence of communities, a 
community representative can request to have its community considered for prior 
consultation despite the mining concession having already been granted to the mining 
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company. This was stated by a representative from Llamapsillon, a neighboring 
community near the Huacravilca project:   
 “There should be prior consultation from the Huacravilca [mining project] in our 
community” (BC, representative of Llamapsillon community, Huancayo, 
08.12.2016).  
A similar analysis was made to determine the levels of authority and legitimacy 
among institutions. ONDS-PCM, MEM and ANA show high levels of authority, while 
OEFA and MINAM show low levels. Despite being state institutions with relatively high 
positions in terms of government hierarchy, ONDS-PCM and MEM have only a medium 
level of legitimacy. The same holds true for MINAM.  The representatives of ONDS-PCM, 
MEM, ANA and OEFA were present during the workshop, and created a shared space 
among stakeholders to understand and get to know the functions of these state 
institutions regarding the land-use conflict. With the participation of these state 
institutions, the consensus of stakeholders agreed on the level of authority of each state 
institution. Unlike ANA´s visibility via the management of water use, OEFA´s work was 
relatively unknown to community authorities. However, OEFA´s visibility nationally only 
began when it started to impose fines on companies in 2014 (Granados Agüero, 2016). 
OEFA received a higher level of authority than MINAM because of its work with the 
monitoring of mines (e.g. Azulcocha, Volcan) compared to the silent work of MINAM. 
Therefore, although OEFA is under MINAM, community authorities are not very aware 
of MINAM work in their region.  
These findings show a trend towards the community perspective because, 
despite the inclusion of different stakeholders, the workshop had a higher attendance 
of community authorities. Most involved state institutions were given a medium level 
of legitimacy since MEM and ANA are more active in the area and OEFA is dealing with 
informing communities about their institution. In the case of MINAM and the local 
government, both institutions were considered to have a low level of legitimacy and 
authority. Local government (i.e., district and province) does not directly distribute the 
received canon minero. However, the type of relationship that could be established with 
their respective communities might depend on the mayor and their ruling party (De 
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Echave et al., 2009). On the other hand, allegations of corruption and the capacities of 
the mayor may also affect their legitimacy and authority from the perspective of 
communities and civil society (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a). For MINAM, these low levels 
could be due to the absence of their work with communities, reducing the recognition 
of their role, position, rights, and responsibilities. Although the other participating state 
institutions recognized the authority and legitimacy of MINAM, community authorities 
have only recently found out about this institution. In the case of ANA, its medium level 
of legitimacy might relate to the fact that this institution provides the right of water use 
and it is under the Ministry of Agriculture, which is better known by the communities 
(Figure 4-3). While one representative from ANA attended the workshop, some 
community authorities did not know ANA. Similarly, past studies have found low levels 
of legitimacy in state institutions, mainly due to their responsibility in enacting investor-
favoring policies (e.g. MEM and its controversy related to the Mining Program Solidarity 
with People22 and allegations of corruption) (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a). 
 
Figure 4-3. Level of authority, legitimacy and working relationships of stakeholders 
involved in the latent land-use conflicts caused by mining in the south-
western region of Junin 
                                                     
22 “Programa Minero de Solidaridad con el Pueblo” (2006-2011) allowed the mining 
company to provide a temporal voluntary payment, depending on the price of metals, 
in order to improve the living conditions of mining-affected people (MEM, 2006). 
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4.3.3. Livelihood characteristics and challenges 
This section provides a perspective from the main local stakeholder, i.e., the campesino 
communities, which are able to trigger land-use conflicts. The existing socio-
environmental conditions such as pollution, negotiation of agreements, or 
misinformation can potentially degenerate into a full-fledged conflict (Arellano-
Yanguas, 2011a; Orihuela et al., 2018). In the meantime, mining companies are only 
focusing on their operations because they have a favorable context for working. Farming 
in the high Andes is confronted with challenges mainly related to climate hazards (e.g., 
frost and precipitation) and soil fertility. Consistent with the reports of the IGP (2012) 
and CENEPRED (2018), which affirm that the research area is highly prone to the 
occurrence of frosts, most surveyed ACM of the campesino communities expressed that 
frost and hail are the major challenges of farming. Concerning the water supply and how 
it is affected by the neighboring mines in terms of quality, quantity, and access, this 
research observed that the perception between control and case study communities 
differed significantly (Table 4-3). This confirms the findings of previous studies from 
Bebbington (2009),  Li (2009; 2017) and  Brain (2017). Problems of soil fertility, however, 
are not related to mining projects (Table 4-3).  
 
Table 4-3. Statistical tests for case study and control communities 
Mining Influence  
Pearson Chi2: Presence of water-
related problem  
Pearson chi2(1)=13.2808      
Pr=0.000* 
Pearson Chi2: Presence of soil-
related problem 
Pearson chi2(1)=0.0714    
Pr=0.789 
Pearson Chi2: Type of economic 
activity  
Pearson chi2(1) =0.6356    
Pr = 0.425 
Independent t-test of family 
income  
t =  -1.2920 
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1975 
Independent t-test of income 
from livestock  
t =  -2.7154  
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0070* 
*statistically significant 
 
To evaluate the results of water problems related with mining, logistic 
regression was applied to determine if other variables, apart from the presence of 
mining activities, (e.g., education, sex, family expenses, agriculture for self-
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consumption) correlated with water-related problems. Thus, a small and a large logistic 
model were calculated. The small model, testing for the reasons behind water problems, 
soil problems (z=4.34, Pr=0.000) and mining (z=4.18, Pr=0.000) were statistically 
significant. The correlations between water and soil problems with mining could be due 
to the mining impact on the environment, which are two constant reasons for conflicts, 
as previous studies also observed through studies in the Tambogrande district  (Haarstad 
and Fløysand, 2007). The overall logistic model fit was LR chi2(2)=45.60 (Pr=0.0000). For 
the large model, an additional variable PCA_all, which refers to the results of PCA to all 
observations of other variables, was added to the logistic regression model. The Barlett 
Test of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) indicated that PCA was appropriate 
(Table 4-4). The KMO test indicated that there were enough observations per variable 
to do PCA, the results from which were used in the large logistic regression model. For 
water-related problems, it was found that soil problems (z=4.39, Pr=0.000) and mining 
(z=4.09, Pr=0.000) were significant predictors. PCA_all (Z=-1.75, Pr=0.08) was not 
significant. The overall model fit resulted in LR chi2(2)=45.60 (Pr>F=0.000) at 95% 
confidence. Comparing both models, it was found that there was no significant 
difference between the small model and large model (LR chi2(1)=3.11, Pr=0.0781) at 95% 
confidence. Based on the Occam's razor principle (Baker, 2007), the small model was 
applied, since all assessed variables in PCA_all were not statically significant. Thus, the 
correlations of the water problems related to mining and soil problems might be possibly 
causal.  
 
Table 4-4. KMO and Bartlett´s tests for water-related problems 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy 
0.6033 
Bartlett´s Test of Sphericity Approx. (Chi-Square) 
df. 
Significance 
377.670 
28 
0.000 
 
Regarding the families’ economic activities in the case communities, 89.73% of 
the surveyed ACMs are only involved in livestock and 8.90% perform other 
supplementary activities (e.g., education, building, transport, mining). In the control 
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communities, 86.61% only engage in agriculture and livestock, while 13.39% 
complement their income by other economic activities (e.g., transportation, education). 
Consequently, no significant difference was revealed between the presence of mining 
activities and family income in the communities (Table 4-3). Despite the similarities, the 
case communities may be benefited by job quotas in the mines, since the average 
monthly income of the control communities (?̅? = 702.73 PEN) was higher than that of 
the case study communities and statistically significant (?̅? = 511.181 PEN). This could 
be related to the factors explained in the previous section such as that the research 
survey in the communities missed the city workers, and also the small job quota per 
community, e.g., Huasicancha, had a job quota of 15 in 2016, although this may vary 
with the needs of the mine. Similar to previous studies (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; 
Zegarra et al., 2007), this study found lower incomes in the case study communities than 
in the control communities, which indicates poverty. Besides income, families can also 
receive a proportion of the economic compensation from mines according to their 
agreements. However, this compensation falls short of solving their economic problems, 
because the annual economic compensation is sometimes shared among community 
members (e.g., 500 PEN/person), or it can alternatively be used for buying an asset for 
communal use. The mine size and the mining stage influence economic compensation 
through the agreement, and communities still face the challenges of economic and 
livelihood improvement despite these benefits.  
Due to the income difference, in order to evaluate whether there were other 
variables (e.g., age, education) influencing the causality between family income and 
livestock income, a simple linear regression was executed. Similar to the comparison of 
the two logistic regression models described above, linear regression models were also 
created to compare a small and large model. When family income was predicted in the 
small linear regression model, it was found that livestock income (t=17.51, Pr=0.000), 
age (t=-2.19, Pr=0.029), and supplementary economic activity (t=6.13, Pr=0.000) were 
significant. Besides these variables, the presence of mining activities in the community 
(t=1.06, Pr=0.290) was not statistically significant to influence family income. The overall 
model fit was adjusted R2= 0.5729 (Pr>F=0.000) at 95% confidence. For the large model, 
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PCA was used to reduce the number of independent variables (i.e., 14 variables) that 
may affect the family income. To assess the adequacy of PCA, a Barlett Test of Sphericity 
and a KMO test were carried out (Table 4-5).  Once both tests indicated the adequacy of 
PCA, the resultant variable called PCA_all was added in order to run a large linear 
regression model. When monthly family income was predicted in the large model (i.e., 
the variables of the short model with PCA_all), it was found that the monthly livestock 
income (t=17.12, Pr=0.000) and supplementary economic activity (t=5.84, Pr=0.000) 
were significant predictors. Age (t=-1.84, Pr=0.067), the presence of mining activities in 
the community (t=0.92, Pr=0.357) and PCA_all (t=1.19, Pr=0.236) were not significant. 
The overall model fit was adjusted R2= 0.5736 (Pr>F=0.000) at 95% confidence. Thus, 
57.36% of the variation in family income is mainly explained by livestock and 
supplementary income. Comparing both models, no significant difference between the 
small and large models were found (LR chi2(1)=1.44, Pr=0.2302) at 95% confidence. 
Finally, because of Occam's razor (Baker, 2007), the small linear regression model should 
be used to explain family income. 
 
Table 4-5. KMO and Bartlett tests for the family income of campesino communities 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.5227 
Bartlett´s Test of Sphericity Approx. (Chi2) 
df. 
Significance 
322.741 
28 
0.000 
 
In general, the results of this study show that the presence of water-related 
problems is associated with soil degradation and mining, while family income is related 
to livestock income, age of respondents, and supplementary economic activity. This 
tends to agree with the results of previous studies in the Andean region, which found 
that households located in mining areas tend to be poorer than those in non-mining 
areas (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Zegarra et al., 2007). Unlike other case studies where 
communities have improved their livelihoods thanks to mining-induced road 
construction that improves market access, provision of high-quality seeds, etc. (Bury, 
2005, 2004), this improvement was not observed in our study area despite the support 
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from mines. For instance, the representative of Corihuarmi highlighted their support to 
improve farming in Chongos Alto:  
“In the case of the Chongos Alto community, Corihuarmi [a mine] has trained them 
to increase the quality of dairy production in the form of pasteurization of milk and 
the production of yogurt and cheese with higher product quality (…) In the case of 
Huasicancha, the community received pots of marmite to pasteurize milk.” (HZ, 
representative of community relations office, Tambo, 17.10.2016).  
The training and supplementary support from mines for communities could 
empower small community businesses. However, the improvement of these businesses 
might depend on the willingness of the community members.  
 
4.3.4. Determinants of land-use conflicts 
In an attempt to establish factors determining latent land-use conflicts, the analysis of 
the in-depth interviews with 34 stakeholders identified a total of 35 factors23, clustered 
in six themes. The factors that were most frequently mentioned are shown in Figure 4-4. 
                                                     
23  The remaining conflict-triggering factors reported are: (1) lack of environmental 
awareness in communities, (2) problems with community integration, (3) reduction of 
crop production because of poor soil quality, (4) low agricultural yields because of water 
scarcity and poor soil quality, (5) economic dependence on mining, (6) presence of social 
programs for communities, (7) deficient human and (8) economic resources in 
decentralized offices, (9) no constant monitoring for environmental impact assessment, 
(10) bad relations between communities and representatives of mines, (11) emigration 
of community members, (12) mining-related misinformation in communities, (13) 
inefficient prior consultation, (14) problems related to distribution of mining royalties, 
and (15) not all communities receiving an agreement with mining companies. 
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Figure 4-4. Frequency of reported causes of land-use conflicts (N=34) 
 
All stakeholders except the mining companies indicated “Water pollution by 
mining activities” as the most important category. Water pollution and mining activities 
become more pressing as water scarcity increases in the community, as corroborated:  
“We do not have water. Our spring only supplies to some neighborhoods [of our 
community]. Water is not enough and there is no support from any state 
institution” (JH, representative of the community of Santa Rosa de Huarmita, Santa 
Rosa de Huarmita, 14.10.2016). 
This statement shows how difficult it can in fact be for communities to have 
water for their activities. Thus, if there is an external factor such as mining operations 
that use this resource, water-related conflict is more likely to occur. Previous studies 
have highlighted that water scarcity is fueled by the activities of mining companies and 
is possibly triggering conflicts (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; De Echave, 2018; Larrain Vial 
SAB, 2012; Li, 2017). It is worth mentioning that until now there has been no official 
report on the quantity of water used by the mining sector (De Echave, 2018; Preciado 
Jerónimo, 2011). Formally, however, mining projects in Peru have to obtain their water 
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use licenses from ANA in agreement with the existing policy framework (CRP, 2009; PRP, 
2017).  
Other conflict-triggering factors are related to the agreements between mining 
companies and campesino communities regarding the lease of community lands. These 
agreements include economic-, social- and environment-related clauses that describe 
the benefits the communities should enjoy. The agreements come after the mining 
company has obtained a concession from the MEM and the approval of mandatory 
environmental impact studies by the Environmental Licensing Agency. This study 
observed that breaching these clauses can easily create conflicts between mining 
communities and companies. Especially negative environmental impacts of mining, for 
instance, the pollution of community water resources, is the second most common 
reason for land-use conflicts. Several ACMs interviewed in Shicuy explained some of the 
environment-related clauses included in their agreement with Azulcocha. They said that 
the agreement states that: “Azulcocha should not pollute our environment,” “Azulcocha 
should take care of the environment,” and “Azulcocha should be careful with the soil.” 
However, other ACMs expressed their concerns about the possible breach of these 
clauses: “Azulcocha might be polluting the rivers and our irrigation channel”. 
If the company disregards the environmental conditions of the agreement and 
fails to heed its economic promises, this generates a common dissatisfaction. Conflicts 
can also arise from the fact that the agreements differently benefit directly and 
indirectly affected communities, e.g., directly affected communities obtain higher 
compensation than indirectly affected ones. This happened for instance in the case of 
Huasicancha that received more money than Chongos Alto in the agreement with the 
Huacravilca mine. Although this disparity was finally negotiated:  
“Huasicancha has become the main beneficiary of Huacravilca (…) Due to the 
better economic benefits obtained by Huasicancha, the dispute among both 
communities arose. Although Chongos Alto is not directly influenced by 
Huacravilca, the community relations office [of Huacravilca] asked them to sign an 
agreement, so the mining company disbursed money to benefit Chongos Alto and 
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has hired 10 community members” (LG, representative of Huacravilca, Huancayo, 
16.11.2016). 
The breach of the clauses of the agreement thus triggers land-use conflicts. 
Besides the clauses of the agreement, environmental institutionalism was also reported 
as a conflict-triggering factor due to the absence of state institutions in communities, 
the disarticulation of state institutions to provide coherent support, and the poor 
support or lack of support for farming. This study seeks to highlight that a conflict cannot 
be solved if a well-established and strong environmental institutionalism does not 
attempt to find a solution. Peru needs to strengthen its environmental reforms and state 
institutions in order to empower its environmental institutionalism. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
This examination of the introduction of environmental institutionalism in Peru focused 
on the influence environmental reforms have had on latent land-use conflicts. This was 
done by assessing different stakeholder perspectives, looking at household livelihood 
profiles, and identifying the main reasons leading to full-fledged conflicts. This study 
found that the following factors can trigger land-use conflicts: (1) The absence of state 
institutions in areas of potential conflict is due to the lack of personnel, equipment, and 
information about the responsibilities and mandates of public environmental agencies 
on the side of the communities. (2) Campesino communities and mining companies are 
the most influential actors in land-use conflicts and have a higher level of influence than 
the state institutions who could potentially intervene. The legitimacy of state 
institutions was also evaluated differently. (3) A lack of substantial local livelihood 
improvement in mining-affected communities. (4) The pollution of community water 
resources by mining.  
As there was no active conflict in the study area – which usually triggers 
stronger official intervention – the observed situation was taken as a good reflection of 
the status quo of the implementation of environmental reforms at the regional level. 
Unlike previous studies focusing on active conflicts, this research shows that there is 
weak environmental institutionalism in areas where there are no active conflicts. This 
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weak environmental institutionalism, the lack of information about the mandate and 
responsibilities of public environmental agencies, and their complete absence in areas 
with potential for land-use conflicts undermine citizen trust. Campesino communities, 
instead of relying on the support of public environmental agencies, rather take up 
matters themselves, which can easily lead to conflicts with mining companies. The 
absence of state institutions and the unleashing of land-use conflicts has been 
established by previous studies, which have revealed that weak state capacities affect 
environmental regulation and monitoring (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a, 2008; Barton, 
2005; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Gustafsson, 2018). The weakening of environment-
related state institutions and regulations was enhanced in the last decade, as some 
functions of MINAM and its agencies (i.e., OEFA) were restricted and removed (CRP, 
2015; Damonte and Vila, 2014; De Echave, 2018; PCM, 2013; PRP, 2014). The law 30230, 
enacted in 2014, restricted OEFA´s imposition of fines to companies following Article 
1924. Consequently, after three years of complaints from communities, this article was 
retracted in 2017, and OEFA has recovered its previous functions (MINAM, 2009). 
Similarly, the lack of information on the roles of the institutions was also reported by De 
Echave (2018) as a determinant of conflict, as most state institutions only contact the 
campesino communities when the conflicts have already escalated. This study 
highlighted the fact that interviewed stakeholders already know their difficulties and 
how to tackle them. However, creating the necessary political will to strengthen 
environmental institutions to improve the performance of institutions and build citizen 
trust in state institutions is needed.  
The level of participation and involvement of stakeholders in conflict solution 
is crucial (Viveros, 2017). This study identified 13 stakeholder groups actively involved 
in mining conflicts (see Table 4-2). Active civil society organizations tend to be 
interconnected among themselves but have few links with stakeholders with higher 
levels of influence or legitimacy (e.g., state institutions). Arellano-Yanguas (2011a) 
                                                     
24 Law N° 30230 establishes tax measures, simplification of procedures and permissions 
for promotion and stimulation of investment. Article 19 of this law focuses on the 
function of OEFA for the prevention and correction of infringing behavior (PRP, 2014). 
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advises NGOs to gain legitimacy by connecting with other institutions of higher 
legitimacy. This study indicates that it is important to increase the collaboration 
between civil society and other stakeholders to provide a joint response when a conflict 
occurs. This response might help to solve or prevent conflicts. Other studies established 
that the involvement of civil society organizations increases the chances that all 
stakeholders are treated fairly (Aydin et al., 2017) and that environmental regulations 
are enforced.  
This study also shows that state institutions, despite relatively high levels of 
influence and legitimacy, do not effectively coordinate their activities. This weakens 
their impact on the latent conflicts and creates distrust among the citizens, undermining 
the effective implementation of environmental institutionalism. Although the conflict-
related roles of state institutions depend on their functions and their influence and 
legitimacy in the communities, state capture and extractivism-driven policies reduce 
citizen trust and negatively affect the work of institutions. The general distrust in state 
environmental institutions was also highlighted by other researchers (Arellano-Yanguas, 
2011a; Bebbington and Bury, 2010, 2009). Another important finding is the fact that it 
is rather the mining company instead of state agencies that have the necessary influence 
to prevent a conflict from erupting. The influence of mining companies in remote areas 
could be used to assume some state responsibilities and solve some local problems, 
thereby contributing to conflict prevention (Quiñones et al., 2013). However, this study 
shows that mining companies avoid encroaching on state responsibilities. In reality, their 
high level of influence and legitimacy are used by mining companies to endorse 
agreements with communities and improve the negotiation with communities in 
opposition to mining projects. However, the campesino communities themselves also 
have a high level of influence and legitimacy, since they control the resources the 
companies are interested in. Unfortunately, this is not the case for neighboring 
communities indirectly affected by mining. Often they do not partake in the benefits 
accrued from mining even if they participate in public hearings. Since communities are 
the ones that get involved in conflicts, state institutions need to understand the mining-
related livelihood impacts and problems they face. However, their absence on the 
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ground and the resulting lack of information on local conditions and dynamics negatively 
affects the legitimacy of state institutions and therefore the local implementation of 
environmental reforms. This, in turn, enhances the likelihood of the outbreak of conflicts 
between campesino communities and mining companies.  
Since the communities are the main stakeholders in potential conflicts, the 
research used household profiling to evaluate the economic challenges mining-affected 
communities are experiencing. Econometric modeling showed that differences in family 
income in these communities mainly depend on profits from livestock rearing, the age 
of respondents, and livelihood diversification, rather than on benefits directly derived 
from the mining companies. Since rural livelihoods are hardly changing, sustaining 
important agricultural resources like water and land remains extremely important. 
Despite the relevance of water consumption for mines and communities, the Peruvian 
government did not assess the total water consumption that had been used from the 
watershed since 1990 (Preciado Jerónimo, 2011; Preciado Jeronimo et al., 2015). 
Reliance on resources, in turn, explains why the pollution or degradation of these 
resources by mining companies can easily cause conflicts with campesino communities. 
This is especially the case with regard to water resources. The Andes of Peru are a water-
stressed area, and the protection of water resources is critical for livelihoods (WB, 2018). 
Land-use conflicts have mainly been driven by water, e.g., in the case of the Conga 
project for gold and copper mining (Delgado and Romero, 2016; Helwege, 2015; PCM, 
2012).  Like the studies by Bebbington and Williams (2008) and Isch et al. (2012), this 
research confirms that water-related problems are associated with the occurrence of 
soil-related problems and the interference of mining companies. In line with other 
research, the findings of this study therefore suggest that the key preventive measure 
to avoid conflicts is the maintenance of good access to quality water for the 
communities (Bianchini et al., 2015; Brain, 2017; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011). Apart from 
domestic needs, adequate water resources are very important for livestock production, 
and a key poverty-alleviating factor of the livelihood strategies of campesino families. 
Through the sale of dairy products, families are able to generate a cash income while 
relying on subsistence production for consumption. 
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Despite regular problems and conflicts, many campesino families hope that 
mining projects in their area will eventually increase their incomes and improve their 
quality of life through the creation of employment opportunities (Basombrío et al., 2016; 
De Echave, 2018). Indeed, local job creation is one important component of the 
agreements between the mining companies and communities. Perreault (2014) 
reported that open-pit mines offer only a few and generally non-qualified jobs, which 
usually does not match community expectations. Similarly, the studied open-pit mines 
offer a low and only temporal job quota for communities that have an agreement. 
However, although they are often only temporary, these jobs provide fixed salaries, 
which are more attractive to farmers than the uncertain income from agriculture and 
livestock rearing under threat from climatic hazards (CTRJ, 2015c). Apart from 
employment, the mines can also improve the economic development of campesino 
communities through the annual payment of land rents. However, the tendency of 
mining companies to delay or default on the payment of land rents is a frequent reason 
for complaints and can escalate into conflict. In general, disagreement about the clauses 
and the fulfillment of the agreements between mining firms and campesino 
communities often triggers conflicts. Conflicts can also arise because community 
members are only marginally involved in the negotiation of the agreements and often 
dissatisfied with the contracts negotiated by their community authorities.  
 
4.5. Conclusions 
In summary, this study investigated the local and regional implementation of 
environmental institutionalism in mining-affected communities in the central Peruvian 
Andes.  Local and regional implementation of reforms was rather weak. Communities 
lacked the necessary information about their rights and the mandates and 
responsibilities of environmental agencies. The stakeholder analysis clearly showed that 
latent conflicts are mainly negotiated between the communities and the mining 
companies with little or no involvement of the relevant environmental agencies. While 
they had some influence and legitimacy, the agencies often failed to cooperate, and 
their performance was undermined by the lack of capacity (human resources and 
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equipment), which created a feeling of distrust within the communities. As a result of 
the poor performance of environmental agencies, environmental degradation, 
particularly the pollution of vital water resources, was named as the most important 
reason for conflicts between campesino communities and mining firms. Since local 
families continue to largely depend on agriculture and livestock rearing for their 
livelihoods and mining employment does not have any significant impact on the income 
of most campesino communities, water issues become critical. Diminishing access as 
well as pollution not only affect domestic consumption but also irrigated agriculture and 
livestock production, an especially important component of local livelihood strategies. 
For these reasons, water-related problems often result in conflicts. Because of the 
breach of environmental and economic clauses of community-mining firm agreements 
and the failure of decentralized government agencies to intervene with a coordinated 
effort, latent conflicts often erupt. The findings show that the establishment and actual 
implementation of a policy framework facilitating the negotiations between campesino 
communities and mining projects are urgently needed. This must be coupled with efforts 
to strengthen the outreach and performance of environmental institutions at local and 
regional levels. Only through these measures is there hope for the improvement of the 
livelihood of campesino communities and their relationship with mining companies.   
Land-use conflict risk index: Building and application in farming-mining lands of the 
Central Peruvian Andes  
87 
 
5. LAND-USE CONFLICT RISK INDEX: BUILDING AND APPLICATION IN FARMING-
MINING LANDS OF THE CENTRAL PERUVIAN ANDES  
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the design and application of a Land-Use Conflict Risk Index 
(LUCRI) to be used as a decision-making tool for conflict prevention and management. 
The index can help policy-makers, mining companies, and academics to identify 
communities at the greatest risk of escalation into land-use conflicts. To the author’s 
knowledge, no such risk index exists, making this research a unique contribution and 
basis for further studies. The proposed risk index uses an interdisciplinary approach, 
unlike some environment-related risk indexes that focus on a single factor such as water 
scarcity (Lezzaik et al., 2018; Ohlsson, 2000) or soil pollution (Albuquerque et al., 2017). 
Hence, a mining company, e.g., through its corporate social responsibility (CSR) unit, 
could use and adapt the index for interacting with relevant communities.  
Because of coexisting spaces between communities and mining operations, as 
well as the predominant national pro-extractivist policies, mining-related conflicts have 
increased in Peru (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Schuldt et al., 2009). Once a mining 
company has obtained the license to explore and/or exploit, campesino communities 
might have to rent or sell their lands to facilitate mining operations (Bury, 2005; Schuldt 
et al., 2009). For instance, campesino communities in the northern Andes sold their 
lands to the Yanacocha25 mine, which changed their livelihoods and led to conflicts 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Li, 2009; Schuldt et al., 2009). These conflicts resulted in the 
modification of the social practice of the mine, increasing the investment for 
remediation and social responsibility (Schuldt et al., 2009). The Yanacocha case 
demonstrates that conflict is used to modify the social approach of the mining company 
towards the benefit of communities. The risk index aims to unveil the most relevant 
                                                     
25 Yanacocha is an open-pit gold mine in Cajamarca (northern Andes) that had two main 
conflicts: Choropampa conflict due to a large mercury spill in 2008, and Conga conflict 
due to mining expansion project and water sources near Cajamarca (Basombrío et al., 
2016).  
Land-use conflict risk index: Building and application in farming-mining lands of the 
Central Peruvian Andes  
88 
 
potential roots of conflict before this occurs, thus preventing conflicts and the 
associated hindering of mining operations.  
Land-use conflicts are manifested by the change of land-use from farming to 
mining occurring once the land tenure and use differ among stakeholders (e.g., mines 
and communities) (Havel, 1986; Hilson, 2002). Resulting conflicts can increase resistance 
to mining operations and the interest of respective companies (Conde and Le Billon, 
2017). However, mining operations have boosted the local economy through the 
distribution of mining revenues (i.e., canon minero) among subnational governments. 
Specifically, the federal government assigns 75% of the canon minero to the affected 
subnational governments (CRP, 2004a, 2001). However, the poor capacity of local 
governments affects the investments of the canon minero (50% of taxes from the mining 
sector), developing problems for investing in and executing long-term projects that 
could improve local livelihoods (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a). Since the canon minero 
cannot be directly given to campesino communities, it must benefit them indirectly 
through public projects such as road construction. Besides, campesino communities 
have to negotiate with the respective mining company to gain agreement on 
compensation for renting their lands. Although not all communities opt for establishing 
an agreement, they may nevertheless be affected by indirect impacts, e.g., pollution of 
water sources and lands.  
The land of the campesinos is comprised of water and soil, and consequently, 
they claim the protection of it against extractivist operations (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; 
De Echave, 2018; Schuldt et al., 2009; Silva-Macher and Farrell, 2014). Together with 
these claims, poverty, and marginalization have deepened land-use conflicts (Schuldt et 
al., 2009) as detailed in previous chapters. In this framework, this chapter deals with two 
main research questions: (RQ 5-1) How can the biophysical, socio-economic, and 
institutional components be combined in a risk index? (RQ 5-2) is based on the 
implications of the risk index, i.e., how can it be improved through future research? 
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5.2. Land-use Conflict Risk Index  
5.2.1. Study Area 
The study area is situated in the south-western zone of the Junin Region. Located in the 
Mantaro watershed of the Central Peruvian Andes, Junin includes 389 campesino 
communities and one of Peru´s oldest mines (La Oroya). This study worked with 8 
campesino communities influenced by mining, i.e., 3 communities in the Cunas sub-
basin and 5 communities in the Aimaraes sub-basin (Figure 5-1), belonging to four 
districts in total. Three mining companies participated in the study (Table 5-1). The 
fieldwork took place from August 2016 to April 2017.  
 
 
Figure 5-1. Location of mining operations and campesino communities (in red) with the 
total number of active community members (in 2016) in the Aimaraes and 
Cunas sub-basins. 
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Table 5-1. Description of mining companies at research zones 
Sub-basins  Mine Mining company Exploitable 
metal 
Community 
Cunas  Azulcocha Brynajom-Trafigura Zn Usibamba, Shicuy, Sulcan 
Aimaraes  Huacravilca Fresnillo Ag Huasicancha,  
Chongos Alto 
Corihuarmi Minera IRL S.A. Au, Ag Chongos Alto, 
Llamapsillon, Palaco.  
 
5.2.2. The Land-Use Conflict Risk Index design   
The design of the Land-Use Conflict Risk Index (LUCRI) can be divided into three main 
stages. First, criteria and indicators are defined via content analysis of the in-depth 
interviews (Chapter 4). Second, indicators are estimated according to their origin and 
composition.  Third, the risk index is calculated and three hypothetical scenarios run. 
Figure 5-2 presents the sequential steps followed in the development of the LUCRI, from 
methods of data collection to the selection of the criteria and indicators, their weighting 
and aggregation and finally the resulting index. According to Mitchell et al. (1995), this 
indicator-based approach “communicates a sense of the condition of the whole”, 
providing data to experts, policy-makers, and modelers. The indicators are operational 
representations of an attribute and a single output value that collects important 
information from the dataset (Gallopin, 1997; WWAP, 2003). Although the LUCRI only 
provides a snapshot of the situation upon data collection, it allows the most reported 
concerns relevant to land-use conflicts to be integrated in order to anticipate them 
before their occurrence (Mitchell et al., 1995). The concerns used in this index are based 
on those reported by stakeholders and communities in the research area (section 5.2.3).  
The information presented in Figure 5-2 is also useful for end-users and allows 
the examination of the development process. This could lead to contributions in the 
form of feedback and further improvements to the index. The modeling of the LUCRI is 
based on the additive aggregation model, which is appropriately simple and 
understandable for decision-makers (Choo and Wedley, 2008).  
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Figure 5-2. Flowchart of the main developmental stages in building the LUCRI 
 
The scale of the LUCRI is from 0 to 1. The following ranges were considered to 
determine the level of risk of escalation into a land-use conflict: 0–0.2 = very low risk, 
0.21–0.4 = low risk, 0.41-0.6 = moderate risk, 0.61-0.8 = high risk, and 0.81-1.0 = very 
high risk.   
In this research, the LUCRI was calculated for each case community (8) in the 
study area using (Equation 1). Per community, the LUCRI uses the resultant value 𝑉(𝐴𝑖) 
and weight (𝑊𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)  that was given by stakeholders. 𝑊𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠  uses the 
overall given rate to estimate the weight of each criterion. Thus, the LUCRI is calculated 
for each community as follows: 
𝐿𝑈𝐶𝑅𝐼 = ∑ (𝑉𝑞(𝐴𝑖))
𝑖
𝑊𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠                         (Equation 1) 
where:  
RI is the risk index that varies from 0 to 1 
𝑉𝑞(𝐴𝑖) is the overall value of the ith alternative at each community  
𝑊𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 is the local weight that was given by stakeholders via MCDA. 
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The LUCRI is based on an additive aggregation model (Choo and Wedley, 2008) 
and weighted linear combination (Malczewski and Rinner, 2015):  
LUCRI 𝐶𝑜𝑚 = (𝑉𝑊)(𝑊)𝑊 + (𝑉𝑆𝐹)(𝑊)𝑆𝐹 + (𝑉𝐿𝑈)(𝑊 )𝐿𝑈 + (𝑉𝐶𝑀𝐷)(𝑊 )𝐶𝑀𝐷 +
(𝑉𝐺𝐼𝐼)(𝑊)𝐺𝐼𝐼 +  (𝑉𝐸)(𝑊 )𝐸                                    (Equation 2) 
where:  
LUCRI 𝐶𝑜𝑚 is the land-use conflict risk index in a community 
𝑉𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the overall value of the criterion estimated in a community 
𝑊𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the overall weight of the criterion estimated in a community 
 
The value of each 𝑉(𝐴𝑖) was calculated using Equation 3. The indicator weights 
( 𝑤𝑘 ) and value functions 𝑣(𝑎𝑖𝑘)  do not consider the spatial heterogeneity within 
decision-making (Malczewski and Rinner, 2015) but are based on linearity and additive 
assumptions. Indeed, spatial heterogeneity does not influence weights and values here 
because focuses is on only one area. Community members provided the indicator 
weights and values during the semi-structured survey. 𝑣(𝑎𝑖𝑘) is the average or median 
of each indicator per community.  𝑤𝑘  is based on the average of the weights per 
indicator.  𝑉(𝐴𝑖) is the sum of the indicators within each criterion per community. The 
weighted linear combination is calculated as:  
𝑉(𝐴𝑖) = ∑ 𝑤𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 𝑣(𝑎𝑖𝑘)                               (Equation 3) 
where: 
𝑉(𝐴𝑖) is the overall value of the criterion 
𝑖 refers to the location of the community 
𝑣(𝑎𝑖𝑘)  is the value of the community with respect to the kth criterion measured 
𝑤𝑘 is the indicator weight given by local people via a rating exercise  
 
5.2.3. Theoretical framework of the Land-Use Conflict Risk Index 
To build the LUCRI, the conceptual basis for selecting the criteria and corresponding 
indicators that may affect land-use conflicts was established. After a literature review 
and content analysis of the in-depth interviews (Chapter 4), the following criteria were 
extracted to be included in the LUCRI: soil fertility (SF), water (W), land-use (LU), 
community-mining dialogues (CMD), involvement of governmental institutions (GII), 
and economy (E). Table 5-2 shows the categories clustered in six criteria to better depict 
the frequency of their mention by community members and stakeholders via in-depth 
interviews (open-ended questions). Table 5-3 shows the indicators included with the 
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aim of being as understandable and plausible as possible to all participant stakeholders. 
The local participants could thus easily assess the criteria and indicators during data 
collection.  
 
Table 5-2. Frequency of the categories mentioned by stakeholders 
From in-depth interviews To LUCRI 
Categories Freq. Criteria Mean Freq. 
Water pollution by mining operations 14 Water 10 
Water scarcity for economic activities 6 
Reduction in crop production by soil quality 3 Soil Fertility 3 
Low farming production by water scarcity and soil quality 3 
Loss of crops and livestock due to climatic hazards 8 Land-Use 8 
Absence of state institutions to boost farming activities 8 
Mining-related misinformation in communities 3 Community-
Mining 
Dialogues 
6 
No standard framework for community-mining relations 5 
Bad previous experiences with mining companies 6 
Personal interests affect community development 6 
Untrained people for mining-related negotiation 5 
Breach of economic clauses 8 
Breach of social clauses 6 
Breach of environment clauses  10 
Dissatisfaction regarding agreements 8 
Participatory monitoring of water/soil  5 
Insufficient job quota per community 6 
Canon minero does not reach communities 4 Involvement of 
Governmental 
Institutions  
 
4 
Disarticulation of state institutions 6 
Weak (decentralized) state institutions 4 
State institutions have problems dealing with 
disinformation 
4 
State institutions mainly reach communities during conflicts 3 
Economic dependence on mining 3 Economy 4 
Community migration and lack of job opportunities 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land-use conflict risk index: Building and application in farming-mining lands of the 
Central Peruvian Andes  
94 
 
Table 5-3. Indicators and criteria for triggering socio-environmental conflicts in the 
Central Andes of Peru 
Criterion (k) Indicator Description 
Water (W) Drought level (Drought) Drought is a constant problem for agriculture and livestock. Data 
obtained from the semi-structured survey. (1 = household has 
problems with droughts in daily activities, 
0 = no drought problems) 
Water access 
(W_access) 
Awareness of water access per household obtained from the 
survey. (1 = household has problems with water access for their 
daily activities,  
0 = no problems with water access)  
Water availability 
(W_availability) 
Water availability reported by household head during survey. (1 
= problems related to water availability for daily activities, 0 = no 
problems)  
Water quality 
(W_quality) 
 
Water quality reported by household head during survey. (1 = 
concern regarding water quality for daily activities, 0 = no 
concern)  
Mining stage (M_stage) Mining stage of the mine based on interviews/secondary data 
Fish absence 
(F_absence) 
Absence of wild trout in the rivers reported during survey. (1 = 
death/absence of fishes,  
0 = no problems) 
Soil Fertility (SF)  Compost Use of compost for crop production mentioned during semi-
structured survey. (1 = use of compost, 0 = no use of compost) 
Crop products 
(C_products) 
Agriculture products classified at the level of nutrient 
requirements based on semi-structured survey and secondary 
data from DRA. (0 = no crops/pastures, 1 = pastures [low 
nutrient requirement], 2 = crops [high nutrient requirement])  
Crop production 
(C_production) 
Annual production of main product per household reported 
during semi-structured survey. 
Soil quality (S_Quality) Soil quality based on interpolation of cadmium concentration in 
the research area.  
Land-Use (LU) 
 
Community area 
(Com_area) 
Total community area (m2) estimated during map creation, in-
depth interviews and secondary data from the Peruvian 
government.  
Grazing area 
(Graze_area) 
Estimation of grazing area (m2) per community using GIS 
mapping. 
Livestock grazing 
(Graze_Livestock) 
Extent of livestock grazing obtained from survey per household. 
(1 = household practices livestock grazing, 0 = household does 
not practice livestock grazing) 
Community-
Mining Dialogues 
(CMD) 
Number of dialogues 
(N_dialogues) 
Dialogues conducted since the first meeting in which mining 
company introduced mining project to directly affected 
community. Obtained from surveys and interviews. 
Time since the first 
meeting (Length_meet) 
Time (in years) from first meeting with mining company until 
now. Obtained through semi-structured surveys and in-depth 
interviews with community authorities.   
Level of   
community/mining 
company relationship  
(Relation) 
Level of the relationship between community and mining 
company is categorized as: Dialogue (1st level), Complaint (2nd 
Level), Protest (3rd Level), Conflict (4th Level). Obtained from the 
semi-structured survey and in-depth interviews with mining 
companies and campesino community authorities. 
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Level of socio-
economic benefits 
(SE_benefits) 
Level of socio-economic benefit from the mining company to the 
community: 1st level (only in community festivities), 2nd level 
(development of small projects), 3rd level (annual agreement 
between community and company). 
Involvement of 
Governmental 
Institutions  
(GII) 
 
Level of awareness of 
institutions 
(Institutions) 
Level of awareness of community regarding institutions obtained 
during semi-structured survey. (0 = Did not know any 
institutions, 1 = Knew one institution, 2 = Knew 2 to 3 
institutions, 3 = Knew 4 or more institutions).  
Community-city 
distance (Distance) 
Distance (km) from the community to the capital (i.e., Huancayo) 
estimated by GPS and GIS mapping.  
Community altitude 
(Altitude) 
Altitude (MASL) of each community measured by GPS, referring 
to community building. 
Road access to 
communities 
(Road_access) 
Presence of paved road to reach the community based on 
surveying community lands. (0 = no paved road, 1 = paved road, 
2 = mixed roads) 
 Economy (E) Family income 
(Income) 
Family income per month based on semi-structured survey with 
ACM. 
Family expenses 
(Expenses) 
Family expenses per month based on semi-structured survey 
with ACM. 
Community-mining 
economic benefits 
(M_payment) 
Annual payment from mining company to benefited community 
reported by mining companies and campesino community 
authorities. 
 
The justification and methodology used to derive each criterion and indicator 
are detailed below.  
 
Water  
Justification  
The Peruvian Andes have high regulatory and reputational risk related to public 
confidence in sustainable water use by companies (Orr et al., 2009; Richards, 2016; 
Schulte et al., 2014), and medium to high physical risk related to water quality and 
availability (WRI, 2015). In the Andean farming-mining lands, competition for water 
occurs among communities and mining companies due to the shift of water property 
from the government to the private sector (Glave and Kuramoto, 2007; Sosa and 
Zwarteveen, 2012). As a result, water security is considered one of the main conflict 
drivers due to impacts on local livelihoods (Conde, 2017; Perreault, 2014).  
In Peru, the provision of drinking water and irrigation water is still a major 
constraint for local wellbeing and economic activities (Boelens et al., 2010). In 2007, 
67.5% of the households in Peru had access to drinking water, while 32.5% got their 
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water supply from rivers, ditches, or some other unsafe source (INEI, 2010). By 2012, 
access to drinking water had increased to 87% nationwide, and up to 72% in rural areas 
(AQUASTAT, 2015). Unlike drinking water, irrigation water in most croplands relies 
primarily on inefficient gravity irrigation (Eda and Chen, 2010), and is weakened by the 
lack of long-term policies for water management (Eda and Chen, 2010).  
The water criterion is comprised of six indicators, data for which were obtained 
during interviews with stakeholders and surveys of campesino communities: drought, 
water access, water availability, water quality, mining stage, and absence of fish. In the 
Andes, drought is one of the root causes behind the weakened irrigation infrastructure 
(Boelens et al., 2010). Due to the significant negative impacts of drought, local Andean 
livelihoods over the last decade (PCM, 2016; Sanabria et al., 2014), and irrigation plans 
based on the ground- and surface water have become contingency plans to protect 
crops and increase productivity (Hoogesteger and Verzijl, 2015; Taft, 2015). 
In the Andes, water access changes according to the needs of the established 
mines, as occurred between Yanacocha mine and the users of irrigation canals from 
communities (Sosa and Zwarteveen, 2012). The government enters into a position in 
which they have to take the water from communities and grant it to mining companies. 
This indicates the power of such companies, as these can later decide to whom water 
access is provided (Swyngedouw, 2009).  
Land-use conflict drivers such as water quality and availability are affected 
due to the mine location and its impact on water sources of downstream communities, 
the underestimation of water consumption by the mines, and the extension of impacts 
on aquifers and rivers (Bebbington et al., 2013; Bebbington and Williams, 2008; 
Gudynas, 2015; Méndez Zegarra et al., 2007; Salem et al., 2018). In the Yanacocha 
conflict, the mine and local people disputed the granted water for mining and irrigation 
(Bury, 2002; Li, 2017; Wagner, 2013), proving that water-related concerns of 
communities can lead to violent conflict and public demonstrations (Triscritti, 2013). 
In Peru, the National Authority of Water (ANA) is in charge of giving water-use 
grants to mines (MINAGRI, 2015, 2008). The financial compensation for water use by 
mines is given annually and based on water availability and the used volume (MINAGRI, 
Land-use conflict risk index: Building and application in farming-mining lands of the 
Central Peruvian Andes  
97 
 
2018, 2017, 2016). In the mine´s operations (MEM, 1992) there are the two mining 
stages exploration and exploitation.  Depending on the size of the mine, the impact 
during exploitation is often higher. Although mining technology for exploitation aims to 
prevent environmental accidents (e.g., mining tailing spills), these accidents can occur 
as a result of the intensity, spatial cover, and complexity of the mines (Gudynas, 2015). 
For example, a spill of 50000 m3 of mining tailings from the Lincuna S.A. mining company 
spread in the Sipchoc watershed (Ancash region in the northern Andes) in March 2018 
due to the increase in surface water of the tailing (TFA, 2018), which affected the water 
sources and crops of neighboring communities (El Comercio, 2018). An environmental 
consequence of mine tailing spills could be the absence of fish in rivers, which is a food 
supply for local communities. Previous studies have documented claims by communities 
in regard to reduced fish catches and the presence of mines, which affected their 
livelihood activities (Bury, 2002).  
 
Methodology 
Prior to reaching out to the communities, this study informed the subnational 
government regarding the research, and requested its support in contacting campesino 
community authorities. Once community authorities had been informed, the voluntary 
participation of each community in the research was requested during their general 
assemblies (meetings with all active community members). If permission was given, the 
research was able to begin. 
Data for the water criterion were obtained by a semi-structured survey 
involving the active community members (ACM) and in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders (including community authorities and mining companies). Drought, water 
access, water availability, water quality, and the absence of wild trout were assessed in 
the survey. The surveys were applied to elicit local knowledge and perceptions of 
possible conflict drivers related to mining and farming activities. The results provided 
values for each ACM. In the case of the indicator mining stage, the value was obtained 
by requesting the information for each community through in-depth interviews based 
on an unstructured survey (Baxter et al., 2015) with stakeholders.  
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Soil fertility 
Justification  
The soil fertility criterion is justified by the importance of soil for community livelihoods, 
which can be affected by mining activities. Defined as the soil’s ability to produce crops 
and sustain high yields, soil fertility is related to the potential and capacity of profits and 
productivity (Gisi et al., 1997, p236). In the Peruvian Andes, soil fertility has decreased 
due to grazing intensification, which is the result of reduced grazing land because of land 
concessions to mining activities (Bebbington and Bury, 2009). State institutions evaluate 
the feasibility of the location of mines and determine whether the mine can affect the 
soil through filtration of pollutants from mine tailings (De Echave et al., 2009). Therefore, 
since communities depend on farming activities, the soil is included as a criterion for the 
LUCRI.  Based on the literature review and the fieldwork, the soil fertility criterion is 
operationalized by four indicators: crop production, crop products, compost, and soil 
quality.  
Crop production in the Andes depends on the altitudinal gradient. Based on 
the altitude, specific ecological characteristics create production zones and 
opportunities (Wiegers et al., 1999). Intensive agriculture is done at altitudes lower than 
3800 MASL while extensive agriculture is done at higher altitudes (Fonte et al., 2012). In 
the research area, the altitude of the studied communities varies from 3500 to ca. 5000 
MASL26. Crop production is also affected by hydrometeorological hazards (e.g., hail, 
frost), water irrigation, droughts and soil nutrients (Fonte et al., 2012).   
In the Andes, smallholder farmers and campesino communities sow traditional 
crop products such as potato (Solanum spp.), quinoa (Chenopodium quinoa), oca (Oxalis 
tuberosa), mashwa (Tropaeolum tuberosum), and ullucu (Ullucus tuberosus) (Fonte et 
al., 2012; Hellin and Higman, 2005). These crops are for self-consumption or small-scale 
commercialization. Crops require soil nutrient levels that are frequently replenished 
                                                     
26 The altitudes of the communities were measured using their meeting center as a 
reference point. Chongos Alto (3571 MASL), Llamapsillon (3628 MASL), Usibamba (3654 
MASL), Palmayoc (3696MASL), Huasicancha (3732 MASL), Palaco (3879 MASL), Sulcan 
(3922 MASL), and Shicuy (3934 MASL).  
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from the inorganic/organic components of the soils and from manure (Weil and Brady, 
2017). Crops are also influenced by temperature and altitude, with temperature 
generally decreasing as altitude increases. For instance, potatoes require daytime 
temperatures of ca. 20°C in contrast to pastures that can thrive at temperatures of ca. 
0°C (Weil and Brady, 2017). Therefore, higher communities tend to shift crop production 
to pasture to feed their livestock. 
Since the fallow period length and number of consecutive years of cultivation 
reduce potato yields (Sarmiento and Bottner, 2002), farmers improve soil nutrients 
through the compost of crop residues and manure (Fonte et al., 2012). They also widely 
use manure during sowing (Caycho-Ronco et al., 2009).  
A decrease in soil quality endangers farming activities and food security 
(Özkaynak and Rodriguez-Labajos, 2017). Claims against mining operations regarding 
soil and water pollution are frequently related to the perception of communities with 
respect to the death of livestock, decrease in farming production, and soil erosion 
through mining activities (Bury, 2002; Rodríguez-Labajos and Özkaynak, 2017). Indeed, 
soil pollution through high concentrations of heavy metals in leachate plumes has been 
observed (Ngole and Ekosse, 2012), and there has been evidence of pollution transfer 
from soil to plants in open-pit mines (Ashraf et al., 2011). In the case of smelters in 
mines, heavy metal particles can be transported and impact soils and crops in distant 
areas (Pruvot et al., 2006; Razo et al., 2004; Rötting et al., 2014). In the current research 
area, there have been reports of mining impacts on the Sulcan and Usibamba 
communities as well as complaints from neighboring communities dated from the start 
of operations of La Oroya smelters in the early twentieth century (section 3) (Caballero 
Martín, 1981; Cotler, 2016; Li, 2017). 
 
Methodology 
The soil fertility criterion was obtained with community permission through a survey of 
ACM. Crop production, crops, and manure use were assessed. The results provided 
aggregated values at the community level. Soil quality was obtained using kriging 
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interpolation in a GIS application with the data of cadmium concentration from 
INGEMMET via the GEOCATMIN platform.  
 
Land Use 
Justification  
The traditional land use in the Andes is agriculture and livestock. As the communities 
are dependent on environmental factors, changes in land use can breed conflicts among 
the local people (Havel, 1986). Such changes are mainly related to the presence of 
extractivist projects close to or on community lands, and these operations may generate 
the use and deterioration of natural resources (Calderón, 2012b; De Echave et al., 2006; 
Hilson, 2002). Livestock is a key economic resource for the communities for income and 
products (e.g., wool, meat, dairy products) (Bebbington, 2001; Brain, 2017; Brush, 1976; 
Chambers, 1995; Fonte et al., 2012; Wiegers et al., 1999), and thus the land-use criterion 
includes the indicators total community area, grazing area, and livestock grazing. 
The total community area is relevant because the larger the area, the greater 
the presence of vital resources for communities, e.g., water sources, pastures. The socio-
economic value of the land for the community is not the same as that for extractivist 
projects, one cause of land-use conflicts (Hilson, 2002). Land ownership can be individual 
or common in the communities. Common land property has stronger cooperation norms 
than individual property (Braaten, 2014). Legally, land as common property requires a 
community´s decision to sell or rent for mining operations (CRP, 1987).  
Regarding grazing area, communities allocate their economic activities and 
resources in production zones, e.g., grazing and agriculture (Fonte et al., 2012). A larger 
grazing area can accommodate greater livestock (De Koning et al., 1999; Postigo et al., 
2008). Reductions in the productivity of pastures may cause the migration of community 
members if they cannot live on their lands (Bury, 2004). Grazing is part of the livelihoods 
of communities since agriculture becomes increasingly difficult at higher altitudes, 
which generates a resource competition with mining operations (Bury, 2002; Li, 2017).  
Besides mining, livestock grazing is affected by climatic hazards, geography, 
and soil and water quality and access, making it more likely to induce conflict escalation 
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(Recharte et al., 2002). Depending on altitude and land resources, livestock may differ. 
At lower altitudes, communities have cattle for dairy products while communities at 
higher altitudes have sheep and camelids (Postigo et al., 2008). 
 
Methodology 
The land-use criterion used land-cover classification and semi-structured surveys of 
ACM while the survey of each community member relied on obtaining grazing livestock 
information. The grazing area per community was extracted from the land-cover 
classification (Chapter 3).  
To map the total community areas, the available maps of each community 
were acquired from the Office of Native and Campesino Communities of DRA27. These 
official maps were produced in the 1920s and 1930s. Based on these maps and the in-
depth interviews with community authorities, this study confirmed that most of the 
community boundaries were formed by rivers. 
 
Community-mining dialogues 
Justification  
The arrival of a mining company in a community can generate two main positions, i.e., 
a positive position through the promises of the company to communities and a negative 
position through the establishment of the enclave economy (Gudynas, 2015). Enclave 
economy refers to the geographical focus of investment through extractivist projects 
(Damonte, 2012), which can foster discontent and contention among neighboring 
communities without the mining-related benefits. To avoid conflict escalation, a 
constant and direct dialogue between communities and representatives of mining 
companies is essential to deal with any misunderstandings. This dialogue leads to the 
establishment of negotiation spaces, which are important for local people giving them 
the opportunity to listen to the mining company and the government (Salas Carreño, 
2008). The community-mining dialogues criterion has four indicators: number of 
                                                     
27Regional Direction of Agriculture of Junín.  
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dialogues, time since the first meeting, level of community/mining company 
relationship, and level of socio-economic benefit.  
Regarding the number of dialogues, mine representatives need to have 
experienced dialogues and worked with communities in order to avoid conflicts (Salas 
Carreño, 2008).  A dialogue space allows the participation and dynamism of civil society, 
communities and other stakeholders (Li, 2017). Previous conflicts have shown (e.g., the 
Conga case) that the arguments of communities change with time and through the 
interaction with other stakeholders (e.g., civil society) (Li, 2017). Therefore, reliable and 
legitimate dialogue spaces allow a better understanding of the roots of conflict and their 
shifts. Depending on the legitimacy of state institutions, their influence in mining-
farming areas through reports can aggravate or decrease the probability of conflict (Li, 
2017). From 2008 to 2017, dialogue-related reasons were a common underlying cause 
of conflict (e.g., Espinar, Tía María, Conga) (De Echave, 2018). 
The time since the first meeting is important because a regular dialogue can 
be key to preventing conflicts (Salas Carreño, 2008). Several cases have shown that state 
institutions and mining companies engaged in appropriate and consistent dialogue with 
communities only when conflicts have escalated. Repeated dialogues can allow 
communities to ask and understand mining operations, impacts, and benefits. Although 
this indicator defines the time that has passed since the first dialogue with the mining 
project, it provides an idea of a history of negotiation that later can be observed in the 
relationship level and the socio-economic benefits to the community.  
The indicator level of community/mining company relationship relates to the 
relationship of the mining company with the communities. The importance of the 
relationship will define future prospects regarding the benefits that communities can 
obtain from the mining company. After the implementation of neoliberal reforms to 
enhance extractivist projects, communities as mining-potential landowners have 
become crucial role-players for the negotiations and the feasibility of these projects 
(Damonte, 2011). With a collective awareness, communities are featured as an 
economic and political institution whose resistance to extractivist projects can generate 
a mobilization of interests or a conflict, e.g., in Peru and Ecuador (Arellano-Yanguas, 
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2011a; Avci and Fernández-Salvador, 2016; Conde and Le Billon, 2017; Damonte, 2011). 
Therefore, the relationship between companies and communities is crucial for 
facilitating the execution of extractivist projects.  
Regarding the level of socio-economic benefit, the agreement between 
communities and mining companies (Chapter 3) aims to meet the needs and 
expectations of both sides. In some cases, e.g., the Antamina28 mine, communities were 
grateful for the relationship with the mining company due to the benefits provided to 
their people (e.g., jobs) (Drinot, 2014; Salas Carreño, 2004). However, if community 
expectations are too high once a mining project has started, dissatisfaction may result 
in conflicts (Salas Carreño, 2008). Other cases, e.g., the Espinar mine, have experienced 
environmental problems (e.g., death of livestock) as a reason for conflict and have 
subsequently negotiated better agreements that included environmental clauses (De 
Echave, 2018; MINAM, 2019).  
 
Methodology 
All indicators of these criteria were obtained through a semi-structured survey of ACM 
of campesino communities and in-depth interviews with stakeholders (including 
community authorities and mining companies). The obtained data were cross-checked 
among stakeholders and communities.  
 
Involvement of Governmental Institutions  
Justification 
Political marginalization in communities negatively affects the participation in mining-
related decision-making processes (Ballard and Banks, 2003). To reduce marginality, the 
current Peruvian government agreed with the regional government to build or improve 
roads to connect cities with remote areas (PRP, 2017a). Road construction also 
facilitates the closeness of state institutions with communities. Despite the increased 
                                                     
28 Antamina is an open-pit copper-zinc mine in the Ancash region in the northern Andes. 
This mine had problems due to spill of copper that affected neighboring communities 
(De Echave, 2018). 
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connectivity, environmental institutionalism and the presence of state institutions in 
communities can encourage conflicts. Therefore, this criterion has the following 
indicators: level of awareness of institutions, community-city distance, community 
altitude, and road access to the community.  
The level of awareness of institutions can determine whether conflicts 
escalate due to the demands of communities on the government (Arroyo and Boelens, 
2013). Communities learn about the existence of state institutions in their regions in 
order to establish formal complaints. Along with road construction, the decentralization 
of state institutions started in the early 2000s and aimed to re-establish democracy and 
state building (PNUD, 2006; Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; Dargent et al., 2017). This 
decentralization process aimed to contribute to a full, harmonious and more sustainable 
development (CRP, 2002), and permeated environment-related state institutions, e.g., 
the Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA) and the National 
Authority of Water (ANA) of the Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture. On the 
other hand, local governments, which gained political power after decentralization 
started, are more widely known to community members due to their management of 
economic resources that come from canon minero and the central government (Drinot, 
2014). Despite efforts towards decentralization and attempts to join the country, there 
are constant conflicts that reveal social gaps and low levels of legitimacy in state 
institutions (Calderón, 2012b). 
Road access to communities varies because road construction differs among 
regions and communities. In Peru, 86.5% of the roads were not paved in 2017 (MTC, 
2019a). The uneven geography of the Andes has even hindered the connections of these 
roads with other cities. Although non-paved roads can help connect communities with 
the capital city (Carrillo Hoyos, 2011; Ospina Ovalle, 2016), paved road construction has 
become part of negotiations with mining companies due to the lacking presence of the 
state (De Echave et al., 2009). 
The community-city distance as the actual physical distance is also a 
determinant of conflict, since the farther from the capital, the easier it is to delegitimize 
community claims (De Echave, 2018). Economically, distance influences market access 
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and the farming-subsistence of communities, where a greater distance makes 
subsistence farming more likely to be the main livelihood (Caycho-Ronco et al., 2009). 
Community altitude refers to the physical altitude of each community, which 
is also related to issues of access. Paved roads become more difficult at higher altitudes 
and decrease the possibility of consistent access to capital cities, markets, and state 
institutions. Also, the higher the altitude, the more vulnerable a community is to climate 
hazards, and water-, and soil-related problems (INGEMMET, 2014).  
 
Methodology  
The level of awareness of institutions was obtained through the semi-structured survey 
of ACM, access to communities by observation during fieldwork, and the community-
city distance and community distance using GPS and secondary data from the Ministry 
of Transport and Communication (MTC, 2019b).  
 
Economy  
Justification 
Campesino communities share the collective ownership of a determined area (Castillo 
et al., 2004; CRP, 1987) and depend mostly on agricultural and livestock-related 
activities for income (Bartl et al., 2009; Bebbington, 2001; Fonte et al., 2012; Kristjanson 
et al., 2007; Postigo et al., 2008; Valdivia and Quiroz, 2003). Despite the environmental 
constraints (e.g., precipitation, temperature), community households often get money 
from the sale of livestock and dairy products (Fonte et al., 2012; Wiegers et al., 1999). 
Despite the potential economic benefit from the presence of mining operations, nearby 
communities might not have improved human development indicators, as was the case 
in Yanacocha (Cajamarca), Antamina (Ancash), Tintaya  (Cusco), and Buenaventura 
(Huancavelica) (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Gudynas, 2015). In return for land concession, 
the canon minero is distributed at the sub-national level, which is also a driver of land-
use conflicts because communities do not receive it directly (Salem et al., 2018). As a 
result, the economy criterion consists of the household economy through family income 
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and expenses and the benefits that are provided from the mining company to 
communities.   
Family income depends mainly on farming activities, which facilitates the 
establishment of mining projects due to the more attractive benefits for community 
members such as job quotas and salaries (Basombrío et al., 2016). Access to public 
services and assets (e.g., education, roads) increases the diversification of community 
economies (Brain, 2017; Escobal, 2001). For instance, the improvement of public assets 
incentivizes communities to prefer grazing lands and dairy production over agriculture 
given the potential generation of higher profits (Li, 2009).  
Family expenses of the communities are supported through farming and 
complementary activities. The need to meet family expenses has evolved along with 
globalization and national issues, e.g., internal armed conflicts and migration leading to 
remittances (Robles Mendoza, 2004). Along with agriculture, communities also 
participate in local commerce through small trade fairs for supplementary income (Diez 
Hurtado, 2001; Martínez Valle, 2002). 
Community-mining economic benefits mainly refer to the annual economic 
payments and job quotas to communities in return for the rent of their lands to mining 
companies. However, job quotas are rare since community members are often not 
qualified (Brain, 2017). Despite this, there are collateral job opportunities for the 
internal economy of communities such as infrastructure building, restaurants, etc. 
(Brain, 2017). In addition, the annual payment that is arranged within agreements (see 
Chapter 3) represents a benefit for the community.  
 
Methodology 
Family income and expenses were obtained through the semi-structured survey of ACM. 
The indicator of community-mining economic benefits was obtained from the in-depth 
interviews with community authorities and stakeholders.  
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5.2.4. Selection, weighting, and aggregation   
Selection of criteria and indicators  
To establish the theoretical framework, the identification of indicators as socio-
environmental root causes of conflicts was done via content analysis using data from in-
depth interviews with stakeholders (e.g., state institutions, mining companies, 
community authorities, and civil society) (Table 5-2). The proposed indicators of the 
LUCRI aimed to be as understandable and plausible as possible for all participants 
because their values and weighting needed to be obtained directly from campesino 
communities. Local participants were able to easily provide responses to these criteria 
and indicators during data collection. Table 5-2 shows the frequency of categories 
clustered in six criteria: Soil Fertility (SF), Water (W), Land-Use (LU), Community-Mining 
Dialogues (CMD), Involvement of Governmental Institutions (GII), and Economy (E).  
 
Indicator values  
The indicator values were first normalized due to their different units. These values were 
obtained from the semi-structured questionnaires of ACM, in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders, secondary data from state institutions (e.g., ANA) and satellite images 
(Landsat 8) (section 5.2.3). 
 
Normalization: Value Function 𝒗(𝒂𝒊𝒌)   
Data transformation was needed to integrate indicators into a composite index. To 
integrate the selected indicator (Table 5-3) per community, a linear transformation was 
done through min-max normalization in order to preserve the relationship among 
original data (Jain and Bhandare, 2011; Malczewski, 2011; OECD, 2008; Patro and Sahu, 
2015). The min-max normalization works with a value range of [0,1], so the min
𝑖
{𝑎𝑖𝑘} =
0 and max
𝑖
{𝑎𝑖𝑘} = 1 . The global value function for each indicator was calculated in 
Equation 4: 
𝑣(𝑎𝑖𝑘) =
𝑎𝑖𝑘−min
𝑖
{𝑎𝑖𝑘}
max
𝑖
{𝑎𝑖𝑘}−min
𝑖
{𝑎𝑖𝑘}
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑘 − 𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑     (Equation 4) 
where: 
𝑎𝑖𝑘 is the level of the 𝑘 − 𝑡ℎ indicator for the i-th alternative 
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𝑣(𝑎𝑖𝑘) is the worth or desirability of that alternative with respect to that indicator and 
varies from 0 (the least-desirable outcome) to 1 (the most-desirable score). 
min
𝑖
{𝑎𝑖𝑘} and max
𝑖
{𝑎𝑖𝑘} are the minimum and maximum indicator values for the 𝑘 − 𝑡ℎ 
indicator, respectively. 
 
Indicator weighting 𝒘𝒌 
This study refers to PCA as an automatic index, where each component is a linear 
weighted combination of the used variables (Abdi and Williams, 2010; Mckenzie, 2003; 
Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006).  
Weights are used to assess the relevance of a given indicator, i.e. the greater 
the weight, the higher the importance of the indicator (Malczewski, 2011; Malczewski 
and Rinner, 2015). Community respondents and authorities provided indicator weights 
through ratings. The ratings for each community were the resultant average or median 
of respondents´ weights per community. After this weight was categorized per criteria, 
the weights were proportioned based on the number of indicators per criterion and the 
averaged weight of each indicator. Indicator weights (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑘 … , 𝑤𝑛) meet two 
conditions: 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑘 ≤ 1 and ∑ = 1
𝑛
𝑘=1 .    
However, there are two main limitations to using PCA here, i.e., not all 
variables (indicators) must be different for each respondent because some indicators 
refer to the whole community rather than to individuals (e.g., community-mining 
economic benefits) and the lack of the added value from the local knowledge, historical 
and cultural background, and experience of the respondents. 
 
Imputation of missing data  
Composite indexes often use data imputation to replace missing data with substitute 
values (Lezzaik et al., 2018). In the LUCRI, there were two cases of missing weighting 
data that should have been given by local experts (i.e., neighboring community 
authorities). In the Cunas sub-basin, three of five invited communities of San Jose de 
Quero district participated in the MCDA workshop. The required information of the 
absent communities was obtained from the average of the participant communities, 
justifiable given their geographic proximity (Brennan and Martin, 2012).    
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Criteria Weighting 𝑾𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 
During a workshop, 22 stakeholders provided the criteria weights via a multi-criteria 
decision analysis technique. This method was used due to its easy comprehension and 
use for stakeholders who were mainly community authorities. Adapted from Mendoza 
et al. (1999), the combined weight for each criterion was estimated. This combined 
weight was then averaged among all stakeholders in order to obtain a unique score per 
criterion that represents the socio-environmental system in the research area. Criterion 
weights ( 𝑊1, 𝑊2, … , 𝑊𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)  fulfill two conditions: 0 ≤ 𝑊𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 ≤ 1  and 
∑ = 1𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠=1 .   
 
5.2.5. Validation of the proposed risk index 
The purpose of validation is to increase confidence in a technique with respect to its 
ability to successfully carry out a task (Lewis and Bardon, 1998). Although the validation 
might not prove the accuracy of the index, this process can invalidate it (Addiscott et al., 
1995; Bockstaller and Girardin, 2003; Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992) or otherwise 
increase user confidence. Due to the difficulty of validating a risk index that uses mixed-
methods, e.g., multi-criteria decision analysis (Malczewski and Rinner, 2015), the 
validation is based on the workflow shown in Figure 5-3 and includes expert judgment, 
which is a suitable option for indexes using qualitative and quantitative data (Bockstaller 
and Girardin, 2003). Although other forms of validation could be complementary 
(Bockstaller and Girardin, 2003), this research does not include them due to the lack of 
available data that show the occurrence of land-use conflicts in the research area.  
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Figure 5-3. Flow diagram for selection of validation method based on indicators 
Adapted from Bockstaller and Girardin (2003). 
 
The validation process was adopted based on previous research (Bockstaller 
and Girardin, 2003; Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992; Lewis and Bardon, 1998). As a result, 
a group of experts was chosen considering their experience and knowledge in (1) the 
research area, (2) with campesino communities generally, and (3) with conflicts 
involving campesino communities. The experts first were provided with a 
characterization of the communities, the building process of LUCRI, and followed by the 
results with their explanation. After the experts had submitted their assessments 
through a short survey (Appendix 8.4), these were compiled and sent back to them for 
a final assessment. The experts reached a consensus on the compiled assessment.  
In addition, in-field validation was done through cross-checking of the selected 
indicators and criteria in a semi-structured survey with the results of the content analysis 
of in-depth interviews.  
 
5.2.6. What-if scenarios 
The final step of the LUCRI involves running hypothetical scenarios based on findings 
from the epistemic community. 
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The scenarios were developed based on the recommendations in previous 
studies (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; Bebbington et al., 2018a; Li, 2017; Salas Carreño, 
2008). The simulation of these scenarios aimed to: (i) differentiate three frequent 
recommendations from the epistemic community, and (ii) assess the criteria and 
indicators that are modified to have their optimal score. Thus, three main scenarios 
were established: (1) strong environmental institutionalism, (2) strong environmental 
institutionalism and community economy, and (3) environmental security. 
For scenario development and analyses, the simulation was done by changing 
the values of certain indicators from their actual values (section 5.2.4) to their optimal 
values in order to reach the conditions of the established scenario. The criterion and 
indicator weights were held constant because their calculated importance reflects the 
status quo for the interested community. 
The community with the highest risk level was used to simulate the different 
scenarios. Thus, the results section (section 5.3.5) first describes the context of the 
community with the highest risk level. In the following subsections, the framework 
behind each scenario is outlined.  
 
Scenario 1: Strong environmental institutionalism  
This scenario represents the opposite reality to the situation analyzed in this study. It 
was indicated (Chapter 4) that there is weak environmental institutionalism, which is 
characterized by the absence and disinformation of state institutions. Environmental 
institutionalism, i.e. the set of institutions and public policy that focuses on 
environmental quality affected by human-nature interactions (Damonte and Vila, 2014), 
was simulated through GII and CMD criteria. This scenario hypothesizes that strong 
environmental institutionalism can significantly decrease the escalation of land-use 
conflicts because communities will acknowledge state institutions through the 
decentralization, connect with the central government, and have legitimate negotiation 
spaces.  
Better connectivity among communities to major cities facilitates their ability 
to reach state institutions, reducing the absence of state institutions in community lands 
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(Conde and Le Billon, 2017). For communities, connectivity through road building has 
become an issue for social justice29, transportation with dignity, market access, farming 
techniques to improve production, and other factors (Wilson, 2004). However, the 
improvement of road access does not necessarily mean better conditions in 
communities, but could, in fact, be a contingent of disadvantages, e.g., illegal mining, 
drug traffic (De Echave, 2018; Perz et al., 2013; Wilson, 2004). Also, although the 
decentralization process has promoted the presence of offices of main state institutions 
in regions beyond the capital, conflicts have revealed persistent low levels of the 
legitimacy of state institutions (Calderón, 2012b).  
In the case of the CMD criterion, the engagement of the community in 
negotiation is done through their participation (Conde and Le Billon, 2017). A constant 
negotiation between both actors enhances the flux of information, thus establishing a 
community-driven negotiation table. However, most conflicts have been characterized 
by insufficient dialogues and negotiations with communities (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011a; 
De Echave, 2018; Salas Carreño, 2008). This poor negotiation lacking the presence of 
state institutions and their low legitimacy decreases the possibility of establishing 
legitimate negotiations and preventing or managing conflicts (Salas Carreño, 2008). 
Although the longest period of negotiation does not necessarily mean a better 
negotiation, more time may allow establishing a stronger relationship with the 
community.  
Scenario 1 required the optimum values of the GII and CMD criteria (section 
5.2.6, Table 5-4).   
 
Table 5-4. Values of indicators of GII and CMD criteria with reasons behind the value 
scaling 
Indicator Value Reason 
N_dialogues 1 A higher value refers to many dialogues between the community and 
mining company. 
Length_meet 1 The longer the length of the first meeting, the higher the probability of 
establishing a positive relation.  
                                                     
29Social justice is defined as “justice at the level of a society or state as regards the 
possession of wealth, commodities, opportunities, and privileges”(Oxford English 
dictionary online, n.d.). 
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Relation 0 A lower value for community-mining relation refers to a less difficult 
relation between both actors. 
SE_benefits 1 The higher the score, the better are the benefits provided to communities. 
Institutions 1 Communities know more state institutions, increasing the legitimacy of 
institutions. 
Distance 0 The shorter the distance to the capital, the more connected the community 
is, increasing its likelihood to contact institutions. 
Altitude 0 The lower the altitude of a community, the better connectivity the 
community has with the capital city. 
Road_access 1 The higher the access, the better connectivity the community has with the 
capital city.  
 
Scenario 2: Strong environmental institutionalism and community economy 
The economic criterion was added to the previous scenario to evaluate if a strong 
community economy in a context of strong environmental institutionalism helps avoids 
conflict escalation. The criterion is based on the family economy (i.e., family income and 
expenses) and the community-mining economic benefits. This scenario hypothesized 
that a strong community economy will raise the environmental concern and resistance 
related to mining operations due to the productive and beneficial farming activities. 
Improved agricultural opportunities and connections with markets can provide a strong 
community farming-based economy. Likewise, the presence of a strong environment 
institutionalism will not influence the decision making of the communities with respect 
to being against mining operations.  
Poor community families are correlated with a higher risk of conflict (Haslam 
and Tanimoune, 2016). The poverty of farming-dependent communities is also due to 
their income, poor public services (road building and maintenance, water, electricity, 
education, and health services) and lack of farming opportunities (Conde and Le Billon, 
2017; Haslam and Tanimoune, 2016). Regarding the community-mining economic 
benefits, the annual payment is commonly seen as compensation that might be 
achieved through the bargaining power of communities in negotiations during land-use 
conflicts (Arce, 2014; Arellano-Yanguas, 2012, 2011a, 2010; Conde and Le Billon, 2017; 
Hinojosa, 2011; Zegarra et al., 2007). However, this compensation might only last as long 
as the mining company is operating on the community land.  
Along with the indicators and values of Table 5-4, the values of the indicators 
of Table 5-5 are input for this scenario.  
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Table 5-5. Values of indicators of the economy criterion with reasons behind the value 
scaling 
Indicator Values Reason 
M_payment 1 The higher the annual payment to communities, the less probable a 
conflict is to escalate. In the case of Shicuy, the high annual payment still 
buffers the escalation of a conflict.  
Income 1 The higher the income, the lower the dependence on mining-related 
benefits. 
Expenses 0 The lower the expenses (combined with higher income), the higher profits 
for families.  
 
Scenario 3: Environmental security 
This scenario is also the opposite of the current situation analyzed in this study. In 
Chapter 3, water and soil were assessed where mining companies were located in the 
rented community lands. Previous studies have shown that mining operations have 
polluted water bodies through their activities, tailings and environmental liabilities 
(Preciado Jerónimo and Álvarez Gutiérrez, 2016). Thus, this scenario assesses 
environmental security through used water, soil fertility, and land-use criteria. This 
scenario hypothesized that if it is possible to ensure environmental security to the 
communities, defined as the absence of risk of the environment in which a community 
depends on (Vivekananda et al., 2014), the risk of land-use conflict might be reduced in 
the current context. Environmental security might have to be granted by the mining 
company, since there is an absence of state institutions in communities.   
In mining, water and soil are the biophysical factors that are used as roots of 
conflict escalation (Bebbington and Williams, 2008; De Echave, 2018; Li, 2017; Perreault, 
2014). Bebbington and Williams (2008) highlighted that communities have concerns 
related to water quantity and quality due to mining activities. The pressure on water 
access and availability has also increased among communities due to the decisions of 
the central government over water use (Hoogesteger and Verzijl, 2015; Sosa and 
Zwarteveen, 2012). As with water pollution, soil pollution by mining operations has a 
long history with an outstanding case, i.e., La Oroya, where local people were affected 
(Reuer et al., 2012).  The concern of the community regarding soil is based on the need 
to increase and produce crops for their own consumption (Fonte et al., 2012). As with 
agriculture, livestock rearing is considered an insurance mechanism for most 
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communities, because they can sell their livestock or derived products (Postigo et al., 
2008; Swinton and Quiroz, 2003). However, mining operations negatively affect water 
quality and quantity, and the land-tenure practices in the Andes (Brain, 2017). 
Therefore, it is necessary to ensure environmental security for communities that are 
affected by mining operations.  
For this scenario, indicator values were set to the optimal scores for the criteria 
water, soil fertility and land-use (Table 5-6). 
 
Table 5-6. Values of indicators of soil fertility and water criteria with reasons behind 
value scaling 
Indicator Value Reason 
Compost 1 Use of compost is crucial to improve community crops. 
C_products 1 Land use could be for crops or pasture. The higher the productivity of 
land the more likely it is to be used for crops. 
C_production 1 The higher the main crop production, the higher the likelihood of 
community families having sufficient food and being able to sell 
products.  
S_quality 0 The lower the concentration of heavy metals (i.e., cadmium), the 
fewer possible grievances for a conflict. 
Com_area 1 The larger the community land, the more resources for community 
economic activities. 
Graze_area 1 The larger the grazing lands, the more pasture for feeding livestock. 
Graze_livestock 1 The more livestock, the higher the livestock-based income. 
Drought 0 The fewer the drought events, the better conditions for crops and 
livestock production. 
W_access 0 The fewer problems with water access, the better water conditions 
for communities. 
W_availability 0 The fewer problems with water availability, the better water 
conditions for communities. 
W_quality 0 The fewer problems with water quality, the better water conditions 
for communities. 
M_stage 0 The lower the mining stage (i.e., exploration), the lower the 
likelihood of causing an environmental impact on community lands. 
F_absence 0 The fewer events of the absence of fish in rivers, the fewer possible 
grievances for a conflict. 
 
5.3. Results  
5.3.1. Value Scaling 
Figure 5-4 shows the average values of the indicators per community (see methodology 
in section 5.2.3). The normative values between 0 and 1 depending on the indicator and 
can be binary or continuous (Table 5-3). For instance, some indicators use 1 for 
indicating that they are concerned or have problems such as drought, water access, 
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water availability, water quality, or absence of fish. Other indicators use 1 to describe 
an activity, i.e., compost, crops, and livestock grazing. The indicators with a continuous 
scale use 1 as the maximum value of their scale.   
 
‡ = average, * = median 
Figure 5-4. Values of indicators per community 
 
Figure 5-4 shows that the indicator values vary among communities. Compost, 
livestock grazing, and the absence of fish have the same value for all communities. All 
respondents use compost for their croplands and do livestock grazing. The absence of 
fish was also not a concern among communities. 
  
5.3.2. Weighting  
Figure 5-5 shows the weights of the indicators by the community. The indicator with the 
maximum weight was the community-mining economic benefit that is given as a result 
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of an agreement. Llamapsillon, despite not having an agreement or receiving this 
payment, is the community that considers this annual payment to be the most 
important indicator. Shicuy and Huasicancha, currently receiving the benefits of their 
agreements, show the same tendency although their weights are lower than non-
benefited communities such as Usibamba and Palmayoc.   
 
 
Figure 5-5. Weights of indicators given by respondents 
Scale from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest possible weight. 
 
 
5.3.3. Land-use Conflict Risk Index (LUCRI) 
Table 5-7 shows the criterion weighting based on the assessments by the local experts, 
i.e., stakeholders. In this assessment, there is an implicit inclination towards the 
community perspective because, despite the inclusion of different stakeholders, the 
workshop had a higher attendance of community authorities. This index thus highlights 
the perspective of the main local stakeholder (campesino communities) who can trigger 
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land-use conflicts. While community complaints may later result in conflicts for different 
reasons, e.g., pollution, improvement of agreements, mining-related misinformation, 
the mining company only aims to extract and produce in their established context. In 
the research area, the experts agreed that the water (W) criterion is the most important 
one, followed by land-use (LU) and community-mining dialogue (CMD).  
 
Table 5-7. Criterion weight based on the assessment of stakeholders 
Weight Soil 
Fertility 
Land-
Use 
Community-
Mining 
Dialogues 
Water Involvement of 
Governmental 
Institutions 
Economy 
𝑾𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.06 
 
Based on Equation 3, Figure 5-6 shows the overall values per criterion among 
communities. These values are joined with the weights in Table 5-7 to obtain the risk 
level (LUCRI).  
Figure 5-7 shows the risk level of each community for escalating into a conflict. 
Huasicancha and Palaco, communities with high risk, have land-use (LU) and water (W) 
as the most important criteria, respectively. This also demonstrates that conflict-
triggering factors change from one case to another. Consequently, the different 
weighting of criteria indicates the complexity that a land-use conflict can reach. The risk 
index thus may help indicate which criterion could be the determinant of conflict and 
consequently inform decision-makers to focus on that criterion to prevent escalation.  
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Figure 5-6. Overall values of criteria per community (Darkest color tone refers to the highest criterion value) 
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Figure 5-7. Criteria scores and risk levels per community applying land-use conflict risk index (LUCRI). 
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5.3.4. Validation of risk index 
Automatic vs expert index  
In this study, PCA was applied to create the risk index and determine its feasibility to 
provide indicator weighting. Most indicators that resulted from the survey of community 
respondents (Table 5-3) were entered in PCA. Based on Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006), 
the weights of each principal component were given by the covariance matrix, since the 
original data from the survey were standardized. In this study, the first component (PC1), 
which explains the largest possible amount of variation of the assessed data, resulted in 
18.40%. The second component (PC2) only explained 15.23% of the data. Consequently, 
this indicates that PCA might only explain 33.63%. Since an overall assessment of data 
resulted in low inter-indicator correlation, PCA was then applied to each community to 
evaluate if the results or the expert-built risk index better captures the message behind 
the data. However, even PCA per community resulted in a lower explained variance than 
30%. Since PCA did not adequately capture the data, local people and stakeholders 
assessed the indicator weights in the semi-structured survey. Community respondents 
weighted the indicators via a rating that used a scale ranging from 0 to 100% of 
importance (the highest rate).  
Figure 5-8 shows the scores of PC1 from the automatic index and the resultant 
scores of the expert risk index. Only four of the eight communities have similar scores. 
The automatic index did not use the common community data (e.g., community-mining 
economic benefit), but the data of ACM of the communities. Thus, the scores between 
each index differ. Therefore, the expert risk index (i.e., LUCRI) was used to involve the 
added value of the common community data, increasing confidence in the indicators 
and criteria.  
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Figure 5-8. Comparison of automatic and expert indexes 
 
Expert validation 
The consensus reached by the experts of the Peruvian epistemic community regarding 
the LUCRI risk index results is shown in Table 5-8. This validation resulted in new 
indicators to be considered in the LUCRI. However, the complexity of the suggested 
indicators will require further and more in-depth studies.   
 
Table 5-8. Summary of assessment related to design, results, and use of LUCRI 
Design Results Use 
Regarding Communities:  
 The economies of communities in 
the Central Andes are diversified and 
consequently, an in-depth study is 
required.  
 Each community is considered as 
unique, hindering the generalization 
of behavior in a conflict.  
 
 
Regarding indicators/criteria:  
 Beneficial to include other indicators 
such as:  
 The reality of 
communities that inhabit 
the Central Andes. 
 The articulation of a 
variety of indicators, 
portraying the problem of 
the conflict risk broadly  
 Informs on the reality, 
although LUCRI still needs 
a greater depth in the 
social and political 
context. 
  LUCRI could be highly useful 
for decision-making if the 
proposed modifications are 
considered in the design. 
  LUCRI could reach 80% utility, 
assuming 100% would be a 
perfect prediction of conflict. 
Some of the remaining 20% is 
affected by the rebuttal based 
on the commentaries in the 
design section.  
  LUCRI aims to reduce the 
conflict to a minimum, which 
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→ Personal interests (i.e., 
opportunists), the emergence of 
new interests and emotions in 
the community. 
→ A political criterion in the 
national, regional and local 
levels, regarding leadership and 
conflict resolution. 
 Due to the inclusion of different 
types of indicators, clear definitions 
of the indicators avoid any 
inaccurate conclusions.  
Further studies  
 Could focus on improving this index 
by in-depth interviews to disclose 
the social reality within 
communities.  
 LUCRI is an effort to show 
the conditions of the 
community agriculture 
and livestock in a possible 
conflict, however, it is 
impossible to portray 
completely this farming 
reality.  
could be considered 
impossible because of the 
latency of conflicts.  
  LUCRI could be used in 
decision-making, although it 
needs to add the mentioned 
indicators (see design column) 
in order to provide a more 
complete view of the reality.  
 
 
As the experts mentioned, a risk index of land-use conflict needs a deeper 
understanding of the social, economic and political context of communities. 
Consequently, this complexity cannot be captured by PCA. Experts explained that it is 
necessary to include the pressure on the community (e.g., social instigators) in the 
LUCRI. However, during the multi-criteria analysis, community authorities highlighted 
that it is not social instigators that cause a conflict. The total score for the weight of 
social instigators was only 6.32 in the rating (100 as max). Based on previous conflicts 
(e.g., Yanacocha and Conga in the northern Andes) and current conflicts (i.e., Las Bambas 
in the southern Andes), this research recommends that further studies should include 
this pressure on the communities. However, a longer study period might be required to 
determine presence, assessment, and inclusion in the risk index. 
The inclusion of economic and political interests in the LUCRI could lead to a 
more subjective approach to the risk index. It is well known that this kind of interest can 
arise before a conflict escalates because of the possible manipulation of the community, 
the economic benefits from the mining company, and the visibility that is earned even 
before the conflict starts. Li (2017) highlighted how a regional mayor joined the anti-
mining position during the Conga conflict, earning visibility in 2011, and then he became 
a presidential candidate in 2016. Another example of political interest was a priest who 
was part of the anti-mining group during the Conga conflict in 2011 and became a 
congressional representative for the period 2016-2021. In the case of economic 
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interests, some respondents mentioned that previous community authorities were 
allegedly involved in receiving economic benefits from mining companies. As a result, 
the inclusion of the political and economic interests in the risk index could also require 
a longer period of study to manage subjectivity in the index. 
 
5.3.5. What-if scenarios  
The Huasicancha community covers the Huasicancha district and consequently most of 
the district’s population belongs to the campesino community. 52% of the population 
comprises the labor force, and 47.45% of this labor force is involved only in farming 
activities (INEI, 2018b, 2018c). Created in 1930, the Huasicancha community performs 
subsistence agriculture (e.g., potato and other native crops), and has a long-term 
territorial conflict with Chongos Alto (Quispe-Zuniga et al., 2018). It is worth mentioning 
that Palaco, Llamapsillon, and Palmayoc also belong to the Chongos Alto district and 
recognize each other as one composite community. Since the Huacravilca project is 
located in the conflict area, the economic interests of these communities might 
influence possible conflict escalation.  
 
Scenario 1: Strong environmental institutionalism  
This scenario establishes that the decentralized state institution has the best working 
conditions, and that there are well-established environmental reforms and regulations, 
which could be provided effectively to the communities. The risk level was 0.17 (0.09 of 
CMD and 0.08 of GII) of 1.00. In this simulation, a reduction in risk score was obtained 
from 0.6 to 0.17. The change in score indicates that stronger environmental 
institutionalism could be used to reduce the number of land-use conflicts in Peru. Thus, 
decision-makers need to consider socio-economic conditions, quality of state 
institutions, and proper implementation of policies to reduce conflicts, as other studies 
have also suggested (Arellano-Yanguas, 2010). 
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Scenario 2: Strong environmental institutionalism and community economy 
In this scenario, the risk index of Huasicancha was simulated under conditions of strong 
environmental institutionalism and a strong community economy. The risk score was 
0.21 (0.09 for CMD, 0.08 for GII and 0.04 for E) of 1.00. In this simulation, an increase in 
the risk score was from 0.17 to 0.21. The increase could be related to the possibility of 
a high income from farming activities and a diversified economy combined with lower 
expenses. This generates a higher profit for the families of the community, making the 
community land and resources more attractive for campesinos.  
 
Scenario 3: Environmental security 
In this scenario, the risk level of Huasicancha was simulated considering environmental 
security. The risk score was 0.32 (0.12 for SF, 0.20 for LU and 0.00 for W) of 1.00. In this 
simulation, an increase in risk level was from 0.21 to 0.32. However, this still represents 
a low risk for the development of a land-use conflict. It is worth mentioning that if the 
water criterion changes, the risk level will increase considerably. This fact was also 
corroborated by previous studies (Bebbington and Williams, 2008; Perreault, 2014; 
Preciado Jerónimo and Álvarez Gutiérrez, 2016). Environmental security, appropriately 
applied, could be used to reduce or manage land-use conflicts.  
 
Finally, in Figure 5-9 the scenarios are joined (Table 5-4 to Table 5-6) and the 
scores of the criteria values (Figure 5-6). The risk levels of these combinations also 
followed the trend of the scenarios. Thus, Huasicancha had the highest risk level in 
scenario 3 (i.e., 0.57), and lower risk levels in scenario 2 (i.e., 0.56) and scenario 1 (i.e., 
0.53).  
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Figure 5-9. Comparison of three scenarios for Huasicancha community 
 
5.4. Discussion 
The Land-use Conflict Risk Index (LUCRI) first required establishing a theoretical 
framework to join the identified indicators and criteria that drive conflicts. These 
indicators include biophysical, social, economic and institutional components. To reflect 
reality as closely as possible, the LUCRI indicators and criteria relied on an assessment 
by local stakeholders to obtain values and weighting. The use of a variety of indicators 
better reflects the complexity of the land-use conflict. Thus, LUCRI aims to support 
decision-makers in order to manage or prevent land-use conflicts.  
The simulation showed the possible changes in the risk level of a community 
under different contexts (see section 5.3.5). Mirroring previous studies (Arellano-
Yanguas, 2011a, 2010; Salas Carreño, 2008), the LUCRI shows that strong environmental 
state institutions and well-established dialogues between communities and mining 
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companies might reduce the level of conflict risk. To reach strong environmental 
institutionalism, the role of the government is crucial because the custodial rights of the 
resources are managed by the government on behalf of the citizens (Collier, 2010). In 
the case of Peru, the subsoil of Andean lands belongs to the Peruvian government, giving 
it the legal power to decide on its use (De Echave, 2018). However, due to the state 
capture by the private sector and allegations of corruption (Durand, 2016; Quiroz, 2013), 
the Peruvian government promotes mining over community livelihoods and local 
ecosystems (Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Gustafsson, 2018; Gustafsson and Scurrah, 
2019). Khodeli (2009) claims that if state institutions exert good governance for resource 
exploitation, then economic growth and poverty reduction can be reached in the 
country. However, in this study, it was found an indication of water and soil pollution 
(Chapter 3), weak environmental institutionalism (Chapter 4) and the need to improve 
community livelihoods. 
Land-use conflicts might be used to generate more inclusive politics, although 
the generated changes may not represent an actual improvement (Arellano-Yanguas, 
2012). The analysis of land-use conflict reveals certain conditions that might determine 
the effectiveness of any decision-making tool such as this risk index. These conditions 
can be the influence of political and economic interests of certain groups, allegations of 
corruption, citizen trust, use of the appointed budget, and varying flows of information 
among stakeholders (Conde, 2017; Gudynas, 2017; Li, 2017; Ormachea Choque et al., 
2014). Regarding these conditions, in Chapters 4 and Chapter 5, the conflict drivers 
within the indicators used to assess them via the risk index are revealed.  
Mining operations have fueled existing internal conflicts in the communities, 
thus weakening the community as an institution. However, this situation can also 
integrate the remaining community to negotiate better conditions (Burneo de la Rocha 
and Chaparro Ortiz de Zevallos, 2010). The LUCRI was designed to work directly with 
campesino communities that are currently influenced by mining activities because these 
communities become negotiators with mining companies and at the same time the main 
actor to trigger conflicts (Bebbington, 2007; Burneo de la Rocha and Chaparro Ortiz de 
Zevallos, 2010; Diez Hurtado, 2001).  
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Despite the complexity of land-use conflicts, the risk index aims to support the 
decision-making process and include all stakeholders. However, the LUCRI as a decision-
support tool cannot be used to make precise forecasts, but rather to provide a broad 
perspective of land-use conflicts based on local experience and target actions in areas 
where there is more room for conflict escalation or stakeholder engagement. Currently, 
land-use conflicts have called the attention of politicians, investors, civil society, 
research community, and society because of the consequences. During 2006 and 2018, 
there were 279 deaths and 4816 injuries due to mining-related conflicts (Ombudsman 
of Peru, 2018). Besides casualties, land-use conflicts affect the work of mining 
operations, the national and local economy, citizen trust in state institutions, and future 
mining investments (Basombrío et al., 2016; Conde, 2017).  
The building of the LUCRI has some limitations. An index could be considered 
an overgeneralized method with subjective judgments from the participants (Lezzaik et 
al., 2018), regardless of being based on an exhaustive theoretical framework and 
integrating extensive data. Another weakness of this index is that there is only one 
temporal instance of data collection. Mitchell et al. (1995) indicated that the index 
requires consistent and historical data to establish greater validity. Therefore, it is 
recommended for decision-makers to collect data annually in order to monitor mining-
influenced communities and prevent conflicts. However, this study was not suited for 
this purpose due to time and budget restrictions. Another limitation of this research 
regarding the risk index is that the study is based on eight communities and three mining 
companies in only one research area. A higher number of mining-affected communities 
and mining companies would bolster the indicators and criteria, including possibly the 
addition of new indicators. Lastly, not all stakeholders could participate (e.g., MINAM) 
in the criteria and indicator weighting exercise, despite efforts to gather all possible 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, the participation of the main stakeholders was successful 
(e.g., campesino communities, mining companies, MEM, ANA, and OEFA).  
As part of the validation of the risk index, the automatic PCA method could not 
fully capture the complexity of the land-use conflict. This is because the integration of 
common community data is crucial and not supported by the statistical method. Despite 
Land-use conflict risk index: Building and application in farming-mining lands of the 
Central Peruvian Andes  
129 
 
the mentioned drawbacks, the LUCRI has joined biophysical, socio-economic, and 
institutional components through the theoretical framework, the applied mixed-
methods approach, an additive aggregation model, and a weighted linear combination. 
It simulates the community most likely to suffer from an escalating land-use conflict. 
Although the index does not indicate when the conflict may occur, it helps to indicate 
both where it could take place and the potential root causes (e.g., indicators and criteria) 
of the conflict. The results indicate that the most frequent criteria with higher variable 
scores were water (W), soil fertility (SF) and community-mining dialogues (CMD). 
In the case of the water criterion (W), only Palaco and Llamapsillon 
communities highlighted the importance of water as the main criterion for conflict 
escalation. The reason could be based on the constant constraint of water sources on 
their lands. Previous studies have shown that communities are not only affected by 
water quality but also by its extraction for mining activities, which affects livelihoods and 
ecosystems (Bebbington and Williams, 2008; Budds, 2014; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011). In 
the case of open-pit mines, groundwater level and water fluxes are affected, despite 
denials from the mining companies (Li, 2017; Preciado Jerónimo, 2011). In the case of 
the soil fertility (SF) criterion, Chongos Alto, Llamapsillon and Palmayoc reported this as 
the main criterion of land-use conflicts. This could be related to their high dependence 
on livestock grazing, potentially limited by pasture production and soil pollution. 
Community-mining dialogues with communities, e.g., Antamina mine, have highlighted 
the necessity of clear communication for the negotiations and the management of land-
use conflicts. As was asserted by the consensus from Salas Carreño (2008), the lack of 
timely participation of expert groups to work with communities and clear 
communication are common mistakes that cause land-use conflicts. In addition, conflict 
prevention could be done through adequate protection by the government from 
extractivism, enhanced citizen trust to turn to this protection, and the willingness of all 
stakeholders to negotiate (Horowitz, 2009).  
Due to the aforementioned drawbacks, the LUCRI was validated by experts, 
who highlighted that the challenge of the index is the complexity of conflicts due to 
social and political contexts. As mentioned in the previous sections, the risk index could 
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not include these factors due to the necessity of a long-term study to analyze the 
emergence of new stakeholders and their interests during conflict escalation. 
Nevertheless, the LUCRI is the first risk index for land-use conflicts and has the potential 
to integrate more political and economic causal conflict factors in further studies. 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
This research demonstrates that mixed-methods can be integrated into a risk index to 
form a participatory and inclusive decision tool to improve the management and 
prevention of land-use conflicts. The risk index was calculated based on non-active 
conflict communities to analyze previous and typical community-mining relationships. 
In this way, the approach avoids the more likely emergence of new stakeholders in a 
context of active conflicts as well as ongoing personal interests. The results indicate 
which communities are more likely to experience land-use conflicts and which criterion 
is likely to be the driver. As the LUCRI is the first of its kind, it faces some limitations that 
could be tackled in further research.   
The proposed theoretical framework provides the necessary interdisciplinary 
approach for the risk index. By using quantitative and qualitative data, the plausible 
results help to validate the suitability of the index. In addition, the testing methodologies 
of automatic and expert index methodologies indicate that the LUCRI provides the 
added value of the experience and knowledge of stakeholders, strengthening the 
estimation of the risk level for conflicts. The validation of the risk index highlights that it 
can be considered a tool for decision-makers if it is later improved with respect to 
political, economic and social aspects. The development of the LUCRI focused on 
indicators that limit subjectivity as much as possible to avoid biased speculation. 
However, the experts recommended including more social and political indicators to 
provide a more accurate result. Therefore, the research concerning the assessment and 
simulation of land-use conflicts is still a work in progress. With further studies, this risk index 
could become a very useful tool for supporting local and national managers to make more 
informed decisions and progress towards reducing land-use conflicts. 
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6. SUMMARY, RESEARCH SYNTHESIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1. Summary  
Neoliberal policy, private investment, and high mining potential have promoted mining 
operations in the Andes, and this has affected campesino communities. The interactions 
between communities and mining companies have escalated into land-use conflicts. 
These conflicts arise due to the overlapping of mining concessions with community lands 
and headwaters, the misinformation around mining concessions and state institutions, 
mining impacts on water and soil, and the emergence of new stakeholders and personal 
interests. This research aimed to evaluate the environmental, social and institutional 
roots of land-use conflicts between the campesino community and mining companies in 
the Central Peruvian Andes. This integrated and interdisciplinary study was developed 
to measure key biophysical parameters, to assess the social and institutional aspects 
related to the management of water and soil, to integrate these components through a 
risk index, and to develop scenarios to analyze possible situations to prevent conflict 
escalation. At present, no studies exist that analyze land-use conflicts using an 
interdisciplinary approach and provide the integration of conflict drivers via a risk index. 
 
6.2. Main research findings  
6.2.1. Measurement of key biophysical parameters in campesino community 
farming-mining lands 
Based on data from three mining projects and fourteen campesino communities, the 
results of this study assessed the impacts of heavy metal concentrations on water and 
soil that are influenced by open-pit mines (RQ 3-1), and assessed their effects on 
community livelihoods (RQ 3-2). Mining impacts, in terms of heavy metal concentrations 
in soil and water, may continue to affect all communities, including those who have no 
agreements with mining companies.  
During the dry season of 2016, the heavy metal concentrations were assessed 
in (i) 24 indicative water samples from streams crossing the mining exploitation 
operations and community lands, and (ii) 12 soil samples at farms 12 km and 24 km away 
from mines. The results indicate that the concentrations of cadmium and arsenic in 
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water, and arsenic, cadmium, and chromium in soils exceeded the national 
environmental quality standards. In the water analysis, concentrations of arsenic and 
cadmium near mining operations also exceeded the national standards. In contrast with 
results from the Peruvian monitoring agency (i.e., OEFA) and those based solely on the 
local geochemistry (INGEMMET), the results highlight that there might be a relationship 
between the high concentrations of heavy metals and current mining operations due to 
the long-term mining exploitation of the region. However, further studies are needed in 
the area that can compare different sample points and seasons.  
Land-cover classification and participatory mapping of land uses were applied to 
compare water and soil analyses. The results indicate that mining activities affect 
community livelihoods, and that the livelihoods of a nearby community that does not 
have an agreement can still be affected by mining activities in terms of livestock grazing 
and watering.  
Further studies are recommended to explore the heavy metal concentrations 
and bioaccumulation in the research area. Finally, this interdisciplinary research has the 
potential to be used as a tool to assess both impacts on the environment and community 
livelihoods occurring at the intersection of mining and community interests.  
 
6.2.2. Assessment of social and institutional aspects related to the management of 
water and soil in the campesino community farming-mining lands 
This study investigated environmental institutionalism in mining-affected communities 
in the Central Peruvian Andes. The research carried out 273 surveys (semi-structured 
questionnaires) with campesino community members, 34 in-depth interviews and a 
social analysis workshop with key stakeholders. The analyses included statistics, social 
analysis, and content analysis.  
Based on the research questions, the results indicate that communities lacked 
the necessary information about their rights and the mandates and responsibilities of 
environment-related state institutions (RQ 4-1). In addition, the social analysis indicated 
that there is little or no involvement of the state institutions before conflict escalation 
(RQ 4-2). While the state institutions had some influence and legitimacy, they often 
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failed to cooperate, and their performance was undermined by the lack of human 
resources and equipment, creating a feeling of distrust within the communities. Because 
of the poor performance of environment-related state institutions, environmental 
degradation, particularly the pollution of vital water resources, was named as the most 
important reason for conflicts between campesino communities and mining companies.  
Besides environmental institutionalism, this study characterized the 
livelihoods and challenges of the communities. Since campesino families continue to 
depend on agriculture and livestock rearing for their livelihoods, mining employment 
does not have any significant impact on the income of most communities (RQ 4-3). 
Water access and pollution might not only affect domestic consumption but also 
irrigated agriculture and livestock production. For these reasons, water-related 
problems often result in conflicts. Thus, the breach of environmental and economic 
clauses of the agreements and the failure of decentralized state institutions to intervene 
with a coordinated effort often cause land-use conflicts to erupt (RQ 4-4). The findings 
show that the establishment and actual implementation of a policy framework 
facilitating the negotiations between campesino communities and mining projects are 
urgently needed. This must be coupled with efforts to strengthen the outreach and 
performance of state institutions at local and regional levels. Only through these 
measures is there hope for the improvement of the livelihoods of campesino 
communities and their relationship with mining companies.   
 
6.2.3. Integration and consolidation of biophysical, social and institutional 
components into a risk index 
The developed risk index can support decision-making in community-mining 
relationships. This research demonstrates that multi-criteria analysis, semi-structured 
questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and GIS methods can be integrated into a risk index 
to form a participatory and inclusive decision tool to improve the management and 
prevention of land-use conflicts. The applied mixed-methods allowed obtaining 
interdisciplinary data that disclosed the socio-environmental factors that may set off a 
conflict in the region. The LUCRI index and its theoretical framework allowed the 
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biophysical, socio-economic, and institutional components to be integrated in the risk 
index (RQ 5-1). The LUCRI reflects reality by using in-situ collected data from 
stakeholders and mining-influenced communities. The index is also based on non-active 
conflict communities analyzing the previous and typical community-mining relations 
thereby avoiding the potential emergence of new stakeholders (i.e., social instigators) 
and high influence of personal interests.  
The proposed theoretical framework incorporates stakeholder perspectives 
using indicators and criteria, the integration of which is recognized as the most 
challenging aspect of building an index. Long-term data and a socio-political approach 
to determine the criteria and indicators were perceived by experts as the main 
challenges for the risk index. Due to the challenge of integration, two validations of the 
index were conducted. First, the comparison of the automatic index (using PCA) with the 
expert-based index (LUCRI) demonstrated the superior methodology. The results of this 
research show that an expert-based index is recommended due to the complexity of 
conflicts. The comparison of both indexes indicates that the LUCRI provided the added 
value of experience and knowledge of stakeholders, thus providing a stronger 
estimation of the risk level for conflicts.  
Secondly, the validation by experts indicated that the LUCRI can be considered 
a tool for decision-makers. With the inclusion of an in-depth analysis of the political and 
social aspects of the local and national context, the LUCRI could become very useful in 
this sense.  
 
6.2.4. Development of scenarios to simulate the conflicts between campesino 
communities and mining companies  
The LUCRI indicates how likely a community is to become engaged in a conflict and which 
criterion is the driver for this likelihood. In the research area, the risk level of the case 
study communities was assessed with the LUCRI, and Huasicancha community was seen 
to have the highest score (0.6/1.0). Next, the weights of the Huasicancha indicators were 
used to simulate three different scenarios generated based on the recommendations of 
the epistemic community (RQ 5-2). The simulation of the three scenarios aimed to show 
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how the risk level of the community with the highest risk could be reduced if 
environmental institutionalism, community economy, and environmental security were 
strengthened.  
The LUCRI as a decision-support tool cannot be used to make precise forecasts 
but rather to provide a broad view of possible land-use conflicts based on local 
experience and target indicators. The scenarios reveal three main take-home messages. 
First, decision-makers need to consider the previous and current socio-economic 
conditions, the quality of state institutions, and the proper implementation of policies 
for better conflict management. Second, a high family livestock-dependent income and 
the diversification of the economy in the community make its lands more attractive for 
its inhabitants, generating a high probability of mining resistance and conflict escalation. 
Third, an appropriately applied increased environmental security could be used to 
reduce the number of land-use conflicts in Peru. 
Although the LUCRI aimed to reflect and simulate different scenarios, it still 
needs further studies on the inclusion of political and social indicators. Thus, further 
inter- and transdisciplinary research is required to improve the index. For instance, it 
was not considered adding political aspects since the index is only applied for 
communities in a closed area, whereas the national political aspects tend to be the same 
for the whole country. Despite the uniqueness of each community, social aspects also 
showed similarities because of the shared history in the research area. However, it is 
recommended to expand the creation of this kind of risk index to other communities in 
Peru or elsewhere in Latin America to improve its prediction quality and ultimately give 
a truer view of land-use conflicts.  
 
6.3. Conclusions and recommendations 
The results of this interdisciplinary research indicate the influence of mining operations 
on community lands at the environmental, social and institutional levels. As there was 
no active conflict in the study area, the observed situation was taken as a good reflection 
of the status quo of the implementation of environmental reforms at the regional level.  
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The assessment of the biophysical factors allowed an analysis of the 
environmental root causes of land-use conflicts, and water and soil pollution by mining 
operations are regarded as the main roots of conflict escalation. The identification of 
this conflict driver was based on the geological, the historical and the newly assessed 
heavy metal concentrations in water and soil on community lands. Although this 
research was designed to only indicate heavy metal concentrations, it provides a 
baseline for future studies since it was the first of its kind in the research area. However, 
not only should environmental root causes be seen as the main conflict drivers but also 
relevant economic factors. Furthermore, communities sometimes see the mining 
company as an opportunity for acquiring economic benefits. The socio-economic 
conflict driver was thus analyzed once the available agreements of communities and 
mining companies were disclosed. The community livelihoods were then analyzed, 
where it could be seen that there is still a strong livestock dependence.  
On the other hand, as in the case with the socio-economic and environmental 
drivers, understanding environmental institutionalism has become a key to better 
assessing the likelihood of conflicts, despite environmental reforms. In this study, all 
state institutions were analyzed that can interact with communities and companies 
before or during a land-use conflict. The results of the study show that environmental 
institutionalism is weak. However, it must be understood that this is in constant flux and 
strengthening could improve from one government to another.  
  The building and validation of the risk index were key to interpreting different 
scenarios. Data collection from community members and stakeholders and the 
validation by experts formed the overarching research steps involving the index. Both 
processes allow identifying the challenges of building a risk index that could be useful 
for decision-making. With further studies, the index could become a very useful tool for 
supporting local and national managers in making informed decisions and progress 
towards conflict prevention. 
Regarding the limitations, it was found that the time allocated for fieldwork 
was not adequate for an in-depth analysis in each community. While other studies 
focused their research on one or three communities, this study analyzed 14 
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communities, which reduced the time spent in each. Time constraint was another 
challenge for obtaining a more in-depth analysis of the social composition and work of 
the communities. Another limitation was water/soil sampling due to the location of 
water origins in mining areas and the forbidden areas due to the territorial conflict 
between Huasicancha and Chongos Alto. Furthermore, the budget for water/soil 
sampling was capped due to the high price of water/soil analysis in an accredited 
laboratory, reducing the number of analyzed samples. Another difficulty was gathering 
all the representatives of state institutions and communities due to their institutional 
budget or commitments (e.g., community elections). Lastly, the complexity of conflicts 
can be seen as a limitation since it is not possible to include all conflict-triggering 
indicators.   
Further studies need to consider a longer period of research per community in 
order to better describe their social contexts. Studies aimed at better capturing the 
environmental drivers should consider increasing the number of soil/water samples and 
the repetitions of sampling in order to identify heavy metal concentrations during the 
operation of the mining concentrator plant and rainy periods. In addition, an in-depth 
analysis of the social and political context in the risk index would be useful in order to 
improve it as a decision support tool.  
Finally, this research contributes to the understanding of land-use conflicts 
from a local to a national perspective in Peru. As a country with a strong policy for 
extractivism, land-use conflicts require more structured, interdisciplinary and realistic 
approaches to research that can promote strong environmental institutionalism and 
better relationships with campesino communities.  
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8. APPENDICES  
8.1. Guidelines of an in-depth interview to mining and community representatives  
To mining projects: 
 Which are the campesino communities directly and indirectly affected by the 
mining project? 
 Which campesino communities have or had a mining-community agreement with 
the mining project? 
 Which are the disagreements or conflicts within the community and with the 
mining project? 
 Could you explain the process (negotiation) from the first contact to the signing 
of the agreement? 
 Which are the main difficulties to establish dialogues that lead to the negotiation 
of the agreement? 
 How was the frequency before and after signing the agreement? 
 How is the renewal of the mining-community agreement? 
 How has the relationship evolved between the mining project and the campesino 
community from the first contact up to now? 
 Which are the main reasons to trigger a land-use conflict? 
 What are the main reasons for breaching the mining-community agreement? 
 
To campesino communities: 
 Has your community had any contact with the mining project? If so, when and 
how was the first contact with the mining project? 
 Has your community ever been contacted by another mining project? If so, how 
was this experience? 
 How was the negotiation that led to signing the agreement? 
 How and why did your community accept signing a mining-community 
agreement?  
 Which are the clauses of the agreement?  
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 Has your community changed after signing the agreement? If so, which are these 
changes? 
 Is your community satisfied with the accomplishment of the agreement? 
 Has the mining-community agreement been completely accomplished? 
 What are the main reasons for breaching the mining-community agreement? 
 Which are the main reasons to trigger a land-use conflict? 
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8.2. Heavy metal concentrations in water and soil analyzed during this research and by state institutions 
Table 8-1. Total metal concentrations (mg L-1) in water samples evaluated by OEFA in Aimaraes sub-basin. Values exceeding EQS are in 
bold. 
Year ID pH Pb Cu Zn As Hg Cr Cd Ni Fe Mn 
2010 
 
sw02_10 4.59 <0.005 0.219 0.279 0.529 <0.0001 0.007 0.009 0.036 36.12 0.400 
sw04_10 5.34 <0.005 0.036 0.07 0.019 <0.0001 0.002 0.0008 0.009 4.309 0.072 
sw05_10 8.27 <0.005 <0.001 <0.001 0.008 <0.0001 <0.001 <0.0007 <0.002 0.148 0.033 
sw06_10 9.37 0.022 0.002 0.007 0.009 <0.0001 <0.001 <0.0007 <0.002 0.079 0.006 
sw09_10 8.14 <0.005 0.002 <0.001 0.007 <0.0001 <0.001 <0.0007 <0.002 0.044 0.045 
sw10_10 4.36 <0.005 0.034 0.154 <0.005 <0.0001 0.002 0.0016 0.022 4.096 0.400 
sw14_10 4.96 <0.005 0.038 0.184 0.006 <0.0001 <0.001 0.0013 0.018 0.440 1.148 
 
2012 
BW07_12 7.0 0.0008 0.0004 0.009 0.0009 <0.0001 <0.0005 - <0.0004 - 0.0093 
sw10_12 4.3 0.0124 0.0534 0.0974 0.0356 <0.0001 0.0018 - 0.0117 - 0.378 
MA08_12 3.0 0.0209 0.0874 0.1494 0.0503 <0.0001 0.0037 - 0.0205 - 0.1072 
MA02_12 8.4 <0.0002 0.0002 0.0042 0.0007 <0.0001 <0.0005 - <0.0004 - 0.0056 
EBMI_12 4.2 0.0022 0.3256 1.0173 0.0068 - - - - - - 
 
2013 
 
sw04_13 3.16 <0.010 0.0085 <0.14 0.0222 <0.0003 - <0.0024 - 4.377 0.0911 
sw10_13 3.16 <0.010 0.0968 0.24 0.0949 <0.0003 - 0.003 - 16.5 0.896 
sw20_13 3.32 <0.010 0.1046 0.26 0.0936 <0.0003 - 0.0038 - 16.6 0.8772 
Sw01_13 3.09 <0.010 0.1137 0.23 0.0492 <0.0003 - <0.0024 - 25.851 1.3723 
sw19_13 3.11 <0.010 0.131 0.21 0.0206 <0.0003 - <0.0024 - 18.5 1.3533 
Based on OEFA reports (OEFA, 2014b, 2014c, 2012). 
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Table 8-2. Total metal concentrations (mg L-1) in water samples evaluated by OEFA in 2013 in Cunas sub-basin 
Code pH Pb Cu Zn As Hg Cr Cd Fe Mn 
vi01 8.18 <0.001 0.0135 0.779 0.23 <1 <0.010 0.01 - - 
e02 8.07 0.009 <0.0083 0.196 13.43 <1 <0.010 <0.0004 - - 
e01 8.24 <0.001 0.0092 0.197 2.977 <0.00003 - <0.0004 0.1232 18.11 
e05 8.22 <0.001 0.0117 0.082 0.050 <0.00003 - <0.0004 0.3218 0.0479 
pcp01 7.96 <0.001 0.0111 1.057 0.333 <0.00003 - 0.0016 0.5555 2.288 
esp01 8.00 <0.001 0.0101 0.077 0.088 <0.00003 - <0.0004 0.1744 0.0307 
e04 8.31 <0.001 0.0078 0.044 <0.008 <0.00003 - <0.0004 0.0989 0.1464 
hv01 8.27 0.009 0.0106 0.088 0.139 0.0007 - <0.0004 0.3655 0.0897 
esp01_14 8.02 <0.001 0.0105 0.088 0.102 0.0008 - 0.0012 0.5415 0.0504 
esp02_14 7.92 <0.001 0.0108 0.279 2.97 0.001 - 0.0016 0.1175 19.82 
Based on OEFA (OEFA, 2014a, 2013a). 
 
Table 8-3. Concentration (mg L-1) of total metals in water samples in this research in Cunas sub-basin 
 Code pH As Cd Ni Hg Pb Cu Fe Mn Zn 
Control 1 I-N 9.68 0.017 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. <0,004 0.033 0.0055 0.004 
2 I-N 0.015 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. <0,004 0.031 0.0055 0.004 
1 P-N 8.07 <0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. 0.005 0.006 <0,0003 <0,003 
2 P-N <0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. 0.005 0.012 <0,0003 0.004 
Cases 1 B-AM 8.31 0.089 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. 0.005 0.111 0.025 0.007 
2 B-AM 0.094 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. 0.006 0.112 0.026 0.009 
1 A-AM 7.78 0.56 0.023 0.019 <0,010 <0,028 0.008 0.926 18.505 12.34 
2 A-AM 0.562 0.022 0.019 <0,010 <0,028 0.007 0.913 18.735 12.47 
1 B-UC 9.7 0.016 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. <0,004 0.032 0.0103 0.007 
2 B-UC 0.017 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. <0,004 0.031 0.0065 <0,003 
1 A-UC 9.37 0.011 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. <0,004 0.022 0.0065 <0,003 
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2 A-UC 0.016 N.D. N.D. <0,010 N.D. <0,004 0.025 0.006 0.009 
N.D. < Detection limit in mg L-1: Cd (0.002), Cu (0,001), Cr (0,002), Ni (0,004) and Pb (0,009) 
 
Table 8-4. Total metal concentrations (mg L-1) in water samples in this research in Aimaraes sub-basin 
  Code pH As Cd Ni Hg Cu Fe Mn Zn 
Control 
1 L-S 
10.9 
<0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 <0,004 0.029 0.006 0.004 
2 L-S 0.011 N.D. N.D. <0,01 <0,004 0.056 0.006 <0.003 
1 I-L 
9.5 
<0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 0.007 0.260 0.015 0.006 
2 I-L <0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 0.017 0.273 0.016 0.008 
Cases 
1 A-CM 
9.18 
<0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 <0,004 0.017 <0,0003 0.004 
2 A-CM <0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 0.005 0.018 0,0035 0.007 
1 B-HM 
5.4 
<0.010 0.006 <0,013 <0,01 0.071 50.020 2.140 0.102 
2 B-HM <0.010 0.006 <0,013 <0,01 0.072 52.000 2.134 0.097 
1 A-HM 
9.9 
<0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 <0,004 0.032 <0,0003 <0,003 
2 A-HM <0.010 <0,005 N.D. <0,01 <0,004 0.028 <0,0003 <0,003 
1 A-CA-S 
9.83 
<0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 <0,004 0.023 0.005 0.004 
2 A-CA-S <0.010 N.D. N.D. <0,01 <0,004 0.046 0.008 0.006 
N.D. < Detection limit in mg L-1: Cd (0.002), Cu (0,001), Cr (0,002), Ni (0,004) and Pb (0,009) 
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Table 8-5. Environmental Quality Standards (EQS) (mg L−1) established by the Peruvian 
Ministry of Environment in 2017. 
Category (C) Use As Cd Hg Cr Pb Cu Fe Mn Zn 
C3: Farming 
activities 
Irrigation 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.1 0.05 0.2 5 0.2 2 
Livestock 
drinking 
0.2 0.05 0.01 1 0.05 0.5 n/a 0.2 24 
C4: 
Conservation of 
aquatic life 
Andean 
rivers 
0.15 0.00025 0.0001 0.011 0.0025 0.1 n/a n/a 0.12 
 
8.3. Code for topographic correction of DEM in RStudio 
####### libraries ######## 
library(raster) 
library(RStoolbox) 
 
####### inputs ######## 
input_image <- "S:/Data/inputs/Mosaic06686918S.tif" 
input_dem <- "S:/Data/inputs/srtm_21_15_pro_clip.tif" 
input_metadata <- 
"S:/Data/inputs/LC08_L1TP_006069_20170722_20170728_01_T1_MTL.txt" 
output_folder <- "S:/Data/outputs" 
 
####### reading data ######## 
sta.file <- stack(input_image) 
elevation <- raster(input_dem) 
extent(elevation) <- extent(sta.file) 
meta.info <- readMeta(input_metadata) 
 
####### processing ########  
sta.output <- list() 
for(i in 1:nlayers(sta.file)){ 
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  x <- 
topCor(img=sta.file[[i]],dem=elevation,metaData=meta.info,method="minnaert",stratI
mg = "slope") 
  sta.output[[i]] <- x 
} 
sta.output <- stack(sta.output) 
#save 
output.name <- paste0(output_folder,"/img_corrrected.tif") 
writeRaster(sta.output,output.name,overwrite=T) 
 
8.4. Code for recode land cover classification 
This script intends to recode a categorical raster 𝑹𝒄𝒂𝒕 with a polygon-based shapefile 
𝑺𝒑𝒐𝒍 with a target_column and recode_column on its attribute table. The name 
specified in target_column of 𝑺𝒑𝒐𝒍 is used to filter values in 𝑹𝒄𝒂𝒕 and overwrite them 
with those indicated in recode_column. 
############### libraries ############# 
library(raster) 
library(gdalUtils) 
library(rgdal) 
 
############### inputs ############# 
classification_filename="D:/Data/mel/class_20180621cat2.tif" 
recoding_shapefile="D:/Data/mel/recla_FIX.shp" 
target_column="tar" 
recode_column="rec" 
overwrite=F 
 
############### reading data ############# 
#start routines 
if(!file.exists(recoding_shapefile)){ 
  stop("'recoding_shapefile' do not exists") 
} 
if(!file.exists(classification_filename)){ 
  stop("'classification_filename' do not exists") 
} 
#open shapefile 
recod.shp <- shapefile(recoding_shapefile) 
if(recod.shp@proj4string@projargs!=raster(classification_filename)@crs@projargs){ 
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  stop("shapefile do not have the same projection system as classification") 
} 
recod.lyr <- unlist(strsplit(basename(recoding_shapefile),"[.]"))[1] 
#open classification 
class.ras <- raster(classification_filename) 
#folders 
temp.folder <- 
paste0(dirname(classification_filename),"/temp");dir.create(temp.folder,showWarning
s=F) 
if(length(list.files(temp.folder))!=0){ 
  unlink(list.files(temp.folder,full.names=T),recursive=T,force=T) 
} 
 
############### processing ############### 
#info needed 
ras.res <- res(class.ras) 
ras.ext <- extent(class.ras) 
ras.ext <- c(ras.ext@xmin,ras.ext@ymin,ras.ext@xmax,ras.ext@ymax) 
#prepare shapefiles 
tar.ras <- paste0(temp.folder,"/temp_tar.tif") 
rec.ras <- paste0(temp.folder,"/temp_rec.tif") 
#target raster 
gdal_rasterize(src_datasource=recoding_shapefile, 
               dst_filename=tar.ras, 
               te=ras.ext, 
               tr=ras.res, 
               a=target_column, 
               l=recod.lyr, 
               ot="Byte") 
#recode raster 
gdal_rasterize(src_datasource=recoding_shapefile, 
               dst_filename=rec.ras, 
               te=ras.ext, 
               tr=ras.res, 
               a=recode_column, 
               l=recod.lyr, 
               ot="Byte") 
 
#input values 
class.val <- values(class.ras) 
class.val[is.na(class.val)] <- 0 
#modifying values 
tar.val <- values(raster(tar.ras)) 
rec.val <- values(raster(rec.ras)) 
#recode 
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class.val[class.val==tar.val] <- rec.val[class.val==tar.val] 
class.val[class.val==0] <- NA 
values(class.ras) <- class.val 
 
############### save ############### 
if(overwrite){ 
  output.name <- classification_filename 
  writeRaster(class.ras,output.name,overwrite=T) 
}else{ 
  output.name <- 
paste0(dirname(classification_filename),"/recoded_",basename(classification_filename
)) 
  writeRaster(class.ras,output.name,overwrite=T) 
} 
#clean 
unlink(temp.folder,recursive=T,force=T) 
 
 
8.5. Validation of risk index 
The following subsections were provided to an expert panel for validation of the 
developed risk index.  
 
8.5.1. Land-use conflict 
Definición: Los conflictos por uso de tierra son generados por el cambio de uso de 
agricultura y/o ganadería hacia minería, afectando los medios de subsistencia 
tradicionales (Hilson, 2002). Estos conflictos son la respuesta de las comunidades ante 
las amenazas de sus ecosistemas y medios de subsistencia (contaminación de agua y 
suelo)  (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Li, 2009; McDonell, 2015). 
 
8.5.2. Descripción de las comunidades 
A pesar del avance en proveer servicios públicos a las comunidades, la pobreza y 
marginalidad ha aumentado así como la probabilidad de conflictos (Haslam and 
Tanimoune, 2016). Por otro lado, las comunidades enfrentan problemas relacionados a 
los eventos climáticos (ej. sequía) que afectan las oportunidades agrarias, 
incrementando la presión sobre la tierra y conflictos por su uso (Haslam and Tanimoune, 
2016; Urrutia, 2003). 
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Figure 8-1. Ubicación de minas y comunidades campesinas con total de comuneros 
activos (2016) en sub-cuencas de Aimaraes y Cunas. 
Comunidades estudiadas en el índice de riesgo estuvieron vinculadas con 
minería fueron resaltadas en rojo.  
 
Nuestro estudio incluyó 8 comunidades campesinas de la región Junín. Table 
8-6 presenta una descripción de las comunidades, basada en el trabajo de campo 2016-
2017.  
Table 8-6. Descripción de comunidades 
Distrito Comun. Descripción 
San José 
de 
Quero 
San 
Pedro de 
Sulcan 
Formado por 25 comuneros activos.  
Depende de las lluvias para la agricultura de autoconsumo. Sin embargo, tiene 
dificultades en acceso de tierra y agua.  
Es un vecino colindante de la mina Azulcocha pero desconocen sobre las 
implicancias de las actividades de la misma. No tiene un convenio con la mina 
Azulcocha.   
Usibam-
ba 
Formado por 238 comuneros activos.  
Su economía se basa en ganadería y productos lácteos. Realiza agricultura a 
través de irrigación y lluvias. 
Es un vecino colindante de la mina Azulcocha pero no quieren tener un 
convenio con la mina.  
San Juan 
de Jarpa  
Shicuy 
 
Formado por 75 comuneros activos.  
Ganadería (usa el 80% de su territorio) y agricultura (usa el 20% de su 
territorio) son sus principales actividades económicas. Tiene un convenio 
activo con la mina Azulcocha desde 2016. 
Huasi-
cancha  
Huasi-
cancha  
 
 
Formado por 251 comuneros activos.  
Ganadería y agricultura son sus principales actividades económicas. Depende 
de las lluvias para la agricultura de autoconsumo. 
Renta tierras al proyecto minero Huacravilca, mediante un convenio. 
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Huasicancha y Palaco (y comunidades pertenecientes al distrito Chongos Alto) 
tienen un conflicto latente por un territorio (10 mil ha), el cual se renta 
actualmente a Huacravilca.  
Chongos 
Alto  
Chongos 
Alto 
 
Formado por 108 comuneros activos.  
Depende de la ganadería y agricultura, aunque la última es afectada por la falta 
de sistema de irrigación apropiado y eventos climáticos (granizo, heladas). 
Presentan precarias carreteras que acceden a la comunidad.  
Antes del 2015, se beneficiaba de la mina Corihuarmi, sin embargo, el convenio 
se canceló hasta la fecha.  
Palma-
yoc 
 
Formado por 22 comuneros activos.  
Ganadería y agricultura son sus principales actividades económicas que son 
afectadas por los eventos climáticos.  
Cercanía a la mina Corihuarmi. 
Palaco Formado por 23 comuneros activos.  
Ganadería y agricultura son sus principales actividades económicas que son 
afectadas por los eventos climáticos.  
Comuneros se quejan sobre la falta de apoyo por parte de MINAGRI. 
Cercanía a la mina Corihuarmi y proyecto Huacravilca. 
Llamapsi-
llon 
 
Formado por 55 comuneros activos.  
Ganadería y agricultura son sus principales actividades económicas que son 
afectadas por los eventos climáticos y la reducción de pastos para ganado. 
Falta de apoyo por parte de MINAGRI para ganadería. 
Cercanía a la mina Corihuarmi. 
 
8.5.3. Índice de riesgo de conflictos por uso de la tierra  
Table 8-7 se presenta a los indicadores y sus criterios obtenidos de un análisis de 
contenido de las entrevistas realizadas a los grupos de interés que se involucrarían en 
un conflicto por uso de tierra. Con la finalidad de evitar la influencia de actores 
oportunistas y de nuevos intereses que desencadenen un probable conflicto, la presente 
investigación se realizó en comunidades que actualmente no están en un conflicto activo 
con las compañías mineras. 
Table 8-7. Descripción de indicadores usados en el índice 
Criterio (k) Indicador (i) Descripción para la obtención de valores 
Agua (W) Sequía La sequía es un problema constante para ganadería y agricultura.  
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (1=Hay 
problema por sequía, 0=no hay dicho problema) 
W_acceso Conocimiento de acceso a fuentes de agua por familia. 
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (1= Hay 
problema por acceso a agua, 0=no hay dicho problema). 
W_disponibilidad Conocimiento de disponibilidad de agua por familia. 
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (1= Hay 
problema por disponibilidad de agua, 0=no hay dicho problema). 
W_calidad 
 
Conocimiento de calidad de agua por familia. 
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (1= Hay 
problema por calidad de agua, 0=no hay dicho problema). 
M_actividad Actividad minera de la mina o proyecto minero (ej. Exploración, 
explotación). 
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Fue obtenido a través de entrevistas y data secundaria.  
F_ausencia Ausencia de trucha en los ríos en comunidades. 
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (1= 
Ausencia de truchas en ríos, 0=presencia de truchas en ríos). 
Suelo (SF)  Compost Uso de compost para cultivos. 
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (1= Uso 
de compost, 0=no uso de compost). 
C_productos Los productos agrícolas fueron clasificados según su uso. 
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (0= No 
cultivos ni pastos, 1= pastos, 2=cultivos como tubérculos). 
C_producción Producción anual de su cultivo principal reportado durante el 
cuestionario semi-estructurado (en kg).  
S_calidad Calidad del suelo en base a la concentración de un metal (en este 
caso Cadmio). Fue obtenido a través de la interpolación (ArcGis) de 
las concentraciones de Cd reportados por INGEMMET.  
Uso de tierra 
(LU) 
 
Com_area Área total por comunidad (m2) que fue estimado mediante la 
georreferenciación y elaboración del mapa de la comunidad 
(ArcGis, entrevista y data secundaria del gobierno). 
Pastoreo_area Área para pastoreo por comunidad (m2) que fue estimado 
mediante la clasificación de cobertura de suelo de imágenes 
satelitales Landsat. 
Pastoreo_ganadería Cada entrevistado manifestó si realiza pastoreo de su ganado. 
Fue obtenido a través del cuestionario semi-estructurado (1= 
realiza pastoreo, 2=No realiza pastoreo). 
Dialogo 
Comunidad-
Minería 
(CMD) 
N_diálogos Número de diálogos realizados entre la comunidad y la compañía 
minera hasta el momento del cuestionario.  
Fue reportado durante el cuestionario semi-estructurado, y 
entrevistas a grupos de interés. 
Tiempo_reunión Estimación del tiempo (en años) desde la primera reunión que se 
llevó a cabo entre la comunidad y la compañía minera.  
Fue reportado durante el cuestionario semi-estructurado, y 
entrevistas a grupos de interés. 
Relación El tipo de relación entre la comunidad y la compañía minera fue 
categorizado desde un accidente ambiental (1) hasta conflicto (9).  
Fue reportado durante el cuestionario semi-estructurado, y 
entrevistas a grupos de interés. 
SE_beneficios Nivel de los beneficios socio-económicos percibidos por la 
comunidad y brindados por la compañía minera (1=solo en fiestas 
de comunidad, 2=ayuda en pequeños proyectos comunales, 
3=convenio entre la mina y la comunidad). 
Involucra-
miento de 
instituciones 
estatales (GII) 
 
Instituciones El nivel de conocimiento de la comunidad sobre las instituciones 
del gobierno (e.g. OEFA, ANA). 
Fue reportado durante el cuestionario semi-estructurado 
(1=conoce solo al gobierno distrital/provincial, 2=conoce a 2 
instituciones, 3=conoce a más de 3 instituciones). 
Distancia Distancia (en km) desde el local comunal hasta Huancayo.  
Basado en la data proveída por el Ministerio de Transporte y 
comunicaciones.  
Altitud Altura (msnm) de cada comunal. 
Fue obtenido a través de la medición por GPS en el local comunal.  
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Carretera_acceso Condición de las vías de acceso para la comunidad (0=trochas, 
1=pistas asfaltadas, 2=pistas asfaltadas y trochas). 
Obtenido a través de la observación en trabajo de campo. 
 Economía (E) Ingreso Ingreso familiar mensual (PEN) reportado por el entrevistado. 
Gastos Gasto familiar mensual (PEN) reportado por el entrevistado. 
M_retribución Retribución anual (PEN) de la mina para la comunidad que fue 
acordado en el convenio. Reportado en cuestionarios y entrevistas 
a grupos de interés.  
 
El índice de riesgo se basó en el modelo de agregación aditiva (Choo and 
Wedley, 2008) y combinación linear  ponderado (Malczewski and Rinner, 2015). 
Ecuación 1 indica los componentes del índice de riesgo RI.  
 
RI 𝐶𝑜𝑚 = (𝑉𝑊)(𝑊)𝑊 + (𝑉𝑆𝐹)(𝑊)𝑆𝐹 + (𝑉𝐿𝑈)(𝑊 )𝐿𝑈 + (𝑉𝐶𝑀𝐷)(𝑊 )𝐶𝑀𝐷
+ (𝑉𝐺𝐼𝐼)(𝑊)𝐺𝐼𝐼 + (𝑉𝐸)(𝑊 )𝐸 
 
Ecuación 1. Índice de riesgo de conflicto de uso de tierra 
Donde: 
RI 𝐶𝑜𝑚 es el índice de riesgo de conflicto de uso de tierra por comunidad 
𝑉𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 es el valor total del criterio estimado por comunidad 
𝑊𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 es el peso total del criterio estimado por comunidad 
 
Los valores totales obtenidos en cada criterio (k) (ver table 2) fueron 
reemplazados en la ecuación del índice de riesgo (RI). Los pesos de cada indicador (i) 
fueron obtenidos por la calificación de los entrevistados comuneros activos. Los pesos 
totales de los criterios (k) fueron obtenidos de la calificación de los grupos de interés. 
 
La Table 8-8 muestra el puntaje obtenido por cada criterio (k) y el índice de 
riesgo (RI) resultante. Como se observa, Huasicancha and Palaco se encuentra en el 
límite de riesgo moderado a desarrollar un conflicto. La escala del índice va de 0 (muy 
bajo nivel de riesgo) a 1 (máximo nivel de riesgo).  
Table 8-8. Índice de riesgo por comunidad 
Comunidad SF LU CMD W GII E RI 
Sulcan 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.31 
Usibamba 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.26 
Shicuy 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.39 
Chongos Alto 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.39 
Palmayoc 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.32 
Huasicancha 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.60 
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Palaco 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.18 0.05 0.004 0.52 
Llamapsillon 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.004 0.34 
 
8.5.4. Questionnaire applied to experts 
Based on (Bockstaller and Girardin, 2003; Mitchell et al., 1995), the following 
questionnaire was established to assess the validation via an expert panel. This expert 
validation aimed to assure the credibility of the developed risk index.  
En base a la información brindada, por favor brinde Usted su opinión con respecto al 
diseño, resultados y uso:  
 
Diseño:  
Basado en el análisis de contenido de entrevistas, se ha desarrollado el índice de riesgo 
considerando 24 indicadores organizados en 6 criterios. El índice de riesgo se enfoca en 
los datos obtenidos directamente del actor principal que desarrolla el conflicto, es decir, 
las comunidades. 
Basado en lo mencionado, ¿Haría Usted alguna modificación al presente índice? Si es así, 
indique dichas modificaciones. 
Resultados: 
¿Considera que este índice de riesgo informa la realidad? ¿Es realista el resultado que se 
obtiene? 
 
Uso 
¿Podría este índice de riesgo ser útil para la toma de decisiones?  
¿Usted utilizaría este índice de riesgo? 
¿Cuál sería la probabilidad y las razones de refutación de este índice de riesgo (0 al 100)? 
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